Serious Eats:27 minutesThe Science of the Best Fresh PastaFresh pasta is easy to make and worth the effort. Photographs:
Vicky Wasik, unless otherwise noted Guess what? If you have
flour in your kitchen, you can make pasta. Right now. Got eggs,
too? You have everything you need to whip up a batch of
silky-smooth fettuccine.
Boston Review:29 minutesHating MotherhoodIn the early 1970s, a woman moved into my Brooklyn commune. She
was older than us, in her thirties, relocating from the Midwest
after breaking up with her husband. She stuck to herself; we
figured she was getting over the divorce. Then one night in the
kitchen, she opened up to a few of us.
thenewinquiry.com:16 minutesOn Heteropessimism“Heterosexuality always embarrasses me,” Maggie Nelson admits
in The Argonauts, a book once so rabidly popular among women and
queers that my first copy was swiped from my bag at a dyke bar
in 2016.
Vanity Fair:41 minutesThe Case of the Vanishing BlondeFrom the start, it was a bad case. A battered 21-year-old woman
with long blond curls was discovered facedown in the weeds,
naked, at the western edge of Miami, where the neat grid of
outer suburbia butts up against the high grass and black mud of
the Everglades.
The New Yorker:12 minutesWhat It Felt Like When “Cat Person” Went ViralIn the fall of 2017, I was finishing up lunch at a Noodles
& Company in Ann Arbor, Michigan, when I saw that I’d missed
a call from a 212 area code. I thought, I bet my story just got
into The New Yorker.
The New York Times:22 minutesAs Facebook Raised a Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tech
GiantsFor years, Facebook gave some of the world’s largest technology
companies more intrusive access to users’ personal data than it
has disclosed, effectively exempting those business partners
from its usual privacy rules, according to internal records and
interviews.
putanumonit.com:24 minutesPolyamory is Rational(ist)“The Rationalist community isn’t just a sex cult,” quoth Diana
Fleischman in a new book about Rationalists, “they do other
great things too!” When I read that I asked my friends if there
are any cultish sex parties I’m not being invited to; they all
assured me that they’re not having
placesjournal.org:39 minutesSmart Cities: Buggy and BrittleCalafia Café in Palo Alto is one of the smartest eateries in
the world. With Google’s former executive chef Charlie Ayers at
the helm, the food here isn’t just for sustenance. This is
California—eating is also a
path to self-improvement.
WIRED:52 minutesDr. Elon & Mr. Musk: Life Inside Tesla’s Production HellThe young Tesla engineer was excited. Ecstatic, in fact. It was
a Saturday in October 2017, and he was working at the
Gigafactory, Tesla’s enormous battery manufacturing plant in
Nevada. Over the previous year, he had been living out of a
suitcase, putting in 13-hour days, seven days a week.
The New Yorker:35 minutesPaging Dr. RobotWhen Pier Giulianotti was a medical student, he hated the
sight of blood. In the mid-seventies, he travelled from his
native Italy to Spain, on a fellowship, and watched a lung
resection. “I nearly fainted,” he recalled recently. “I had to
sit down in the corner.
✾ WaldenPond.press ✾
Tuesday 17 May 2022 ✾
Ben Doherty ✾
1 minute read ✾
Hi,
I don't drink Corona beer (because I've got a sodastream so I can make
my own fizzy water whenever I like) but their marketing line "from where you'd rather be" is pretty great. That's where I'm putting my brain while I'm
writing this. I'm imagining myself in a comfy armchair, with a never
ending cup of tea that's always the right temperature. (I'm getting
most of my reading time, in real life, on the bus at the moment.)
The cover image is from Iceland, which is more of a raging waterfalls
than a secluded pond kind of place. But, I think that's where I'd
rather be, at least this week.
Lots of love
Ben
Some things you might like to know
If you've intentionally gone offline, you might want to know a few
things without having to reach for Google.
Short Link Codes
You'll see that there are words that have numbers next to them,
like this. If you look at the end of this article you'll see that these
numbers correspond to some footnotes. Often these will have a 4
character code—like this LUXe—next to them. Links in
articles on the web are invisible, and when you look at them, often
they'll look like this:
Which looks pretty nasty if you need to type it into your browser to
visit the site.
Fear not! There is a solution. On the Walden Pond website there is a
green blob in the top left. If you click on it, you can type in your
code and press go. It'll take you to that site.
I find that if I'm reading offline, that if I highlight (with a
highlighter or a coloured pencil) the links I'm interested in, I can
go back to them as a batch. You might want to make a little mark on
the side of the page too so that you can flick back to it without
having to search too much.
Why the name "Walden Pond"?
Henry Thoreau
was an American transcendentalist philosopher, naturalist, essayist
and poet. He wrote a pretty famous book called
Walden
while shacked up in a cabin by Walden Pond (which is a lake in
Massachusetts).
He was making a show of being far from the madding crowd. But was only
2 miles away from town, and would get his mum to do his laundry. This
isn't taking a swipe at Thoreau for being disingenuous, I think it was
smart. He was managing his attention, not living in a state of nature,
and not living in a state of perpetual hyperstimulation.
I named Walden Pond—the zine—after the technique, not the place. (See
the essay by
Venkatesh Rao:
Against Waldenponding.) It talks about how you can unplug strategically to manage your
attention, without going full unabomber.
Everyone's circumstances change, usually pretty frequently. So if you
know you've got a bit of cabin time coming up, and you want a longer
edition, or you're about to go into intense crunch time, and want a
shorter edition, or even to pause for a while, you can go to the
payment details page and change your edition length, or pause
your subscription. There's
a blog article about it too.
If you find yourself thinking "This article would be much better in one column, rather than
two" then we've got you covered. Tag the article in Pocket with
wp1col and it'll come out full width. This should be
great for thing like poems.
Guess what? If you have flour in your kitchen, you can make pasta.
Right now. Got eggs, too? You have everything you need to whip up a
batch of silky-smooth fettuccine. Have some cheese or vegetables lying
around? You could be sitting down to
fresh ravioli,tortellini, or a hearty lasagna in
under two hours.
And yet, if you do a quick search for pasta recipes, chances are
you’ll walk away more confused than confident. Some call for flour and
whole eggs, others for additions of water or oil. Weight versus volume
measurements, kneading times, resting conditions—it’s all over the map.
It’s not just a lay cook’s issue, either. When I was in culinary
school, I had a series of instructors who only left me more
disoriented. Some insisted on oil, others on salt, still others on
additional yolks or a splash of water. Prescribed kneading and resting
times often contradicted each other. One instructor told us to hang
the pasta to dry for at least 10 minutes before cooking it; others had
us keep it tightly wrapped until the moment it was dropped in the pot.
So how’s a girl to choose the very best way? If you’re this girl, you
obsess. You make batch after batch—dozens and dozens of batches, in fact—to find out. You walk around dusted and streaked with flour, crumbly
bits of dough crusted to the end of your sleeves. You make
spreadsheets and charts, and sometimes you maybe even cry.
You make all-egg pastas, pastas made with just whites, pastas made
with just yolks, and pastas made with nothing more than water. You try
different flours and check resting times at 15-minute intervals for
almost an entire day. You taste more ratios of egg yolk to egg white
to flour than you care to admit. You add oil, you add salt, you add
oil and salt. You wave forkfuls of fettuccine at your friends
and family and colleagues, wrangling them into taste test after taste
test. You read every book you can get your hands on. Your forearms get
totally ripped.
Eventually, you realize there’s no such thing as the perfect
pasta.
"there are as many kinds of perfect pasta as you want there to be."
In part, that’s because pasta is very forgiving. It also comes in many
shapes and sizes and textures, as well as
colors and flavors. Which means that there are
as many kinds of perfect pasta as you want there to be.
This isn’t to say that making fresh pasta is unusually easy or
unusually difficult. Yes, it’s an intimidating process, especially if
you’re not used to working with flour and water. But it’s also an
eminently achievable skill, and once you’re comfortable with the basic
technique, there’s really no reason why you can’t reap the rewards on
a regular basis.
First things first. I’m going to give you a simple, versatile recipe
for fresh pasta dough. I’m going to take you through it step by step
and show you how your dough should look along the way. And I’m also
going to tell you how you can tinker with my recipe on your own time,
to get exactly the flavor, texture, and color you desire. I’ll even
share a couple of sneaky cheats that’ll save you time when you’re in a
rush (and send Italian grandmothers a-rollin’ in their graves).
Is It Worth It?: Fresh Pasta Versus Dried
If you’ve reached this point and you’re wondering why on earth anyone
would bother to make pasta from scratch when it’s just a boiling pot
of water and a cardboard box away, then it’s time to get acquainted
with the fresh stuff. It’s crucial here to understand that
fresh pasta and dry pasta are two totally different beasts,
each suited to different tasks, and the qualities we look for when
making them are accordingly distinct.
Your typical fresh, Italian-style pasta is made from a combination of
eggs and flour. As I’ve mentioned, many iterations of this basic
formula exist, but this definition should do just fine for now.
The eggs and flour are mixed into a stiff but pliable dough that’s
kneaded, rested, and then rolled—usually through a machine—and
either cut into strips for noodles or left in sheets that are used to
make lasagna or stuffed pastas, like
ravioli.
Pros will adjust their basic dough recipe depending on which kind of
pasta they’re making; my
basic pasta dough
will work well for a wide variety of styles.* Fresh pasta is
considered superior to dried pasta in several important respects—namely for its tender, silky texture; rich, eggy flavor; and soft
yellow hue.
*For the purposes of this post, we won’t be getting into extruded
pastas—your penne, rigatoni,
macaroni, and so forth—which
require different equipment and a substantially different dough
formula.
Dry pasta, on the other hand, typically contains no eggs. It’s made by
mixing semolina flour—a coarse
wheat flour—and water. The two
are industrially mixed, shaped, and dried at low temperatures for
optimal storage. Not only is it more convenient than fresh pasta, but
the denser, firmer texture stands up to (and actually requires) longer
cooking times. That same firm texture means it holds up beautifully
under heavy, hearty sauces.
The recipe we’ll be breaking down here is for a light, springy, and
delicate fresh pasta that’s as well suited to slicing into noodles as
it is to making stuffed pastas, which require super-thin, pliable
sheets of dough.
How to Make Fresh Pasta, Step by Step
The process of making your own pasta can be broken down into six
steps: assembling your equipment, choosing the ingredients, mixing and
kneading the dough, resting the dough, rolling out the pasta and
cutting it into noodles, and cooking it. I tested a range of variables
within each of these steps, honing the recipe based on my findings,
until I had my ideal technique down to a science.
There are a lot of pasta-making tools on the market, from
pasta-rolling attachments for a KitchenAid stand mixer to fluted
pastry wheels and special drying racks. (Here’s a complete list of
essential tools for making, cooking, and serving pasta.)
All of these things do perform useful tasks, but pasta predates them
by a long shot, and they’re far from necessary. If you have
pasta-making experience and you’re looking for a good workout, all you
really need is flour, eggs, and a rolling pin. (Actually, you don’t
even need a rolling pin if you’re going for pastas like pici,
orecchiette, capunti, and other hand-shaped or hand-rolled
doughs.) But—since I don’t really
like to exercise—I use a pasta
maker.
At work, I use a stand mixer attachment; at home, I just use a simple,
hand-cranked pasta roller. I also like to keep a bench scraper around,
which makes it easier and neater to portion the dough and keep my work
space clean.
It’s also helpful to have a parchment-lined sheet tray ready for your
rolled-out dough, a kitchen towel and/or plastic wrap to cover
it and keep it from drying out, and some extra flour for dusting the
pasta to keep it from getting too sticky.
The only other thing you’ll need is a few square feet of surface
space. A wooden table, a marble countertop, a big cutting board—just find yourself a spot where you can make a big, floury mess.
Pasta recipes call for all kinds of ingredients. But there are two
things any pasta recipe absolutely needs: flour and water. That’s
because flour and water are how you create gluten, the network of
proteins that gives pasta its stretchy texture and bite.
The more you work that dough, the more elasticity it will develop.
Striking the right level of gluten development is key to fresh pastas,
pizza crusts, and most baked goods. There
are, of course, gluten-free pasta doughs, which substitute that
protein network with standard gluten alternatives, like xanthan or
guar gum and even eggs. (This recipe, for instance, uses a
combination of xanthan gum, brown rice flour, and tapioca flour.)
There are many manipulable variables within a pasta dough, and I
wanted to try them all. Would the type of flour make a difference?
What kind of ratio of flour to egg yolk to egg white would yield the
best pasta? Does adding salt or olive oil matter? Yeah, it’s a lot to
test. Aren’t you glad I did it all for you?
What Type of Flour to Use for Fresh Pasta
Before we go any further, let’s take a minute to talk flour.
Specifically, the three kinds of wheat flour you’ll find mentioned in
pasta recipes: semolina, all-purpose, and high-protein, finely milled
"00" flour.
At the end of the day, I settled on using all-purpose flour for my
recipe. It’s the flour most people already have in their pantries, and
it makes great pasta. Any time I refer to "flour" from here on out,
I’m talking about your handy bag of AP.
That said, if you want to get more serious, 00 flour, with its powdery
texture, can yield even silkier noodles, and semolina adds a
heartiness and a rougher texture that’ll help sauces cling better to
your noodles. Some folks like to add a combination of semolina and
00—I haven’t tested all the
permutations, but stay tuned. I just might take the insanity to a
whole new level.
Regardless of what flours you choose to experiment with, I’d recommend
familiarizing yourself with basic dough-making techniques using just
one type, so that you’ll know what cues to look for.
Egg Whites, Egg Yolks, Water: Identifying the Best Source of
Hydration
With my flour selected, it was time to test different sources of
moisture. My first step was to make three doughs, keeping the
hydration level as consistent as possible across the board. I used
three equal measurements of all-purpose flour as my baseline; one
batch got water, one batch got egg whites, and the third got egg
yolks.** I added just as much as I needed to make the dough come
together. This is what I wound up with; you can probably tell which is
which.
✤ ✤ ✤I stuck with large eggs for all my tests, and even weighed them to
make sure that I was adding consistent amounts of water, protein,
and fat to each dough.
The water-only pasta (right) was a total bust—the noodles were bland, mushy, and...well...watery. And the egg white
pasta (center) wasn’t much better: Whites are almost 90% water, so,
while the noodles weren’t quite as bad as the water-based version,
which literally fell apart and stuck to each other in a big, gluey
mass, they definitely weren’t winners. The yolks, on the other hand,
made a beautiful, golden dough (left). Yolks contain about 48% water,
17% protein, and around 33% fat. More yolks will deliver more color,
more egg flavor, and silkier noodles.
Unfortunately, that high fat content complicates things a little bit.
Though it’s not exactly scientifically accurate, you can think of that
fat as making the gluten proteins all slippery, preventing them from
building a strong network—when I
tested this using different amounts of olive oil, I found that, sure
enough, more oil made for softer, mushier, less elastic noodles. And,
to complicate matters even further, I had a really hard time getting
the flour and yolks to come together. It was a dry, tough dough that
was difficult to mix and knead—not exactly beginner-friendly.
Difficulty aside, an all-yolk pasta may make great noodles, but it’s
not sufficiently elastic to use for stuffed pastas, which require a
dough that can be rolled more thinly and is, quite simply, bendier. I
needed to strike a better balance.
At this point, I knew there was no point in adding water—if I wanted additional moisture, egg whites were definitely a better
bet. It seemed clear that my dough was going to require a combination
of whole eggs and additional yolks. I ultimately settled on three
yolks for every egg white.
What’s that? You like softer, mushier noodles? Good for you.
Add a teaspoon of oil to my basic recipe. Want a richer, eggier flavor
and a more golden hue? Throw in an extra yolk and add a little more
flour. This is your dough.
The Golden Ratio: Determining the Right Hydration Level
To figure out exactly how much flour to use with my eggs—to find my ideal hydration level, technically speaking—I made five batches of dough. Using the same ratio of yolk and egg
white for each, I began with four ounces of flour and, moving in
half-ounce increments, added flour to each batch until I could no
longer get the dough to come together.
After I’d kneaded these doughs for 10 minutes each, they looked like
this:
Once I’d let them rest for 30 minutes (more on resting times
shortly!), I attempted to roll out all five doughs. The wettest dough
and the driest dough were completely unworkable. They simply wouldn’t
pass through the roller—one was
incredibly sticky, while the other crumbled into dry clumps.
Sometimes, a longer resting time can help a dough hydrate more, and it
is possible that the driest of these could be rehabilitated with
additional time. We’ll get to the pros and cons of long rests in a
bit.
Ultimately, the sweet spot that I, and my blind-tasters, settled on
was one whole egg (1.4 ounces white and 0.6 ounce yolk) and two yolks
(1.2 ounces yolk) for every five ounces of flour. The dough
represented by the pasta strands on the left was so wet that the
noodles stuck together; the one on the right was dense and almost
stiff. The middle pasta, our unanimous winner, was made with a dough
that was relatively easy to mix and knead, but not so wet that the
pasta stuck to the roller or itself. It tasted good, looked good, and
had that signature delicate, satiny texture.
To Salt or Not to Salt?
My dough was almost perfect. The only other thing I wanted to test was
whether I’d get even better flavor by adding salt directly to the
dough, instead of just my cooking water or sauce. The simple answer is
yes. Do it!
Salting pasta water
is still well and good, but there’s no compelling reason not to salt
your dough. I tried both fine-grained iodized salt and slightly
coarser kosher salt, and both work; I prefer the flavor of kosher
salt. Just don’t use a coarse sea salt, which will keep your dough
from developing a silky-smooth texture.
Hypothetically, you could salt your pasta even more and skip salting
your pasta water, but I choose to make a dough that still tastes good
after cooking in salted water, since it gives me a little more
flexibility in the flavor of the final product—I can make and freeze batches of dough and then decide on a
case-by-case basis how salty I want my pasta to be.
At this point, we’re working with 10 ounces of flour, a teaspoon of
salt, and two whole eggs, plus four additional yolks. This will make
four to six servings and can be halved or doubled as desired.
If you have a good food processor, you can go ahead and toss all your
ingredients in and let it run until it forms a big ball. Let it keep
whipping around in there, or take it out and knead it with your hands.
You can get to a similar point with a stand mixer, using your dough
hook attachment.
But I gotta admit: I love making pasta by hand. It’s a little more
work, but it’s satisfying, fun work. It also gives you a lot more
control.
"Mixing by hand guarantees that you can adjust your dough as you’re
working"
I’m going to let you in on a little secret: When I’m making pasta at
home, I don’t measure my flour. Sure, I’ll weigh out a rough amount,
but when you’re working with flour and eggs, there are a lot of
variables that you simply can’t control. Your eggs might be slightly
bigger or smaller; it might be an especially humid or dry day. All of
these things will affect how much flour you’ll need. Mixing by hand
guarantees that you can adjust your dough as you’re working,
ultimately allowing you to develop your ideal texture with greater
precision. Here’s how to do it.
Step 1: Make a Well
Weigh out your flour and pour it onto your surface in a pile. Then,
with your fingers, make a hole in the center. You’ll want it to be
relatively wide—at least four
inches—to accommodate all those
eggs.
Now add your eggs to the center. These photos show the old-school
technique, in which you actually whisk the eggs once they’re on the
countertop, but there’s no reason you can’t whisk them ahead of time.
Add any other ingredients you’re using—salt and/or oil.
Step 2: Mix
Using a fork or your fingertips, gradually start pushing the flour
into the pool of egg. Keep adding flour until it no longer makes sense
to use the fork—the dough will be
wet and sticky, but will hold together as a single mass.
Step 3: Knead
At this point, take out your bench scraper and scrape off any dough
sticking to your fork or your hands. Then, begin to fold additional
flour into the dough with the bench scraper, turning the dough roughly
45° each time, to more evenly incorporate the flour. Once the dough
feels firm and dry and can form a craggy-looking ball, it’s time to
start kneading.
I’m not gonna lie: Kneading is a pain in the butt. It’s a lot of work,
but you’ll want to be firm and persistent. An under-kneaded pasta
won’t have the same kind of snappy spring as a properly worked dough,
and you may even wind up with bubbles or bits of unincorporated flour.
It’s almost impossible to over-knead a dough, though, since it’ll
eventually build up so much elasticity that it won’t allow you to
continue.
That said, you don’t want to keep the dough out for too long, lest it
begin to dry out. Around 10 minutes of kneading will allow you to get
a smooth ball of dough without having to worry about drying.
To knead, simply press the heel of your hand into the ball of dough,
pushing forward and down. Rotate the ball 45° and do it again. You’ll
want to keep going until the dough no longer looks powdery—it should have a smooth, elastic texture, similar to a firm ball of
Play-Doh. If your dough feels wet and tacky, add more flour as
necessary.
If it feels too dry, don’t add water unless it literally cannot hold
together. This is what "too dry" looks like:
If, as with the dough above, incorporating water seems really
necessary, I recommend using a spray bottle, which will allow you to
add very small amounts of water to a large surface area of dough. If
your dough looks wetter than the photo above, it’s probably fine. Just
keep kneading.
Once you have your ball of kneaded dough, wrap it tightly in plastic,
and either jump down to the resting section below or follow our
instructions for...
Refrigerating or Freezing Fresh Pasta Dough
If your plan is to make your fresh pasta in advance and come back to
it later, this is where you can pause your work. Once the dough is
wrapped in plastic, stick it in the fridge, but be forewarned that it
will gradually acquire a grayish tinge—which won’t affect flavor or texture, but does make for a
disappointing presentation. To give it more time, tuck the wrapped
ball into a zipper-lock bag, removing as much air as possible, and
freeze it for up to three weeks.
When you’re ready, thaw it in the refrigerator until it’s soft and
pliant to the touch. It’s time to talk resting.
Now that you’ve built up that gluten network, you have a dough that’s
incredibly elastic and springy. The resting period allows the flour to
continue to hydrate, and the gluten network to relax. Most experts
will tell you that if you tried to roll out your dough at this point,
disaster would ensue—your dough
would be too dry and too elastic to roll out.
If we were working with rolling pins only, that would probably be
true—the dough would just keep
snapping back. But we’re in the
21st century, and it’s
a little more complicated than that.
Here are six doughs. The one all the way on the right wasn’t rested at
all. The one on the left rested for six hours. In between them are
doughs that rested for 15 minutes, 30 minutes, one hour, and three
hours.
I rolled the six-hour and the no-rest doughs once, through the widest
setting on my pasta roller, to see what would happen.
You can see that the unrested dough, up top, is freaking out. It’s all
rough and jagged, because the rolling has essentially snapped those
little gluten bonds in half. But as I continued to roll it through
increasingly thinner settings, it took on a much smoother texture. By
the end, there was very little visual difference between the two.
Ultimately, I rolled out and cooked all six doughs. Was there a
difference between them? Yes. The dough that hadn’t rested at all was
a little harder and firmer, a little more rubbery. The doughs that had
rested for an hour or longer were almost identical.
In the case of the pasta dough, the extra time is just downtime;
you’re not expending both time and effort. But if you’re
looking for a quicker method, this is where you can cheat. No rest, or
just a few minutes’ rest, is not going to make inedible pasta. In
fact, it’ll make pretty damn good pasta. It is, however, a trade-off,
and only you can say whether or not it’s a worthwhile one.
Take a deep breath and give yourself a pat on the back—you’re almost done. And hey—this
part’s pretty fun!
Cut your dough into four pieces, set one aside, and wrap up the rest.
Use a rolling pin to flatten the dough to at least half an inch thick.
Try to keep the shape and size relatively even from end to end. This
will make our later steps a little easier.
Then, turn to your pasta maker. For this stage, you’ll want the flat
roller—the ones with teeth come
later. Adjust it to the widest setting (on most machines, it’s labeled
either "0" or "1"). If you’re using a stand mixer attachment, set it
to a medium-low speed. If you’re hand-cranking, you’ll just want to be
steady and consistent. First-timers may want to work with a partner,
so that one person can crank the machine and the other can feed the
dough into the rollers.
Now we’re ready to do a first pass. Simply feed the dough into the
roller, like so:
You’ll want to gently support the exiting end with the flat of your
hand or your index finger. Send it through the first setting until it
passes through without resistance—at least three times. Then turn the dial to the next setting.
This will narrow the space between the rollers, pressing your pasta
even thinner. You’ll notice it getting quite a bit longer as you
proceed. You’ll want to pass the dough through the rollers at least
two or three times for each of the first three settings. Later
settings will require only one or two passes, though.
Unfortunately, no matter how careful you are, mistakes happen. The
pasta goes through funny and doubles up, or it gets a hole. That’s
where laminating comes in.
Laminating is basically a process of folding the dough into a smaller
package and feeding it back into the pasta maker. The main argument
for laminating has to do with the final texture of your dough, but
it’s also a great way to patch up any pesky holes.
There are two basic types of folds you can do, pictured below. It’s
easiest to laminate before your dough has gone any further than the
third-setting stage—as it gets
longer, it becomes almost impossible to feed back into the machine.
One method requires two folds, and the other requires three. I haven’t
noticed a difference between these two in my final results, but I
personally prefer three folds, because it makes for neater corners
and, in case you haven’t noticed, I’m a little particular about this
stuff. Here’s the three-fold technique:
And this is the two-fold method:
In either case, you’ll want to feed the dough back in at a rotated
angle. This allows you to change up the direction in which the roller
is pulling the pasta, and I find that the dough is sturdier and more
manageable when I’ve laminated at least two or three times over the
course of rolling. That said, the difference does seem more pronounced
when you’re handling the uncooked dough, versus when you’re actually
eating the final product.
But wait! Be careful! What you don’t want to do is forget to
turn it back to the widest setting when you put the laminated dough
back in. Because...this happens:
Yeah. Not so good.
If you’re planning to make fettuccine, I’d recommend rolling it to the
third-to-last setting (usually, that’s labeled "6"). If you’re going
to use the dough for ravioli, you’ll want to go a little thinner,
since stacking two sheets of pasta will make the edges twice as
thick—I go one setting thinner.
The pasta will be very delicate and translucent at this point, so
handle it with care.
If the dough becomes longer than you can reasonably handle, simply lay
it down on a cutting board and cut it in half. Dust one half with
flour and cover it with a kitchen towel, then continue rolling the
other.
Once you’ve rolled the dough, laminated it, and rolled it again, all
the way to your preferred thickness, you’ll want to cover it up with a
kitchen towel or plastic wrap to keep the pasta dough from drying out.
Dust some flour onto parchment or wax paper, lay the pasta on top, and
continue to sprinkle flour as you fold it over. (No, you shouldn’t lay
your pasta on the towel like I did in those photos. Just put it all on
the parchment paper.) If you’re working in warm, humid conditions, or
if you notice the pasta sticking together, you can instead cut it into
approximately 12- to 14-inch sections and place a sheet of lightly
floured parchment paper between the layers.
At this point, you can forge onward and make noodles, or you can
prepare a stuffed pasta or
lasagna. I’ve covered ravioli and
tortellini in separate articles, but for now, let’s talk noodles.
This part’s super easy: Just feed a 12- to 14-inch section of dough
through the fettuccine or linguine cutter...
...catch it as it comes out...
...dust it with flour, and curl it up into a little nest.
If, for any reason, your pasta winds up sticking to itself, just ball
it back up and start over. It sucks, I know. It happens if a room is
too hot, or if your dough is a little too hydrated; next time, add
more flour or dust the sheets a little more heavily to compensate.
And voilà! You just made pasta! Want an even wider noodle, or a more
handmade appearance? Use a sharp knife or a pizza cutter to slice the
dough into strips by hand instead.
How to Cook Fresh Pasta
Now here comes the really easy part. Boil up some salted
water, and toss those noodles in. They’ll cook quickly—I’m talking 60-seconds quickly—so be ready to taste and drain them almost immediately.
That said, while fresh pasta cooks rapidly, it’s important to make
sure that it’s thoroughly cooked. Unlike dry pasta, it actually gets
slightly firmer during the first phase of cooking. If you don’t cook
it long enough, the egg and flour proteins won’t set, your starch
won’t fully hydrate, and you’ll end up with a kinda pasty pasta.
Personally, I like my pasta cooked for around 90 seconds, but you may
find that you prefer a shorter or longer boiling time. Just don’t
exceed two minutes—that’s when it
starts to get mushy.
In the early 1970s, a woman moved into my Brooklyn commune. She was
older than us, in her thirties, relocating from the Midwest after
breaking up with her husband. She stuck to herself; we figured she was
getting over the divorce. Then one night in the kitchen, she opened up
to a few of us. She had started out conventionally, she said. Straight
job, straight partner, and one after another, three kids. Then
feminism happened. She realized she was suffocating. “I abandoned my
children,” she said, almost in a whisper.
I had already decided not to have a family. I didn’t think I could
manage writing, politics, an erotic life, and kids all at once. A part
of me felt that this woman should have thought family life through
beforehand, as I had. But I had the advantage of youth, a feminist
adolescence. For this reason, another part of me admired her. What
courage it must have taken to throw off the patriarchal burden of
kinder and kuchen! Mostly, though, I was stunned. Sure, men leave
their children all the time. But what kind of woman does this?
Many of Italian novelist Elena Ferrante’s characters are that kind of
woman. “In Ferrante’s world, mothers regularly walk out on their
children, neglect or forget about them in favor of writing and/or
sexual passion; love and hate, protect and resent, guide and thwart
them in equal measure,” writes Jacqueline Rose in
Mothers (2018). One of these mothers is Leda, protagonist of
the 2006 novel The Lost Daughter, recently adapted for film
by Maggie Gyllenhaal. While on vacation at a Greek beach, Leda (played
with vulnerable froideur by Olivia Coleman) finds her attention
magnetized by a beautiful young mother, Nina (Dakota Johnson), who is
engaged in languorous play with her young daughter. This intimacy,
both enthralling and claustrophobic, throws Leda back twenty years,
when her own two daughters’ ceaseless demands for attention and touch
overwhelmed her every attempt to think, read, or even masturbate. Leda
leaves her husband and children to pursue an academic career and a
love affair, returning after three years. “Children,” Leda tells
Nina’s pregnant sister-in-law, “are a crushing responsibility.” Only
in the end of the story does she confess her maternal crime. “I’m an
unnatural mother,” Leda says, without explanation or excuse.
Not everyone has loved “The Lost Daughter,” but almost all agree that
its content is shocking and Gyllenhaal was courageous in making it.
TheAtlantic’s review is
headlined: “The movie that understands the secret shame of motherhood.”
What is the shameful secret? Jeannette Catsoulis
answers
in the New York Times: the “raw, and even radical . . .
notion that motherhood can plunder the self in irreparable ways.”
Ferrante agrees. “The risk Leda runs seems to me all in that
question,” she
writes
in an essay. “Can I, a woman of today, succeed in being loved by my
daughters, in loving them, without having of necessity to sacrifice
myself and therefore hate myself?” Another question might follow: can
a woman like Leda choose herself over her children and not be hated?
“The Lost Daughter” is what Ann Snitow called, in a 1992
piece
on feminism and motherhood, a “demon text.” Written by white feminists
between 1963 and about 1974, this handful of books were in fact more
demonized than demonic. Their offense? Imagining that we might “break
the inexorable tie between mothers and children” and that a woman’s
life could be meaningful without children. Such writing vanished as
quickly as it had appeared, Snitow wrote, yet “we have been
apologizing ever since.”
The first “demon text” was Betty Friedan’s
The Feminine Mystique (1963). Friedan’s exegesis of “the
problem that has no name”—the
frustration, depression, and anger of women squashed into fulltime
“homemaking” and childcare—sparked millions of women into feminist consciousness.
It also bulldozed millions more. Friedan was homophobic: How could
women aspire to a career, she wondered, when the only models were “the
old-maid high-school teachers; the librarian; the . . . woman doctor .
. . who cut her hair like a man”? She was drearily bourgeois. For lack
of inspiring mentors, she wrote, too many young women “retreated into
the beatnik vacuum.”
But the gravest failing of The Feminine Mystique was its
erasure of the people bell hooks called, in 1984, “the silent
majority”—the Black, brown, and
poor women “most victimized by sexist oppression [and] powerless to
change their condition in life.” Presuming to describe the universal
condition of Woman, Friedan’s “‘problem that has no name’ . . .
actually referred to the plight of a select group of college-educated,
middle and upper class, married white women,” who longed for
fulfilling careers. But who, hooks asked, would mind the house and
children when these women were liberated? Friedan’s solution to “the
problem” often boiled down to “get a maid”—or, more decorously, a “cleaning woman.” A third of women were
already in the workforce, hooks noted. How fulfilled were the
babysitters, factory workers, or prostitutes?
Friedan did not acknowledge the status her subjects enjoyed “within a
racist, sexist, capitalist state,” hooks wrote. Her denunciation,
comprising the
first pages
of Feminist Theory: from margin to center (1984),
became the iconic critique not just of
The Feminine Mystique but of the strain of privileged white
feminism it helped to bring about.
Friedan’s “new life plan for women”—essentially access to subsidized higher education and daycare—aimed to push the stay-at-home suburban mom onto the commuter train
with the men carrying briefcases. But this vision was pro-family:
happy wife, happy life. A happy mother herself, Friedan had not an
unkind word for motherhood.
The demon texts that followed Friedan’s were far harsher in their
portrayal of motherhood, depicting it as a kind of malady. In the
first edition of Our Bodies Ourselves (1970) the Boston
Women’s Health Collective called pregnancy a “life crisis with
tremendous growth possibilities.” Post-partem, they wrote, “the
physical changes . . . are enormous. Although they are considered
‘natural’ they closely resemble the pathological.” Germaine Greer’s
1970 blockbuster The Female Eunuch diagnosed the family as a
sick organism, with Mother at its “dead heart.”
The most famous, and vilified, of the second-wave texts is Shulamith
Firestone’s
The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution
(1970). The book evinced outright revulsion toward biological
pregnancy and childbirth. “Pregnancy is barbaric . . . the temporary
deformation of the body of the individual for the sake of the
species,” she pronounced. “Moreover, childbirth hurts and it
isn’t good for you.” She quoted a friend who’d been through it: having
a baby was “like shitting a pumpkin.”
For Firestone the mother-child tie was a chain-gang shackle: “The
heart of woman’s oppression is her childbearing and childrearing
roles.” Maternal fury is inevitable, she claimed, but this fury can be
a source of revolutionary zeal. She explained: “The mother who wants
to kill her child for what she has had to sacrifice for it (a common
desire) learns to love that same child only when she understands that
it is as helpless, as oppressed as she is, and by the same oppressor:
then her hatred is directed outward, and ‘motherlove’ is born.”
How could this bondage be broken? End Nature! In vitro fertilization,
“test tube babies,” and “even parthenogenesis—virgin birth—could be developed
very soon,” Firestone predicted. Yes, reprotech, like warcraft, could
be deployed to enforce patriarchal power. But the feminist revolution
would seize the weapons and turn them on the oppressor. Compared with
Friedan’s reformist white paper, The Dialectic of Sex is a
cyborg’s “Bread and Roses,” singing in the death of every kind of
labor. “The double curse that man should till the soil by the sweat of
his brow and that woman should bear in pain and travail,” proclaimed
Firestone, “would be lifted through technology to make humane living
for the first time a possibility.”
Yet even as Firestone and other feminists were deconstructing the
ideology of biological destiny, others still were repurposing it to
build a utopian “gynocracy.” In 1974 Weather Underground fugitive Jane
Alpert disseminated “Mother Right: A New Feminist Theory.” In it she declared that
“the capacity to bear and nurture children” is not just the root of
women’s oppression. It is “the basis of [their] powers,” whether or
not they reproduce. The same mother-child bond that Firestone would
smash to free human potential Alpert glorified as the promise of a
humane future. “The paradigm for all social relationships is the
relationship of a healthy and secure mother to her child,” she wrote.
In the manifesto that would galvanize pronatalist “cultural” feminism,
Alpert exhorted “Womankind” to “worship” the “Mother.”
The feminist idealization of matriarchy was compatible with the
patriarchal Christian “family values” that swept Ronald Reagan to
power in 1980. Together they had the muscle to keep the demon down in
its hole; the “postfeminist” retraction soon began. No one seemed
readier to repent than Friedan. In 1981 her book
The Second Stage decried the “feminist mystique” that
rejected family and motherhood. In the
commencement speech
she gave at her alma mater that year, she urged Smith College
graduates to be nicer to men.
There is now no shortage of books about motherhood. In the
Paris Review in 2018, Lauren Elkin
praised
a new “crop” for “their unerring seriousness, their ambition, the way
they demand that the experience of motherhood in all its viscera be
taken seriously as literature.” Can any of these be classified as
demon texts? After I’d ordered a few, Amazon kindly offered me a
screenful of recent motherhood-agnostic texts. Some guide readers on
deciding whether to have kids; others guide them not to (for example,
No Kids: 40 Good Reasons Not to Have Children (2009),
by Corinne Maier; and Jen Kirkman’s
I Can Barely Take Care of Myself: Tales from a Happy Life Without
Kids
(2013)). The subtitle of Amy Blackstone’s
Childfree by Choice (2019) trumpets a “movement redefining
family and creating a new age of independence.”
A movement? A movement implies collective action; not having kids is
neither collective nor active. There is, however, a community, much of
which lives on social media. The “Childfree” sub-Reddit has 1.4
million members. The “I Regret Having Children” Facebook page has over
44,000, almost entirely women; other women have gathered at the
markedly unladylike “Lady No-Kids.” The mommy blogs have roiled with
rebellion since the COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns began. Under a
video
of Boston mothers screaming profanities in a field, blogger “Scary
Mommy” comments that the event looks funny, but its meaning is not:
“We’re not tired, we’re done. We have nothing left to give.”
If one can attempt to generalize about the scores of posts, it seems
the regretful moms are looking for solace, while the “child-free” are
spoiling for a fight. On Facebook, “Dual Income No Kids/Single Income
No Kids” (“DINK/SINK,” boasting 13,800 members) features endless
photos and cartoons of musts-to-avoid (baby puke, household chaos), as
well as shiny rewards-for-avoiding (poolside cocktails, diamond ring).
Pugnaciousness may be the predominant tone of social media, but these
people seem to be daring outsiders to find the childless distasteful.
If there is one justification for childlessness that may be popularly
accepted, it is art. Art, like childbirth, is productive; the
childless artist or writer cannot be accused of sloth. At the same
time, artists—or I’ll speak for
myself, writers—are geniuses at
getting nothing done, which is not a good skill for parenting. This is
the subtext of the essays in
Selfish, Shallow, and Self-Absorbed: Sixteen Writers on the
Decision Not to Have Kids
(2015), try as both the contributors and editor Meghan Daum do to come
up with something else. Not incidental, of course, is the fact that
childcare is still mostly women’s job; of the sixteen writers in the
collection, twelve are women. Sigrid Nunez catalogues the great
ones—Jane Austen, the Brontes,
George Eliot, Virginia Woolf—who
did not have children. Colette neglected her unwanted daughter. Doris
Lessing left two kids in Africa to return to London to write. Nunez
quotes Alice Munro, who’d “bat” her two-year-old “away with one hand
and type with the other.” Like Leda, Munro is rueful: the child
understood herself to be “the adversary to what was most important to
me.”
Some in the collection, including Michelle Huneven, had traumatic
childhoods and don’t trust themselves to mother well. Laura Kipnis
doesn’t cotton to mothers, “a strange and unenviable breed: harried,
hampered, resentful.” Several take pains to establish themselves as
the cool aunt or preempt charges of child-hating. “There’s no question
that I would have loved my child with a kind of love I’d never know
otherwise,” announces Daum. Tell that to the 44,000 members of “I
Regret Having My Children.”
A few take it upon themselves to consider the larger social
implications of their decision. Lionel Shriver frets about the Global
North’s indolent birth rate while “elsewhere”—she names Niger, Yemen, and China—they are reproducing like fruit flies. In short, Baby Boomers
(presumably white ones) are shirking their eugenic duty. Shriver
interviews Gabriella, who comes from “generations of academics,
historians, diplomats—thinkers
and doers”—her “genetic
inheritance,” Gabriella calls it, without which she believes “the
world will be a poorer place.” Another interviewee, Nora, has similar
misgivings about the waste of her superior genes. But like Gabriella,
she can’t be bothered: “Devoting my whole life to promulgating my
ethnicity is a big ask,” she says. Ick.
Only the men in the collection joke freely. After all, this is not
really their department. Geoff Dyer skips briskly from the deference
paid the seven-year-old pashas in his posh neighborhood to a cheerful
existential nihilism. “Of all the arguments for having children, the
suggestion that it gives life ‘meaning’ is the one to which I am most
hostile—apart from all the
others. The assumption that life needs a meaning or purpose!” he
exclaims. Tim Kreider describes parenthood as “noisy and toy-strewn,
pee-stained and shrieky.”
Among the demon novels I read, the majority also feature artists or
writers struggling to produce anything besides breast milk. At the
beginning of her barely fictional autofiction
I Love You But I’ve Chosen Darkness (2021), Claire Vaye
Watkins has a sane and gainfully employed husband, a few-months-old
baby, and a bang-up case of postpartum blues. Unable to “feel any
feelings beyond those set to music by the Walt Disney Company,” she’s
stopped writing or even caring about writing. A child of high desert
hipneck poverty and daughter of the guy who procured young girls for
Charles Manson, Claire has reason to be disinclined toward family
life. When a friend of a friend urges escape—“Don’t fetishize marriage and babies. Don’t succumb to the axial tilt
of monogamy. . . Travel! . . . Even shitty, shitty St. Patrick’s Day
in Vegas is better than the best day at home with an infant”—Claire cannot argue. She quits hubby and baby, retraces her parents’
wanderings, consumes heroic amounts of intoxicants, and sows a
truckload of wild oats. Occasionally she’s tickled by wistfulness for
what she left behind, and she is charmed by her daughter when they
eventually meet again. But she doesn’t return to the cocoon.
The Shame (2020), the brief, artful first novel by
Makenna Goodman, also begins with a mother’s flight. The main
character, Alma, drives from her homestead in Vermont to Williamsburg,
Brooklyn in the middle of the night. In Vermont, while her husband
teaches at a nearby college, Alma tends sheep, cans vegetables,
patches pants, repairs the woodstove—and mothers. She mothers actively, conscientiously—though not excellently, in her own estimation, and with waning verve.
“‘Cherish it,’ a woman told me at the market, smiling at the kids. I
wanted to punch her in the fucking face.”
Alma is also an unpublished writer. She begins a story whose narrator
is herself, only better. Then she discovers the character’s model on a
mothering site. “Celeste” is a single mom and ceramicist leading a
hilariously Instagrammable life. Celeste travels to Bali, plays the
harmonium, “ate raw clams with cranberry horseradish relish at the
MOMA.” “Her handbag was a cube of Oaxacan palm leaves.” The story
fades away, but Alma continues to follow Celeste obsessively online.
Finally, she takes off to Williamsburg to find her. When she does,
Alma witnesses her idol shoving a croissant into the face of her
hysterical toddler.
The Shame is about ambition, envy, consumption, and the
difficult, exhilarating search for a writerly voice, among other
things. But, like the other demon novels, it is mainly about the ways
that motherhood can plunder—or
cleave—the self. “Motherhood had
cracked me in half. My self as a mother and my self as not were two
different people, distinct,” writes Watkins. “Someone else had written
[her books], elves-and-shoemaker style.” Alma laments, “I was being
stretched to my limit when it came to mothering. I tried to access a
feeling of selfhood from small bouts of writing, daydreaming, and
painting.” The work goes nowhere; the chores are “daunting,” the
children “parasitic. . . I had no idea who I was anymore, or what I
liked to do.” Only when the fantasized self is revealed as false—the celestial is brought to earth—can Alma become whole, artist and mother.
Two other books literalize the metaphor of the split self. In
The Need (2019), Helen Phillips’s highly praised novel,
Molly, a paleobotanist with young children Viv and Ben, is pursued by
Moll, the embodied ghost of her negative alter-life. Moll longs for
the children she lost to a suicide bomber—the children Molly has and is going bats caring for. In the end Molly
incorporates Moll—good mother and
bad, “one shadow.” In the haunting of the lucky mother by the grieving
could-have-been mother, one might see a pale allusion to Toni
Morrison’s Sethe, among the greatest tragic mothers in literature, who
is haunted by the ghost of the beloved child she kills to save from
the atrocities of slavery.
Nightbitch, of the eponymous 2021 novel by Rachel Yoder, is a
conceptual artist trying not to be consumed by motherhood. Her son
“was her only project. She had done the ultimate job of creation, and
now she had nothing left,” she tells herself. “To keep him alive—that was the only artistic gesture she could muster.” But the
restless, ruthlessly desiring artist refuses to be displaced by the
compulsorily giving mother. Ferocity transforms woman into dog:
Nightbitch. Self-integration begins when Nightbitch trains her boy to
be a puppy. Having never gone to sleep without endless snacks and
stories, he beds down happily in a dog crate. And when, unable to
contain her canine instincts, Nightbitch kills the family cat, the
child is giddy, and suggests they eat it.
A striking aspect of this body of work is its whiteness. The
contributors to Selfish are well established, well enough
off, and almost all white. The white parents in the novels are
heterosexual, married, and middle class. They live in private homes.
Except for Molly, who depends on Aunt Norma for succor and
babysitting, the families are nuclear: the wives responsible for the
kids, the husbands offstage, pursuing careers. These moms do not solve
their problems by organizing community daycares or marching for
universal basic income. At best, they demand that the fathers chip in.
Duke University Black feminist scholar Jennifer C. Nash mentions this
whiteness in a 2018
review essay
called “The Political Life of Black Motherhood.” The field of maternal
studies, launched by the 1976 publication of Adrienne Rich’s seminal
Of Woman Born, was “fundamentally shaped by the intellectual
and political labor of black feminists,” Nash writes. She cites hooks,
Dorothy Roberts, author of the massively influential
Killing the Black Body (1997), sociologist Patricia Hill
Collins, literary critic Hortense Spillers, and essayist-poet Audre
Lorde. Yet maternal memoirs, which also proliferated after Rich’s
book, are overwhelmingly white. And not only white, they also tend
toward the demonic (a term Nash doesn’t use). The genre, she says,
“roots itself in mapping white maternal ambivalence, in treating
motherhood as a space that takes—perhaps even steals—from women.”
Like hooks, Collins links these women’s problems to whiteness. In
Black Feminist Thought (1990), Collins argues that white
assumptions about motherhood—the
nuclear, private family household, the mother as sole caregiver
economically dependent on a man—have historically been alien to African American women. With roots in
African tribal cultures and the wrenched-apart families of slavery, as
well as the exigencies of ongoing poverty, a collective approach to
raising children is common in African American communities. A
bloodmother cares for her children within a web of aunts and grannies,
neighbors, othermothers, or “fictive kin” who take in children
orphaned by the sale or death of their parents in slavery or whose
parents cannot keep them due to destitution, illness, or
incarceration.
Collins stresses that “in woman-centered kin units . . . the
centrality of mothers is not predicated on male powerlessness” or
absence. Yet this was the charge made by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in
his 1965 report “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action”—a charge that lives on in welfare and child-protective practices.
Overly powerful Black mothers, not white supremacist policies,
produced a “tangle of pathology” resulting in violence and social
disintegration, Moynihan claimed. “In essence, the Negro community has
been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out
of line with the rest of the American society, seriously retards the
progress of the group as a whole and imposes a crushing burden on the
Negro male and, in consequence, on a great many Negro women as well.”
Snitow called the Moynihan Report one of the real anti-mother demon
texts of the 1960s. I’d nominate it a contender for all time. But
Moynihan was neither the first nor the last to characterize Black
motherhood as pathological. After his report came the mythical
“welfare queen” and the depraved (also mythical) “crack mother.”
Meanwhile, in these same decades, an image of the Black mother was
emerging on the other side of the mask. In media as diverse as
TV sitcoms and Black Power leaflets, she was a warrior-mother,
both victim of the trauma of African-American life under white
supremacy, and also its iconic resister.
Nash explores another “now-dominant,” more flattering though equally
flattening, picture of Black motherhood. Here it is “a site of
spiritual and psychic renewal” and a revolutionary, transgressive
practice, “always upending prevailing heterosexist, patriarchal,
antiblack, and misogynistic norms.” In The Atlantic, Leah
Wright Rigueur
opens
a piece with a scene of her laughing uproariously at the birth of her
third child—a Madonna of Black
Joy. “Celebratory joy felt particularly appropriate for the occasion
given the reality of Black mothers’ experiences in America,” she
writes. Even white cultural feminists of the 1970s plucked from
Blackness to draw the blueprints of their matriarchal utopias. They
looked, for instance, to the speculative fiction of Octavia Butler, in
whose futures the populations are brown and the mothers, while fierce
and ornery (and sometimes male), are world-shapers.
Is the demon text white because Black and brown women have more
serious worries than the binkie buried in the back seat of the SUV?
Are they preoccupied by problems of survival, such as disproportionate
rates of maternal and infant mortality, environmental racism, and
surveillance by “child-protective” services? Are maternal resentment,
rage, and indifference White People Problems? Like the men in the
Selfish anthology, at least one Dominican-American male
novelist skewers this notion. The mother of the protagonist in a Junot
Díaz
story
wonders why a young neighborhood woman has no kids. “Maybe she just
doesn’t like children,” he suggests. The mother replies: “Nobody likes
children. . . . That doesn’t mean you don’t have them.”
Nash agrees that maternal ambivalence is not the exclusive province of
white people. She asks why Black feminist scholars “steadfastly refuse
to document the violence of motherhood apart from the threat of state
violence.” She is not interested in supplanting one dominant image
with another but rather, wishes for complexity. “Is there space for
maternal unhappiness in the black feminist theoretical maternal
archive, space for accounts of motherhood that find mothering
profoundly unradical, perhaps even tedious, exhausting, or upsetting?”
Where are the childless-by-choice, the careerist, the
just-going-about-her-business Black mom? Portraying the Black mother
as the apotheotic revolutionary not only eclipses a vast range of
everyday experience, says Nash, it also “shores up a singular notion
of radical black female subjectivity: motherhood.”
An outlier in this landscape is Alice Walker, a writer-mother who has
wrestled publicly with her dual identity. But just as Snitow looked
back on the demon texts of the 1960s and ’70s and found them less
demonic than all that, Walker’s “One Child of One’s Own,” published in
Ms. in 1979, is remembered as a treatise on maternal
ambivalence, whereas it is much less ambivalent about motherhood than
it is enraged about what Cherie Moraga later summed up regarding
social justice movements of the 1970s: “All the women were white, all
the Blacks were men.” Toward that one child, Rebecca, Walker is
tender; she speaks of the pains of motherhood, such as worrying about
the child’s illness and the racism she will face, but she appreciates
how those pains opened her to worlds she would not otherwise have
known. The piece ends with a poem listing the obstacles various women
writers faced—Woolf her madness,
Austen her lovelessness—and “You
[Alice] have Rebecca—who is/ much
more delightful/ and less distracting / than any of the calamities/
above.”
Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of Alice Walker’s chief demonizers is
Rebecca Walker. In an interview with NPR, the daughter described the
Ms. piece as “extremely ambivalent about motherhood.” Alice,
Rebecca recalled, “talked about how you should really only have one
child, because if you had more than one child you would be enslaved to
your children, and you wouldn’t be able to be creative, and you
wouldn’t be able to be free, and you would lose your independence and
your peace of mind.” Nor had she forgotten that Mom called her a
calamity. Rebecca has gotten her revenge; quite publicly she renounced
Alice. Still, the poetic symmetry does not escape her. The NPR
interview marked the release of Rebecca’s own memoir
Baby Love: Choosing Motherhood after a Lifetime of Ambivalence.
We can improve motherhood: we can make it less onerous and more
egalitarian, stop criminalizing “bad” mothers, and quit pressuring
people who do not want kids into having them. But these are
incremental reforms. They will not solve the real problems of
motherhood, which, as the demon texts plainly show, simply adapt to
the times. Like capitalism, motherhood will always find ways to screw
mothers.
The only solution is to abolish mothers.
That, in essence, is Shulamith Firestone’s vision in
The Dialectic of Sex. It is also Sophie Lewis’s in
Full Surrogacy Now:Feminism Against Family (2019).
Like Firestone, Lewis is uninterested in reform. She is a
utopian. She wants to break not just the inexorable tie between
mothers and children but the links between mothers and gestation,
gestation and family, family and capitalism, and capitalism and human
life. “Let’s prefigure a way of manufacturing one another
noncompetitively,” Lewis writes. “Let’s hold one another hospitably,
explode notions of hereditary parentage, and multiply real, loving
solidarities. Let us build a care commune based on comradeship, a
world sustained by kith and kind more than by kin. Where pregnancy is
concerned, let every pregnancy be for everyone. Let us overthrow, in
short, the ‘family.’”
In the meantime, Lewis argues, those who perform gestational
labor—commercial surrogates—must have workers’ rights and autonomy. The book’s through line is a
journalistic investigation of an Indian surrogacy facility called the
Akanksha Fertility Clinic and of its owner and manager, Dr. Nayana
Patel. Earning wealth and social cachet off the low-paid, highly
controlled workers’ backs, Patel fashions herself a feminist and
rescuer of the downtrodden poor. But Full Surrogacy Now is
not an exposé, and the surrogates’ own testimonies complicate any
villain-victim narrative. Rather, Lewis uses commercial gestation as a
lens through which to interrogate the gendered, economic, and
sentimental presumptions about “natural” baby production and
family-making.
Whether unpaid or commercial—a
labor of love, obligation, or livelihood—gestation is work, Lewis insists. Calling it work does not “dignify”
surrogacy, however, or imply a demand for wages for parenting. Rather,
it positions gestation as a site of resistance to the capitalist
commodification of everything: “What if we reimagined pregnancy, and
not just its prescribed aftermath, as work under capitalism—that is, as something to be struggled in and against toward a utopian
horizon free of work and free of value?”
Periodically, the press announces that the artificial womb is just
around the corner—within two
generations, a scientist
recently told
the BBC. In that documentary, as in all the others, the brows on the
talking heads furrow over ethical issues and democratic input. Then
they unfurrow, as they celebrate the coming marvels for preemies and
joys for the uterus-deprived—in
this piece, a handsome gay couple (no ecstatic biotech shareholders
are pictured).
Firestone saw the baby machine as the engine of revolution, redefining
“our relationship to production and reproduction” and leading to the
end of class and the family. Lewis notes that we don’t even need the
incubator. “Since the perfection of IVF techniques enabled a body to
gestate entirely foreign material,” she writes, “living humans have
become the sexless ‘technology’ component of the euphemism Assisted
Reproductive Technology.’” This is not a reason to ban the practice,
the high-moral goal of some feminists and human rights activists, says
Lewis; surrogacy, like abortion, will continue whether it is legal or
not. “When everybody is announcing calamity and dystopia, it is very
important to notice that, with surrogacy as with so much else, plus ça
change, plus c’est la même chose,” she writes. “But equally, and far
more excitingly, there is this: the more things stay the same with
surrogacy, the more people force them to change.” What will be forced
to change ultimately includes not just gestation, but everything:
parenthood, childhood, care, community.
Might Lewis’s full surrogacy and mutual human remaking offer a way out
for the mothers of the demon novels? In the penultimate section of
The Need, Molly has reluctantly capitulated to Moll’s
entreaties to spend time with the children. Soon, she comes to depend
on this mothering surrogate—because, really, what mother doesn’t need at least one? The women set
up an alternating schedule: one hides in the husband’s basement studio
while the other tends to the kids. But Molly’s guilt and anxiety
compel her to lurk, then to appear, during Moll’s shifts.
One evening Molly and the children become ill and fall into a fevered
sleep together. When she emerges from the bedroom, she finds them
recovered and bathed, at the kitchen table with Moll. “Hi, other
Mommy,” says Viv casually when she spots her “real” mother. Ben barely
notices her. Later, Molly and Moll will press together into one, an
enlightened, renewed individual. Could they have continued
“manufacturing one another noncompetitively?” A mother has awakened
from the sleep of reason, and her world is transformed. Yet there are
no monsters here. Just a woman and a couple of kids, eating snacks in
their pajamas.
“Heterosexuality always embarrasses me,” Maggie Nelson admits in
The Argonauts, a book once so rabidly popular among women and
queers that my first copy was swiped from my bag at a dyke bar in
2016. Nelson’s confession has always struck me as diagnostic of our
current moment, in which indictments of heterosexuality have become
something of a meme. Yet when I asked her about it during a Skype call
held by a sexuality-studies workshop for graduate students, she
backtracked. Denying that she is embarrassed by heterosexuality in
general, Nelson claimed that she is only humiliated by her
own heterosexuality, by moments in her life when she has
entertained—or suffered from—a romantic attraction to cis men.
At the time this caveat struck me as both unnecessarily defensive and
disingenuous. Of all people, Nelson knows her queer theory, and thus
knows that her own heterosexual experience only comes into focus via
the cultural delineation of heterosexuality from other (less
embarrassing?) forms of intimacy and attachment. It doesn’t make sense
to extricate your own straight experience from straightness as an
institution—if you are
embarrassed by one, you are necessarily embarrassed by the other.
Heterosexuality is nobody’s personal problem.
What I now see is that Nelson’s caveat is typical of heteropessimism,
a mode of feeling with a long history, and which is particularly
palpable in the present. Heteropessimism consists of performative
disaffiliations with heterosexuality, usually expressed in the form of
regret, embarrassment, or hopelessness about straight experience.
Heteropessimism generally has a heavy focus on men as the root of the
problem. That these disaffiliations are “performative” does not mean
that they are insincere but rather that they are rarely accompanied by
the actual abandonment of heterosexuality. Sure, some heteropessimists
act on their beliefs, choosing celibacy or the now largely outmoded
option of political lesbianism, yet most stick with heterosexuality
even as they judge it to be irredeemable. Even incels, overflowing
with heteropessimism, stress the involuntary nature of their
condition.
Social media is a playground of performative disidentification, and
heteropessimism thrives there. One recent surge of online
heteropessimism was triggered by the Straight Pride event in Boston
(an event that, like so much of the right-leaning internet, is
simultaneously less substantial and far more sinister than most people
seem to believe). At the same time as the City of Boston granted
organizers a permit for the event to take place, they denied them the
right to fly a newly unveiled Straight Pride flag, which—as social-media users jumped over themselves to point out—tellingly resembled a black-and-white-striped prison uniform.
“Heterosexuality is a prison!” a chorus declared, vocalizing one of
heteropessimism’s central maxims. Many of those who seized the
opportunity to mock Straight Pride and its appropriately drab flag
were, unsurprisingly, queer, yet a sizable number of straight people
could also be found in the fray. A quick Twitter search of the phrase
“heterosexuality is a prison” reveals that it is attached just as
often to complaints made from within heterosexual experience as
to queers thanking their lucky stars they were born gay.
Confronted by Straight Pride, many are keen to emphasize that they are
not that kind of heterosexual, that they are, in fact,
ashamed of being straight, and that, not to be dramatic, they
see heterosexuality as a prison within which they are confined against
their will. (The prevalence of the prison metaphor could be taken as a
reassuring indication of abolitionism going mainstream or a worrying
reminder of how easily incarceration is still trivialized in the
popular imagination.) Their disavowals are akin to white people making
jokes about “stuff white people like,” a connection that makes sense
given the sinister intimacy between Straight Pride and
white-supremacist organizing. Yet while trying to redeem oneself from
whiteness or heterosexuality through performative distancing
mechanisms might seem progressive, the reality is usually little more
than an abdication of responsibility. If heteropessimism’s purpose is
personal absolution, it cannot also be justice.
Performatively detaching oneself from heterosexuality is particularly
appealing for women, and the reason why is encapsulated by one of
heteropessimism’s memetic antecedents: the overly attached girlfriend.
This early meme is less a portrayal of actual behavior than a goofy
male nightmare, the suffocatingly overcommitted partner against whom
freewheeling men like to define themselves. Interestingly, the meme
originally emerged from a video parodying Justin Bieber’s 2012 hit
“Boyfriend,” which begins with the now famous romantic threat “If I
was your boyfriend, I’d never let you go.” As is fairly common in
straight culture, a negative trait like obsessive jealousy—which in reality is one of the most commonly cited triggers of
male-on-female domestic violence—is repackaged and sold as a female trait. If the OAG was a
manifestation of men’s heteropessimism, women reacted by declaring
themselves absolutely and flamboyantly unattached—to men and to heterosexuality in general.
Aproliferationofmemesparading
this lack of attachment emerged in the OAG’s wake, quickly becoming a
foundational mode of women’s heteropessimist expression.
In this sense, heteropessimism is, to borrow Lee Edelman’s phrase, an
“anesthetic feeling”: “a feeling that aims to protect against
overintensity of feeling and an attachment that can survive
detachment.” Heteropessimism’s anesthetic effect is especially
seductive because it dissociates women from the very traits—overattachment and “the overintensity of feeling”—for which straight culture is determined to make us ashamed. That
much heteropessimist sentiment is delivered in joke form coheres with
Henri Bergson’s idea that comedy delivers “a momentary anesthesia of
the heart.” Unlike traditional comedy, however, heteropessimism is
anticathartic. Its structure is anticipatory, designed to preemptively
anesthetize the heart against the pervasive awfulness of heterosexual
culture as well as the sharp plunge of quotidian romantic pain. During
the media storm surrounding Brett Kavanaugh’s hearing, for example,
the comedian
Solomon Georgio tweeted
(to the tune of over 23,000 retweets and 142,000 likes): “Today is a
reminder that if homosexuality was a choice, there would be 2, maybe
3, straight women left after today.” This sentence, which circles back
to the same word on which it began, betrays the confusion between
universality and specificity embedded in heteropessimism. Kavanagh is
a “reminder” of a preexisting fact—that no woman would choose to be straight—yet this fact is somehow also produced by “today,” by the particular
awfulness of the present.
Like most online subcultures, heteropessimism occupies a contradictory
relationship to the market. Quite often framed as an anti-capitalist
position, heteropessimism could be read as a refusal of the “good
life” of marital consumption and property ownership that capitalism
once mandated. Yet this good life, which was always withheld from
marginalized populations, is now untenable for almost everyone. If the
couple was the primary consumer unit of the past, today this has
collapsed, or more accurately been replaced by a new dyad, the
individual consumer and her phone. It is hardly news that the goal of
the big hookup apps is to keep people single. Tinder has made this
surprisingly explicit in its first ever brand campaign, which features
an exuberant, seemingly carefree blonde woman accompanied by the words
“Single does what single wants.” Stay single, stay wanting, and let
the data of your desire accumulate like so many layers of gold.
Heteropessimism has helped stimulate this individualizing turn, not
just by draining the hetero couple form of its appeal but because
dissatisfaction with heterosexuality, despite being sold as universal,
always seems to operate on the level of the individual. Collectively
changing the conditions of straight culture is not the purview of
heteropessimism. In this sense, heteropessimism actually reinforces
the privatizing function of heterosexuality, even as it is mass
distributed through culture as a viral meme. Under a heteropessimistic
rubric, women might not view themselves as competing with one another
within the cutthroat dating “market,” but in metabolizing the problem
of heterosexuality as a personal issue the possibility of solidarity
remains foreclosed.
This is an acute problem. Social movements such as #MeToo or the South
African protest against intimate-partner violence #MenAreTrash
demonstrate the frightening urgency with which heterosexual culture
needs to be revolutionized. Heteropessimism might seem like a starting
point of that revolution, but in reality its anesthetizing force has
had the ironic effect of stalling some of the momentum of these
movements. If “heterosexuality” becomes shorthand for misogyny, the
proper object of critique falls from view. To be permanently,
preemptively disappointed in heterosexuality is to refuse the
possibility of changing straight culture for the better. This is, of
course, similar to the charge often leveled against Afro-pessimism, a
school of thought that takes antiblackness to be the transhistorical
structuring force of the world. Both Afro- and heteropessimism are
reactions to perceived immutability, but beyond this their resonance
is mostly morphological. The pessimism in heteropessimism is more
literal, more basic (in both senses of the word) than it is in
Afropessimism. Partly for this reason, heteropessimism is far more
obviously prohibitive of social change.
Unlike Afropessimists, heteropessimists bear responsibility for
exactly what they identify as irredeemable, and this responsibility
cannot evaporate via disavowal, however much they might like it
to. A certain strain of heteropessimism assigns 100 percent of the
blame for heterosexuality’s malfunction to men, and has thus become
one of the myriad ways in which young women—especially white women—have
learned to disclaim our own cruelty and power. Like most lesbians, I
have found myself on the receiving end of approximately 100,000 drunk
straight women bemoaning their orientation and insisting that it would
be “so much easier” to be gay. Sure, it probably would be! That “men
are trash” is not something I am personally invested in disputing. Yet
in announcing her wish to be gay, the speaker carelessly glosses over
the fact that she has chosen to stay attached to
heterosexuality—to remain among
the (slightly more than 2 or 3) women who are, despite everything,
still straight.
Women are not the only heteropessimists. From the indignant fury of
the incel to the married man complaining about his “old ball and
chain,” men clearly subscribe to heteropessimism even if, like all
feelings, they are not exactly encouraged to express it. To be clear,
men’s heteropessimist claims tend to be neither ethically nor
logically equivalent to those made by women. Instead, they are a kind
of funhouse distortion of feminist complaint. Nowhere is this
perversion better illustrated than on Facebook, where the efforts of
men’s-rights activists have led administrators to classify “men are
trash” as hate speech and suspend the accounts of those who use the
phrase. (Users may post “women are trash” with impunity.)
Heteropessimism has become a framework through which men process both
demands for gender equality and the quotidian experience of romantic
harm as evidence of a global female conspiracy. One of the most
prominent male heteropessimist memes asserts that the #MeToo climate
has made dating too dangerous—for
men. The most zealous male heteropessimists—so committed that they are mocked by other male-supremacist groups
for actually choosing to act on their heteropessimism—unite under the delightful banner of Men Going Their Own Way. MGTOW
maintain that women are sly, parasitic, and essentially evil, that
heterosexuality is wholly beneficial to women and severely dangerous
for men, and that the only solution is for men to abstain from
marriage, reproduction, and (according to some) dating, sex, and even
masturbation.
The result is a strange parody of feminism. In place of heterosexual
relations, MGTOW are encouraged to form homosocial self-care
communities that will both shield and heal them from romantic trauma,
ensuring a kind of prolonged anesthesia of the heart. The movement’s
heavy reliance on the Internet makes it difficult to know how
substantial it is in reality. Its members are prolific meme makers,
and online forums are their consciousness-raising site of choice. Yet
even if MGTOW became a prominent force in reality, in choosing to
self-segregate, this group actually render themselves the least
dangerous of male heteropessimists. Far more disturbing are those
who’ve come to believe that contemporary culture cheats them out of
their “right” to possess women—and choose to act on this belief. In a talk at the 2019 Duke
Feminist Theory Workshop, Lauren Berlant identified heteropessimism as
a product of contemporary tectonic shifts in social power: “As we are
living now, when privilege unravels it goes out kicking and screaming,
and people lose confidence in how to be together, uncertain about how
to read each other, and incompetent about even their own desire . . .
as the incels, braincels, and many new sex-negative feminists
exemplify.” Thus far, this is the only explicit acknowledgment I’ve
found of the link between these feminist and anti-feminist traditions
of heterosexual negativity.
Such a theoretical lacuna is unsurprising. Heterosexuality has long
been a neglected object of study, elbowed out of sexuality studies
right after the field emerged by the sexier and cooler project of
queer theory. Queer theorists look smugly at heterosexuality over
their shoulders as the thing that they have—thank God—left behind. In doing
so, they remain outdatedly attached to a moment in which
heterosexuality was widely understood to be an idealized form of life.
In Jane Ward’s otherwise razor-sharp
Not Gay: Sex Between Straight White Men, the sociologist
chooses to define straight people not by the sex acts they pursue but
by the fact that “they enjoy heterosexual culture. Simply put, being
sexually ‘normal’ suits them. It feels good; it feels like home.” This
flattening account of straight identity, which fails to accommodate
even the possibility of heteropessimism, is a far cry from our
current reality.
Compared to the heady possibilities of the queer world to come,
heterosexuality appears unbearably drab and predictable (the “same old
story” as Skepta puts it in a
recent heteropessimist anthem). Indeed, in the moment just before feminist theorization of
heterosexuality all but totally fizzled out, a pre–Gender Trouble
Judith Butler wrote that “precisely because it is bound to fail, and
yet endeavors to succeed, the project of heterosexual identity is
propelled into an endless repetition of itself.”
Spinning on its wheels, endlessly repeating, going nowhere—heteropessimists and queer theorists alike are convinced that this is
heterosexuality’s permanent fate. I think they’re wrong, that there’s
evidence heterosexual culture is changing. But even if it weren’t, we
would have to believe it could, because tens of thousands of women are
currently dying of it
every year, murdered by their husbands,
boyfriends, or exes. (That
almost all mass shooters have histories of domestic violence
makes it obvious that heterosexuality also poses a fatal threat to
anyone, of any gender, who happens to be in a movie theater, at
school, in the office, at a mall.) Yes, universal queerness and the
abolition of gender may be the horizon toward which we are eventually
moving—but what happens in the
meantime?
Particularly for women, radically transforming heterosexuality might
begin with honest accounts of which elements of heterosexuality are
actually appealing—the house is
clearly on fire, but is there anything worth saving? Such accounts are
totally foreclosed by heteropessimism, and must therefore be drawn
from conversations and narratives that—even if only momentarily—transcend a heteropessimist register.
One such conversation can be found in the writer Harron Walker’s
podcast why do i like men. In episode one, guest Larissa Pham
echoes the ridiculers of Straight Pride: “Heterosexuality is a prison
. . . heterosexuality is awful.” Pham posits heterosexuality as a form
of wayward, masochistic desire; she tells Walker that she likes men
“’cause you don’t know what’s good for you . . . and you’re drawn to
that which destroys you.” Later, Pham reverts to the familiar
implication that no woman would choose heterosexuality: “I don’t think
you can choose attraction.”
Yet over the course of the conversation Pham does cite reasons why she
finds men desirable, such as “big arms,” “penis,” and “the way men
smell . . . most men.” In subsequent episodes, other guests offer
their own ideas about men’s appeal. Theda Hammel suggests that women
are drawn to men because intimate proximity to a man is affirming:
“The reason that a woman likes men—or a trans woman maybe in particular likes men—is not necessarily because men are that likeable . . . but just that
they bring out qualities that you like in yourself, by virtue of being
different from you.” For all their obviousness, these observations are
quite rarely voiced. Hearing them spoken so plainly exposes how
heteropessimism has worked to silence articulations of women’s desire.
why do i like men is a half joke—you can hear the smirk in Walker’s voice as she delivers the question
at the beginning of each episode—but it is also a sincere inquiry. In asking and reasking the
podcast’s eponymous question, Walker pushes through heteropessimist
anesthesia and reawakens her own vulnerability. In this light,
heterosexuality is not a terminal diagnosis but becomes a possible
site of experiment and change.
For a long time, heterosexuality’s normalization allowed it to
endlessly repeat, immune from any substantial change. Today,
heteropessimism might actually obscure the extent to which
heterosexuality is changing—even as it is also causing it. Without an immutable object of
critique, the logic of heteropessimism falls apart. Perversely, this
has created a renewed investment in the consistency of
heterosexuality, a reinscription of heterosexuality’s tired features,
even as this investment takes the disguised form of negative feeling.
In this light, heteropessimism reveals something about the way we can
remain secretly attached to the continuity of the very things we
(sincerely) decry as toxic, boring, broken. Faced with the possibility
of disappointment, anesthesia can feel like a balm.
History and Theory of Architecture, Modern Architecture, Le Corbusier,
Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Frank Lloyd Wright, Womens Studies, Climate
Responsive Design - History, Architecture - Psychological Aspects
Historians of Modern Architecture have cultivated the image of the
architect as a temperamental genius, unconcerned by issues of
politeness or pragmatics—a
reading reinforced in cultural representations of Modern Architects,
such as Howard Roark, the protagonist in Ayn Rand’s 1943 novel
The Fountainhead (a character widely believed to be based
on the architect Frank Lloyd Wright). The perception of the
Modern Architect as an artistic hero or genius has also influenced
the reception of their work. Despite their indisputable place within
the architectural canon, many important works of Modern Architecture
were contested on pragmatic grounds, such as cost, brief and
particularly concerning issues of suitability and effectiveness in
relation to climate and weather. A number of famed cases resulted in
legal action between clients and architects, and in many more
examples historians have critically framed these accounts to
highlight alternate issues and agendas.
“Complaints about the weather,” in relation to architecture,
inevitably raise issues regarding a work’s “success,” particularly
in view of the tensions between artistry and functionality inherent
in the discipline of architecture. While in more recent decades
these ideas have been framed around ideas of sustainability—particularly in relation to contemporary buildings—more traditionally they have been engaged through discussions of an
architect’s ethical responsibility to deliver a habitable building
that meets the client’s needs. This paper suggests these complaints
often raise a broader range of issues and are used to highlight
tensions inherent in the discipline. In the history of Modern
Architecture, these complaints are often framed through gender
studies, ethics and, more recently, artistic asceticism. Accounts of
complaints and disputes are often invoked in the social construction
(or deconstruction) of artistic genius—whether in a positive or negative light. Through its discussion of
a number of famed examples, this paper will discuss the framing of
climate in relation to the figure of the Modern Architect and the
reception of the architectural “masterpiece.”
Dear Monsieur Le Corbusier …
In June 1930 Mme Savoye, the patron of the famed Villa Savoye on the
outskirts of Paris, wrote to her architect, Le Corbusier, stating:
“it is still raining in our garage” (Sbriglio 144)—a persistent theme in their correspondence. This letter followed
another sent in March after discovering leaks in the garage and
several bedrooms following a visit during inclement weather. While
sent prior to the building’s completion, she also noted that
rainfall on the bathroom skylight “makes a terrible noise […] which
prevents us from sleeping in bad weather” (Sbriglio 142).
Claiming to have warned Le Corbusier about the concern, the
contractor refused to accept responsibility, prompting some rather
fiery correspondence between the two. This problem, compounded by
issues with the heating system, resulted in the house feeling, as
Sbriglio notes, “cold and damp” and subject to “substantial heat
loss due to the large glazing”—a cause for particular concern given the health problems of the
clients’ only child, Roger Savoye, that saw him spend time in a
French Sanatorium (Sbriglio 145). While the cause of Roger’s illness
is not clear, at least one writer (albeit with a noticeable lack of
footnotes or supporting evidence) has linked this directly to the
villa (de Botton 65).
Mme Savoye’s complaints about dampness, humidity, condensation and
leaking in her home persisted in subsequent years, prompting Benton
to summarise in 1987, “every autumn […] there were cries of distress
from the Savoye family with the first rains” (Villas 204).
These also extended to discussion of the heating system, which while
proving insufficient was also causing flooding (Benton, "Villa" 93).
In 1935 Savoye again wrote to Le Corbusier, wearily stating:
It is raining in the hall, it’s raining on the ramp and the wall of
the garage is absolutely soaked [….] it’s still raining in my
bathroom, which floods in bad weather, as the water comes in through
the skylight. The gardener’s walls are also wet through. (Sbriglio
146–7)
Savoye’s understandable vexation with waterproofing problems in her
home continued to escalate. With a mixture of gratitude and
frustration, a letter sent two years later stated: “After
innumerable demands you have finally accepted that this house which
you built in 1929 in uninhabitable…. Please render it inhabitable
immediately. I sincerely hope that I will not have to take recourse
to legal action” (Sbriglio 147).
Paradoxically, Le Corbusier was interested in the potential of
architecture and urban planning to facilitate health and well-being,
as well as the effects that climate may play in this. Early
twentieth century medical thought advocated
heliotherary (therapeutic exposure to sunlight) for a
diverse range of medical conditions, ranging from rickets to
tuberculosis. Similarly the health benefits of climate, such as the
dryness of mountain air, had been recognised for much longer, and
had led to burgeoning industries associated with health, travel and
climate. The dangers of damp environments had also long been
medically recognised. Le Corbusier’s awareness of the health
benefits of sunshine led to the inclusion of a solarium in the villa
that afforded both framed and unframed views of the surrounding
countryside, such as those that were advocated in the seventeenth
century as an antidote to melancholy (Burton 65–66).
Both Benton and Sbriglio present Mme Savoye’s complaints as part of
their comprehensive histories of an important and influential work
of Modern Architecture. Each reproduce excerpts from archival
letters that are not widely translated or accessible, and Benton’s
1984 essay is the source other authors generally cite in discussing
these matters. In contrast, for example, Murphy’s 2002 account of
the villa’s conversion from “house” to “historical monument” cites
the same letters (via Benton) as part of a broader argument that
highlights the “undomestic” or “unhomely” nature of the work by
cataloguing such accounts of the client’s experience of discomfort
while residing in the space—thus revisiting a number of common criticisms of Modern
Architecture.
Le Corbusier’s reputation for designing buildings that responded
poorly to climate is often referenced in popular accounts of his
work. For example, a 1935 article published in Time states:
Though the great expanses of glass that he favors may occasionally
turn his rooms into hothouses, his flat roofs may leak and his plans
may be wasteful of space, it was Architect Le Corbusier who in 1923
put the entire philosophy of modern architecture into a single
sentence: “A house is a machine to live in.”
Reference to these issues are usually made rather minimally in
academic accounts of his work, and few would agree with this
article’s assertion that Le Corbusier’s influence as a phrasemaker
would rival the impact of his architecture. In contrast, such
issues, in relation to other architects, are often invoked more
rhetorically as part of a variety of historical agendas,
particularly in constructing feminist histories of architecture.
While Corbusier and his work have often been the source of
intellectual contention from feminist scholars—for example in regard to authorial disputes and fractious
relationships with the likes of Eileen Gray or Charlotte
Perriand—discussion
of the functional failures in the Villa Savoye are rarely addressed
from this perspective. Rather, feminist scholars have focussed their
attention on a number of other projects, most notably the case of
the Farnsworth House, another canonical work of Modernism.
Dear Herr Mies van der Rohe …
Mies van der Rohe’s Farnsworth House, completed in 1951 in Plano
Illinois, was commissioned as a country weekend residence by an
unmarried female doctor, a brief credited with freeing the architect
from many of the usual pragmatic requirements of a permanent city
residence. In response Mies designed a rectilinear steel and glass
pavilion, which hovered (to avoid the flood levels) above the
landscape, sheltered by maple trees, in close proximity to the Fox
River. The refined architectural detail, elegant formal properties,
and poetic relationship with the surrounding landscape—whether in its autumnal splendour or covered in a thick blanket of
snow—captivated
architects seeing it become, like the Villa Savoye, one of the most
revered architectural works of the twentieth century.
Prior to construction a model was exhibited in the Museum of Modern
Art in New York and, upon completion the building became a
pilgrimage site for architects and admirers. The exhibition of the
design later fuelled debate about whether Dr Farnsworth constituted
a patron or a client (Friedman 134); a distinction
generating very different expectations for the responsibilities of
the architect, particularly regarding the production of a habitable
home that met the client’s brief versus producing a design of
architectural merit.
The house was intended as a frame for viewing and contemplating
nature, thus seeing nature and climate aligned with the
transcendental qualities of the design. Following a visit during
construction, Farnsworth described the building’s relationship to
the elements, writing: “the two horizontal planes of the unfinished
building, floating over the meadows, were unearthly beautiful under
a sun which glowed like a wild rose” (5). Similarly, in 1951, Arthur
Drexler described the building as “a quantity of air caught between
a floor and a roof” (Vandenberg 6). Seven years later the architect
himself asserted that nature “gained a more profound significance”
when viewed from within the house (Friedman 139).
While the transparency of the house was “forgiven” by its isolated
location and the lack of visibility from neighbouring properties,
the issues a glass and steel box might pose for the thermal comfort
of its occupant are not difficult to imagine. Following the house’s
completion, Farnsworth fitted windows with insect screens and blinds
(although Mies intended for curtains to be installed) that clumsily
undermined the refined and minimalistic architectural details.
Controversy surrounding the house was, in part, the result of its
bold new architectural language. However, it was also due to the
architect-client relationship, which turned acrimonious in a very
public manner. A dispute between Mies and Farnsworth regarding
unpaid fees was fought both in the courtroom and the media, becoming
a forum for broader debate as various journals (for example,
House Beautiful), publicly took sides.
The professional female client versus the male architect and the
framing of their dispute by historians and the media has seen this
project become a seminal case-study in feminist architectural
histories, such as Friedman’s
Women and the Making of the Modern House of 1998. Beyond
the conflict and speculation about the individuals involved, at the
core of these discussions were the inadequacies of the project in
relation to comfort and climate. For example, Farnsworth describes
in her journal finding the house awash with several inches of water,
leading to a court session being convened on the rooftop in order to
properly ascertain the defects (14).
Written retrospectively, after their relationship soured,
Farnsworth’s journal delights in recounting any errors or
misjudgements made by Mies during construction. For example, she
described testing the fireplace to find “the house was sealed so
hermetically that the attempt of a flame to go up the chimney caused
an interior negative pressure” (2). Further, her growing
disenchantment was reflected in bleak descriptions aligning the
building with the weather. Describing her first night camping in her
home, she wrote: “the expanses of the glass walls and the sills were
covered with ice. The silent meadows outside white with old and
hardened snow reflected the bleak [light] bulb within, as if the
glass house itself were an unshaded bulb of uncalculated watts
lighting the winter plains” (9).
In an April 1953 article in House Beautiful, Elizabeth
Gordon publicly sided with Farnsworth as part of a broader campaign
against the International Style. She condemned the home, and its
‘type’ as “unlivable”, writing: “You burn up in the summer and
freeze in the winter, because nothing must interfere with the ‘pure’
form of their rectangles” (250). Gordon included the lack of
“overhanging roofs to shade you from the sun” among a catalogue of
“human qualities” she believed architects sacrificed for the
expression of composition—a
list that also included possessions, children, pets and adequate
kitchen facilities (250). In 1998 excerpts from this article were
reproduced by Friedman, in her seminal work of feminist
architectural history, and were central in her discussion of the way
that debates surrounding this house were framed through notions of
gender.
Responding to this conflict, and its media coverage, in 1960 Peter
Blake wrote:
All great houses by great architects tend to be somewhat
impractical; many of Corbu’s and Wright’s house clients find that
they are living in too expensive and too inefficient buildings. Yet
many of these clients would never exchange their houses for the most
workable piece of mediocrity. (88)
Far from complaining about the weather, the writings of its second
owner, Peter Palumbo, poetically meditate the building’s
relationship to the seasons and the elements. In his foreword to a
2003 monograph, he wrote:
life inside the house is very much a balance with nature, and an
extension of nature. A change in the season or an alteration of the
landscape creates a marked change in the mood inside the house. With
an electric storm of Wagnerian proportions illuminating the night
sky and shaking the foundations of the house to their very core, it
is possible to remain quite dry! When, with the melting snows of
spring, the Fox River becomes a roaring torrent that bursts its
banks, the house assumes a character of a house-boat, the water
level sometimes rising perilously close to the front door. On such
occasions, the approach to the house is by canoe, which is tied to
the steps of the upper terrace. (Vandenberg 5)
Palumbo purchased the house from Farnsworth and commissioned Mies’s
grandson to restore it to its original condition, removing the
blinds and insect screens, and installing an air-conditioning
system. The critical positioning of Palumbo has been quite different
from that of Farnsworth. His restoration and writings on the project
have in some ways seen him positioned as the “real” architectural
patron. Furthermore, his willingness to tolerate some discomfort in
his inhabitation has seen him in some ways prefigure the type of
resident that will be next be discussed in reference to recent
owners of Wright properties.
Dear Mr Wright …
Accounts of weatherproofing problems in buildings designed by Frank
Lloyd Wright have become the basis of mythology in the architectural
discipline. For example, in 1936 Herbert Johnson and J. Vernon
Steinle visited Wright’s Richard Lloyd Jones house in Oklahoma. As
Jonathan Lipman wrote, “Steinle’s most prominent recollection of the
house was that there were scores of tubs and canning jars in the
house catching water leaking through the roof” (45). While Lipman
notes the irony that both the house and office Wright designed for
Johnson would suffer the same problem, it is the anecdotal accounts
of the former that have perhaps attracted the most interest. An
oft-recounted story tells of Johnson telephoning Wright, during a
dinner party, with regard to water dripping from the ceiling into
his guest-of-honour’s soup; the complaint was reportedly rebuffed
unsympathetically by Wright who suggested the lady should move her
chair (Farr 272).
Wright himself addressed his reputation for designing buildings that
leaked in his Autobiography. In reference to
La Miniatura in Pasadena, of 1923, he contextualised
difficulties with the local climate, which he suggested was prone to
causing leaks, writing: “The sun bakes the roof for eleven months,
two weeks and five days, shrinking it to a shrivel. Then giving the
roof no warning whatever to get back to normal if it could, the
clouds burst. Unsuspecting roof surfaces are deluged by a three inch
downpour.” He continued, stating:
I knew all this. And I know there are more leaking roofs in Southern
California than in all the rest of the world put together. I knew
that the citizens come to look upon water thus in a singularly
ungrateful mood. I knew that water is all that enables them to have
their being there, but let any of it through on them from above,
unexpectedly, in their houses and they go mad. It is a kind of
phobia. I knew all this and I have taken seriously precautions in
the details of this little house to avoid such scenes as a result of
negligible roofs. This is the truth. (250)
Wright was quick to attribute blame—directed squarely at the builder. Never one for quiet diplomacy, he
complained that the “builder had lied to [him] about the flashing
under and within the coping walls” (250) and he was ignorant of the
incident because the client had not informed him of the leak. He
suggested the client’s silence was undoubtedly due to her “not
wishing to hurt [his] feelings”. Although given earlier statements
it might be speculated that she did not wish to be accused of
pandering to a phobia of leaks. Wright was dismissive of the
client’s inconvenience, suggesting she would be able to continue as
normal until the next rains the following year and claiming he
“fixed the house” once he “found out about it” (250). Implicit in
this justification was the idea that it was not unreasonable to
expect the client to bear a few days of “discomfort” each year in
tolerance of the local climate. In true Wright style, discussions of
these problems in his autobiography were self-constructive
concessions.
While Wright refused to take responsibility for climate-related
issues in La Minatura, he was more forthcoming in
appreciating the triumphs of his Imperial Hotel in Japan—one of the only buildings in the vicinity to survive the 1923
earthquake. In a chapter of his autobiography titled “Building
against Doomsday (Why the Great Earthquake did not destroy the
Imperial Hotel),” Wright reproduced a telegram sent by Okura Impeho
stating: “Hotel stands undamaged as monument of your genius hundreds
of homeless provided perfectly maintained service. Congratulations”
(222).
Far from unconcerned by nature or climate, Wright’s works celebrated
and often went to great effort to accommodate the poetic qualities
of these. In reference to his own home, Taliesin, Wright wrote:
I wanted a home where icicles by invitation might beautify the
eaves. So there were no gutters. And when the snow piled deep on the
roofs […] icicles came to hang staccato from the eaves. Prismatic
crystal pendants sometimes six feet long, glittered between the
landscape and the eyes inside. Taliesin in winter was a frosted
palace roofed and walled with snow, hung with iridescent fringes.
(173)
This description was, in part, included as a demonstration of his
“superior” understanding and appreciation of nature and its poetic
possibilities; an understanding not always mirrored by his clients.
Discussing the Lloyd Lewis House in Libertyville, Illinois of 1939,
Wright described his endeavours to keep the house comfortable (and
avoid flooding) in Spring, Autumn and Summer months which, he
conceded, left the house more vulnerable to winter conditions.
Utilising an underfloor heating system, which he argued created a
more healthful natural climate rather than an “artificial
condition,” he conceded this may feel inadequate upon first entering
the space (495). Following the client’s complaints that this system
and the fireplace were insufficient, particularly in comparison with
the temperature levels he was accustomed to in his workplace (at
The Daily News), Wright playfully wrote:
I thought of various ways of keeping the writer warm, I thought of
wiring him to an electric pad inside his vest, allowing lots of lead
wire so he could get around. But he waved the idea aside with
contempt. […] Then I suggested we appeal to Secretary Knox to turn
down the heat at the daily news […] so he could become acclimated.
(497)
Due to the client’s disinclination to bear this discomfort or use
any such alternate schemes, Wright reluctantly refit the house with
double-glazing (at the clients expense).
In such cases, discussion of leaks or thermal discomfort were not
always negative, but were cited rhetorically implying that
perfunctory building techniques were not yet advanced enough to meet
the architect’s expectations, or that their creative abilities were
suppressed by conservative or difficult clients. Thus discussions of
building failures have often been invoked in the social construction
of the “architect-genius.” Interestingly accounts of the
permeability of Wright’s buildings are more often included in
biographical rather that architectural writings.
In recent years, these accounts of weatherproofing problems have
transformed from accusing letters or statements implying failure to
a “badge of honour” among occupants who endure discomfort for the
sake of art. This changing perspective is usually more pronounced in
second generation owners, like Peter Palumbo (who has also owned
Corbusier and Wright designed homes), who are either more aware of
the potential problems in owning such a house or are more tolerant
given an understanding of the historical worth of these projects.
This is nowhere more evident than in a profile published in the real
estate section of the New York Times. Rather than
concealing these issues to preserve the resale value of the
property, weatherproofing problems are presented as an endearing
quirk. The new owners of Wright’s Prefab No. 1 of 1959, on Staten
Island declared they initially did not have enough pots to place
under the fifty separate leaks in their home, but in December 2005
proudly boasted they were ‘down to only one leak’ (Bernstein,
"Living"). Similarly, in 2003 the resident of a Long Island
Wright-designed property, optimistically claimed that while his
children often complained their bedrooms were uncomfortably cold,
this encouraged the family to spend more time in the warmer communal
spaces (Bernstein, "In a House"). This client, more than simply
optimistic, (perhaps unwittingly) implies an awareness of the
importance of “the hearth” in Wright’s architecture.
In such cases complaints about the weather are re-framed. The
leaking roof is no longer representative of gender or power
relationships between the client and the uncompromising artistic
genius. Rather, it actually empowers the inhabitant who rises above
their circumstances for the sake of art, invoking a kind of artistic
asceticism.
While “enlightened” clients of famed architects may be willing to
suffer the effects of climate in the interiors of their homes, their
neighbours are less tolerant as suggested in a more recent example.
Complaints about the alteration of the micro-climate surrounding
Frank Gehry’s Walt Disney Concert Hall in Los Angeles prompted the
sandblasting of part of the exterior cladding to reduce glare. In
2004, USA Today reported that reflections from the
stainless steel cladding were responsible for raising the
temperature in neighbouring buildings by more than 9° Celsius,
forcing neighbours to close their blinds and operate their
air-conditioners. There were also fears that the glare might
inadvertently cause traffic problems. Further, one report found that
average ground temperatures adjacent to the building peaked at
approximately 58° Celsius (Schiler and Valmont). Unlike the
Modernist examples, this more recent project has not yet been framed
in aid of a critical agenda, and has seemingly been reported simply
for being “newsworthy.”
Benign Conversation
Discussion of the suitability of Modern Architecture in relation to
climate has proven a perennial topic of conversation, invoked in the
course of recurring debates and criticisms. The fascination with
accounts of climate-related problems—particularly in discussing the work of the great Modernist
Architects like Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe and Frank Lloyd
Wright—is in part due to a
certain Schadenfreude in debunking the esteem and authority
of a canonical figure. This is particularly the case with one, such
as Wright, who was characterised by significant self-confidence and
an acerbic wit often applied at the expense of others. Yet these
accounts have been invoked as much in the construction of
the figure of the architect as a creative genius as they have been
in the deconstruction of this figure—as well as the historical construction of the client and the
historians involved.
In view of the growing awareness of the threats and realities of
climate change, complaints about the weather are destined to adopt a
new significance and be invoked in support of a different range of
agendas. While it may be somewhat anachronistic to interpret the
designs of Frank Lloyd Wright or Mies van der Rohe in terms of
current discussions about sustainability in architecture, these
topics are often broached when restoring, renovating or adapting the
designs of such architects for new or contemporary usage. In
contrast, the climatic problems caused by Gehry’s concert hall are
destined to be framed according to a different set of values—such as the relationship of his work to the time, or perhaps in
relation to contemporary technology. While discussion of the weather
is, in the conversational arts, credited as benign topic, this is
rarely the case in architectural history.
References
Benton, Tim.
The Villas of Le Corbusier 1920–1930.
New Haven: Yale UP, 1987.
———. “Villa Savoye and the
Architects’ Practice (1984).”
Le Corbusier: The Garland Essays. Ed. H. Allen Brooks. New
York: Garland, 1987. 83–105.
Blake, Peter.
Mies van der Rohe: Architecture and Structure.
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963 (1960).
Campbell, Margaret. “What Tuberculosis Did for Modernism: The
Influence of a Curative Environment on Modernist Design and
Architecture.” Medical History 49 (2005): 463–488.
Farr, Finis. Frank Lloyd Wright: A Biography. New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1961.
Friedman, Alice T.
Women and the Making of the Modern House: A Social and
Architectural History. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1998.
Gordon, Elizabeth. “The Threat to the Next America.”
House Beautiful 95.4 (1953): 126–30, 250–51. Excerpts reproduced in
Friedman. Women and the Making of the Modern House.
140–141.
✾ vanityfair.com✾
Monday 8 November 2010✾
Mark Bowden✾ 41 minute read✾
From the start, it was a bad case.
A battered 21-year-old woman with long blond curls was discovered
facedown in the weeds, naked, at the western edge of Miami, where the
neat grid of outer suburbia butts up against the high grass and black
mud of the Everglades. It was early on a winter morning in 2005. A
local power-company worker was driving by the empty lots of an unbuilt
cul-de-sac when he saw her.
And much to his surprise, she was alive. She was still unconscious
when the police airlifted her to Jackson Memorial Hospital. When she
woke up in its trauma center, she could remember little about what had
happened to her, but her body told an ugly tale. She had been raped,
badly beaten, and left for dead. There was severe head trauma; she had
suffered brain-rattling blows. Semen was recovered from inside her.
The bones around her right eye were shattered. She was terrified and
confused. She bent English to her native Ukrainian grammar and syntax,
dropping pronouns and inverting standard sentence structure, which
made her hard to understand. And one of the first things she asked for
on waking was her lawyer. That was unusual.
Miami-Dade detectives learned that she had been living for months at
the Airport Regency Hotel, eight miles from where she was found. It is
one of those crisply efficient overnight spots in the orbit of major
airports that cater to travelers needing a bed between legs of long
flights. She was employed by a cruise-ship line and had severely cut
her finger on the job, so she was being put up at the hotel by her
employers while she healed. The assault had begun, she said, in her
room, on the fourth floor. She described her attackers as two or three
white men who spoke with accents that she heard as “Hispanic,” but she
wasn’t certain. She remembered one of the men pushing a pillow into
her face, and being forced to drink something strong, alcoholic. She
had fragments of memories like bits of a bad dream—of being held up or carried, of being thrown over a man’s shoulder as
he moved down a flight of stairs, of being roughly violated in the
backseat of a car, of pleading for her life. Powerful, cruel moments,
but there was nothing solid, nothing that made a decent lead. When her
lawyer soon after filed a lawsuit against the hotel, alleging
negligence, going after potentially deep corporate pockets, the
detectives thought something was fishy. This was not your typical rape
victim. What if she was part of some sophisticated con?
The police detectives did what they could at the hotel, combing the
woman’s room for evidence, interviewing hotel employees, obtaining
images from all of the surveillance cameras for the morning of the
crime, going over the guest lists. The hotel had 174 rooms, and so
many people came and went that it would have taken months working
full-time to run checks on every one of them, something beyond the
resources of a police department in a high-crime area like Miami-Dade.
The sex-crimes unit set aside the file with no clear leads, only more
questions. After several weeks, “we were dried up,” recalled Allen
Foote, the detective handling the case.
So the action was all headed toward civil court. The hotel engaged a
law firm to defend itself from the woman’s lawsuit, and the firm
eventually hired a private detective named
Ken Brennan
to figure out what had happened.
Foote was not pleased. It was usually a pain in the ass to have a
private detective snooping around one of his cases. Brennan was right
out of central casting—middle-aged, deeply tanned, with gray hair. He was a weight lifter
and favored open-necked shirts that showed off both the definition of
his upper pecs and the bright, solid-gold chain around his neck. The
look said: mature, virile, laid-back, and making it. He had been
divorced, and his former wife was now deceased; his children were
grown. He had little in the way of daily family responsibilities.
Brennan had been a cop on Long Island, where he was from, and had
worked eight years as a D.E.A. agent. He had left the agency in the
mid-90s to work as a commodities broker and to set up as a private
detective. The brokering was not to his taste, but the investigating
was. He was a warm, talkative guy, with a thick Long Island accent,
who sized people up quickly and with a healthy strain of New York
brass. If he liked you, he let you know it right away, and you were
his friend for life, and if he didn’t … well, you would find that out
right away, too. Nothing shocked him; in fact, most of the salacious
run-of-the-mill work that pays private detectives’ bills—domestic jobs and petty insurance scams—bored him. Brennan turned those offers away. The ones he took were
mostly from businesses and law firms, who hired him to nail down the
facts in civil-court cases like this one.
He had a fixed policy. He told potential employers up front, “I’ll
find out what happened. I’m not going to shade things to assist your
client, but I will find out what the truth is.” Brennan liked it when
the information he uncovered helped his clients, but that wasn’t a
priority. Winning lawsuits wasn’t the goal. What excited him was the
mystery.
The job in this case was straightforward. Find out who raped and beat
this young woman and dumped her in the weeds. Had the attack even
happened at the hotel, or had she slipped out and met her assailant or
assailants someplace else? Was she just a simple victim, or was she
being used by some kind of Eastern European syndicate? Was she a
prostitute? Was she somehow implicated? There were many questions and
few answers.
Vanishing Act
‘I used to be a cop and a federal agent,” Brennan told Detective
Foote, introducing himself at the Miami-Dade police sex-crimes-unit
offices. Foote had long strawberry-blond hair, which he combed
straight back, and a bushy blond mustache. He was about the same age
as Brennan, who read him right away as a fellow member of the
fraternity, somebody he could reason with on familiar terms.
“Look, you and I both know there’s no fucking way you can investigate
this case,” Brennan said. “I can see this through to the end. I won’t
step on your dick. I won’t do a thing without telling you about it. If
I figure out who did it, you get the arrest. I won’t do anything to
fuck it up for you.”
Foote saw logic in this and did something he ordinarily wouldn’t do.
He shared what he had in his file: crime-scene photos, surveillance
footage from the hotel security cameras, the victim’s confused
statement. Foote had interviewed a couple of hotel staff members, but
they hadn’t seen a thing. He’d gone about as far as he could with it.
He thought, Good luck.
The insurance adjuster had fared no better than Foote. As Brennan
reviewed the adjuster’s detailed summary of the case in early November
of 2005, eight months after the victim had been found, it was easy to
see why. The woman’s memory was all over the map. First she said she
had been attacked by one man, then three, then two. At one point she
said their accent might have been not Hispanic but “Romanian.” There
was no evidence to implicate anyone.
The hotel had a significant security system. The property was fenced,
and the back gates were locked and monitored. There were only a few
points of entry and exit. During the night, the back door was locked
and could be opened only remotely. There were two security guards on
duty at all times. Each exit was equipped with a surveillance camera.
There was one over the front entrance and one over the back, one in
the lobby, one at the lobby elevator, and others out by the pool and
parking lot. All of the hotel guests had digital key cards that left a
computer record every time they unlocked the door to their rooms. It
was possible to track the comings and goings of every person who
checked in.
Brennan started where all good detectives start. What did he know for
sure? He knew the victim had gone up to her fourth-floor room at the
Airport Regency at 3:41 A.M., that she had used her key card to enter
her room at about the same time, and that she had been found at dawn
in the weeds eight miles west. Somewhere in that roughly three-hour
window, she had left the hotel. But there was no evidence of this on
any of the cameras. So, how?
The victim was colorfully present on the video record, with her
bright-red puffy jacket and shoulder-length blond curls. She had been
in and out all night. After months of living in the hotel, she was
clearly restless. She made frequent trips down to the lobby just to
chat with hotel workers and guests, or to step outside for a smoke,
and the cameras caught her every trip. She had gone out to dinner with
a friend and returned around midnight, but she wasn’t done yet. She is
seen exiting the elevator at about three in the morning, and the
camera over the front entrance catches her walking away. She told
investigators that she had walked to a nearby gas station to buy a
phone card because she wanted to call her mother back in Ukraine,
where people were just waking up. Minutes after her departure, the
camera catches her return. The lobby camera records her re-entering
the hotel and crossing the lobby. Moments later she is seen entering
the elevator for her final trip upstairs. A large black man gets onto
the elevator right behind her, and the recording shows them exchanging
a few words. The police report showed her entering her room 20 minutes
later, which had led to much speculation about where she was during
that time. The victim had no memory of going anywhere but directly to
her room. Brennan checked the clock on the camera at the elevator and
found that it ran more than 20 minutes behind the computer clock,
which recorded the key swipes, solving that small mystery. After she
entered the lobby elevator, she was not seen again by any of the
cameras.
The surveillance cameras were in perfect working order. They were not
on continually; they were activated by motion detectors. Miami-Dade
detectives had tried to beat the motion detectors by moving very
slowly, or finding angles of approach that would not be seen, but they
had failed. No matter how slowly they moved, no matter what approach
they tried, the cameras clicked on faithfully and caught them.
One possibility was that she had left through her fourth-floor window.
Someone would have had to drop her out the window or somehow lower
her, presumably unconscious, into the bushes below, and then exit the
hotel and walk around to retrieve her. But the woman showed no signs
of injury from such a drop, or from ropes, and the bushes behind the
hotel had not been trampled. The police had examined them carefully,
looking for any sign of disturbance. It was also possible, with more
than one assailant, that she had been lowered into the grasp of
someone who had avoided disturbing the bushes, but Brennan saw that
such explanations began to severely stretch credulity. Sex crimes are
not committed by determined teams of attackers who come with padded
ropes to lower victims from fourth-floor windows.
No, Brennan concluded. Unless this crime had been pulled off by a team
of magicians, the victim had to have come down in the elevator to the
lobby and left through the front door. The answer was not obvious, but
it had to be somewhere in the video record from those cameras.
“Needless to say, the big mystery here is how this woman got out of
the hotel,” read the summary of the case prepared by the insurance
adjuster. It was a mystery he had not been able to crack.
Brennan penciled one word on the memo: “Disguise?”
He began studying the video record with great care, until he could
account for every coming and going. Whenever a person or a group
arrived, the camera over the front door recorded it. Seconds later,
the entries were captured by the lobby cameras, and then, soon after,
by the elevator cameras. Room-key records showed the arrivals entering
their rooms. Likewise, those departing were recorded in the opposite
sequence: elevator, lobby, front door. The parking-lot cameras
recorded cars coming and going. One by one, Brennan eliminated scores
of potential suspects. If someone had left the hotel before the victim
re-entered her room, and did not return, he could not have attacked
her. Such people were eliminated. Those who entered and were not seen
to leave were also eliminated, and likewise anyone exiting the hotel
without a bag, or carrying only a small bag. Brennan eliminated no one
without a clear reason, not even women or families. He watched
carefully for any sign of someone behaving nervously, or erratically.
This painstaking process ultimately left him with only one suspect:
the man seen entering the elevator behind the victim at 3:41 A.M. He
was a very large black man with glasses, who looked to be at least six
four and upwards of 300 pounds. He and the woman are seen casually
talking as they enter the elevator. The same man emerges from the
elevator into the lobby less than two hours later, at 5:28 A.M.,
pulling a suitcase with wheels. The camera over the front door records
him rolling the suitcase out toward the parking lot at a casual
stroll. He returns less than an hour later, shortly before dawn,
without the bag. He gets back on the elevator and heads upstairs.
Why would a man haul his luggage out of an airport hotel early in the
morning, when he was not checking out, and then return to his room
within the hour without it? That question, coupled with Brennan’s
careful process of elimination, led him to the conclusion that the
victim had been taken out of the hotel inside the big man’s suitcase.
But it seemed too small. It looked to be about the size that air
travelers can fit into overhead compartments. But the man himself was
so big, perhaps the size of the bag was an illusion. Brennan studied
the video as the man exited the elevator and also as he left the
hotel, then measured the doorways of both. When he matched visible
reference points in the video—the
number of tiles to each side of the bag as it was wheeled out the
front door, and the height of a bar that ran around the inside of the
elevator—he was able to get a
close approximation of the suitcase’s actual size. He obtained one
that fit those measurements, which was larger than the bag on the
video had appeared to be, and invited a flexible young woman whose
proportions matched the victim’s to curl up inside it. She fit.
He scrutinized the video still more closely, watching it again and
again. The man steps off the elevator rolling the bag behind him. As
he does, the wheels catch momentarily in the space between the
elevator floor and the ground floor, just for a split second. It was
hardly noticeable if you weren’t looking for it. The man has to give
the bag a tug to get it unstuck.
And that clinched it. That tiny tug. The bag had to have been heavy to
get stuck. Brennan was now convinced. This is the guy. No matter what
the victim had said—that she had
been attacked by two or maybe three men, that they were “white,” that
they spoke with accents that sounded Hispanic or perhaps Romanian—Brennan was convinced her attacker had to be this man.
The detective was struck by something else. His suspect was entirely
collected. Cool and calm, entering the elevator with the woman,
exiting with the suitcase, pulling it behind him out to the parking
lot, then strolling back less than an hour later. Brennan had been a
cop. He had seen ordinary men caught up in the aftermath of a violent
crime. They were beside themselves. Shaking. Panicky. If a man rapes
and beats a woman to the point where he thinks she’s dead, and then
hauls the body out to dump it in the weeds, does he come strolling
back into the same hotel as if nothing happened? An ordinary attacker
would have been two states away by noon.
What this man’s demeanor suggested to Brennan was chilling.
He’s good at this. He’s done this before.
The “Mercury” Man
Brennan called a meeting at the hotel on November 17, 2005. The owners
were there, the insurance adjusters, and the lawyers—in other words, the people who had hired him. They met in a
boardroom. On a laptop screen, Brennan pulled up the image of the
large man pulling his suitcase off the elevator.
He said, “This is the guy that did it. That girl is inside that
suitcase.”
There was some snickering.
“How do you come up with that?” he was asked. Brennan described his
process of elimination, how he had narrowed and narrowed the search,
until it led him to this man.
They weren’t buying it.
“Didn’t the victim say that she was attacked by two white guys?” one
of them asked.
“I’m telling you,” said Brennan. “This is the guy. Let me run with it
a little bit. If you’re willing to give me the resources, I’ll track
this guy down.”
He told them that it was a complete win-win. The hotel’s liability in
the civil suit would go way down if he could show that the woman had
not been attacked by a hotel employee. “What could be better?” he
said. “Think how good you’ll look if we actually catch the guy
responsible. You’d be solving a horrible crime!”
They seemed distinctly unmoved.
“Look at how cool this guy is,” he told them, replaying the video. “He
just raped and beat a woman to death, or thinks he has, and it’s not
like he’s all nervous and jittery. He’s cool as a clam! Tell me the
kind of person who could do such a thing and be this nonchalant. This
ain’t the only time he’s done this.”
A discussion ensued. There were some in the room who wanted to find
the rapist, but the decision was primarily a business calculation. It
was about weighing the detective’s fee against a chance to limit their
exposure. Brennan didn’t care what their reasons were; he just wanted
to keep going. Old instincts had been aroused. He had never even met
the victim, but with her attacker in his sights, he wanted him badly.
Here was a guy who was walking around almost a year later, certain he
had gotten away with his crime. Brennan wanted what all detectives
want: the gotcha! He wanted to see the look on the guy’s face.
It was close, but in the end the hotel suits decided to let him keep
working. Having overcome their skepticism so narrowly, Brennan was
even more determined to prove he was right.
The hotel’s records were useless. There were too many rooms and there
was too much turnover to scrutinize every guest. Even if the hotel
staff remembered a 300-pound black man with glasses, which they did
not, there was no way to tell whether he was a registered hotel guest
or a visitor, or if he was sharing someone else’s room. Even in cases
where they photocopied a guest’s driver’s license, which they did not
do faithfully, the image came up so muddy that there was no way to
make out the face.
So he went back to the video. Now that he knew whom he was looking
for, Brennan scrutinized every appearance of his suspect, at the
elevator, in the lobby, at the hotel restaurant, at the front door. In
one of the video snippets at the elevator, the suspect is seen walking
with a fit black man wearing a white T-shirt with the word “Mercury”
on the front, which meant nothing to Brennan. His first thoughts were
the car company, or the planet, or the element. There was nothing
there he could work with. The manner of both men on the snippet
suggested that they knew each other. They walked past the elevator and
turned to their right, in the direction of the restaurant. So Brennan
hunted up video from the restaurant surveillance camera, and, sure
enough, it captured the two entering. As Brennan reviewed more video,
he saw the big black man with the other man quite frequently, so he
suspected that the two had been in town together. The man in the
T-shirt had an ID tag on a string around his neck, but it was too
small to read on the screen. Brennan called NASA to see if they had a
way to enhance the picture. He described the camera and was told that
it couldn’t be done.
Again, back to the video. In the restaurant footage, the man in the
T-shirt is momentarily seen from behind, revealing another word, on
the back of the T-shirt. The best view comes in a split second as he
sidesteps someone leaving, giving the camera a better angle. Brennan
could see the letter V at the beginning of the word, and
O at the end. He could make out a vague pattern of script in
the middle, but could not be sure of the exact letters. It was like
looking at an eye chart when you need stronger glasses; you take a
guess. It looked to him as if the word was “Verado.” It meant nothing
to him, but that was his hunch. So he Googled it and found that
“Verado” was the name of a new outboard engine manufactured by Mercury
Marine, the boat-engine manufacturer.
There had been a big boat show in Miami in February, when the incident
happened. Perhaps the man in the white T-shirt had been working at the
show for Mercury Marine, and if he had, maybe his big friend had, too.
Mercury Marine is a subsidiary of the Brunswick Corporation, which
also manufactures billiards and bowling equipment and other
recreational products. Brennan called its head of security, Alan
Sperling, and explained what he was trying to do. His first thought
was that the company might have put its boat-show employees up at the
Airport Regency. If it had, he might be able to identify and locate
the man in the picture through the company. Sperling checked, and, no,
Mercury’s employees had stayed at a different hotel. Brennan racked
his brain. Had any of the crews who set up the company’s booth stayed
at the Regency? Again, the answer was no.
“Well, who got those shirts?,” Brennan asked.
Sperling checked and called back two weeks later. He said the only
place the shirts had been given away was at the boat show’s food
court. The company in charge of food for the show was called
Centerplate, which handles concessions for large sporting events and
conventions. It was a big company with employees spread across the
nation. Brennan called the head of human resources for Centerplate,
who told him that the company had put up some of its people at the
Regency, but that it had hired more than 200 for the boat show, from
all over.
“Somebody has to remember a big black guy, 300 pounds at least—in glasses,” said the detective.
A week later, the man from Centerplate called back. Some of their
workers did remember a big black man with glasses, but no one knew his
name. Someone did seem to recall, he said, that the company had
initially hired the man to work at Zephyr Field, home of the New
Orleans Zephyrs, the minor-league baseball team in Metairie, a
sprawling suburb. This was a solid lead, but there was a bad thing
about it: Hurricane Katrina had devastated the city just months
earlier, and the residents of Metairie had been evacuated. It was a
community scattered to the winds.
Good News, Bad News
Brennan was stubborn. He was now months into this effort to identify
and find the man responsible for raping and beating a woman he had
never met. There was no way that what he was being paid for the job
was worth the hours he was putting in. Nobody else cared as much as he
did. What the hotel’s insurers really wanted, Brennan knew, was for
him to tell them that the victim was a hooker, and that she had been
beaten by one of her johns, which would go a long way toward freeing
them from any liability. But this wasn’t true, and he had told them at
the outset that the truth was all they would get from him. Detective
Foote was openly skeptical. He had given Brennan all the information
he had. He had more pressing cases with real leads and real prospects.
But Brennan had a picture in his head. He could see this big man with
glasses coolly going about his business day to day—smug, chatting up the girls, no doubt looking for his next victim,
comfortable, certain that his crimes left no trail.
Katrina was the bad thing about the New Orleans lead, but there was
also a good thing. Brennan had a buddy on the police force there, a
Captain Ernest Demma. Some years earlier, on a vacation to the French
Quarter with his kids, Brennan had risked his hide helping Demma
subdue a prisoner who had violently turned on him.
“The guy had broken away from me,” Demma recalled, “and out of nowhere
comes this guy in a black jacket flying down the sidewalk, who runs
him down, tackles him, and held the guy until my men could subdue him.
He was fantastic.” It was the kind of gesture a cop never forgets.
Demma dubbed Brennan “Batman.” New Orleans may have been down for the
count, but when Batman called, Demma was up for anything.
The captain sent one of his sergeants out to Zephyr Field, where the
club was working overtime to get its storm-ravaged facility ready to
open the 2006 season. Demma called Brennan back: “The good news is: I
know who this guy is.”
“What’s the bad news?”
“His name is Mike Jones, there’s probably only a million of them, and
he doesn’t work there anymore, and nobody knows where he went.”
Still, a name! Brennan thanked Demma and went back to the Regency
database, and, sure enough, he found that there had indeed been a
guest named Mike Jones staying at the hotel when the attack occurred.
He had checked in on February 14, seven days before the rape and
assault, and he had checked out on the
22nd, one day after he was seen rolling his suitcase to the car. The full
name on his Visa card was Michael Lee Jones. The card had been
canceled, and the address was for a Virginia residence Jones had
vacated years earlier. He had left no forwarding address. Brennan
lacked authority to subpoena further information from the credit-card
company, and the evidence he had was still too slight to get
Miami-Dade police involved. The phone number Jones had left with
registration was a number for Centerplate.
But the trail was warm again. Brennan knew that Jones no longer worked
for Centerplate, and the people there didn’t know where he was, but
the detective thought he knew certain things about his prey. Judging
by the nonchalance he showed hauling a young woman’s body out of the
hotel stuffed in a suitcase, Brennan suspected that this was a
practiced routine. The Centerplate job had kept him moving from city
to city, all expenses paid, a perfect setup for a serial rapist with a
method that was tried and true. If Jones was his man, then he wouldn’t
give up an arrangement like that. If he wasn’t employed by Centerplate
anymore, where would somebody with his work experience go next? Who
was facilitating his predation now? Brennan got some names from
Centerplate and went online and compiled a list of the food-service
company’s 20 to 25 top competitors.
He started working his way down the list, calling the human-resources
department for each of the competing firms, and one by one he struck
out. As it happened, one company on the list, Ovations, had its
headquarters in the Tampa area, and Brennan was planning a trip up in
that direction anyway, so he decided to drop in. As any investigator
will tell you, an interview in person is always better than an
interview on the phone. Brennan stopped by and, as he can do, talked
his way into the office of the company’s C.O.O. He explained his
manhunt and asked if Ovations employed a 300-plus-pound black man with
glasses named Michael Lee Jones.
The executive didn’t even check a database. He told Brennan, who was
not a law-enforcement official, that if he wanted that information he
would have to return with a subpoena. All the other companies had
checked a database and just told him no. He knew he had finally asked
in the right place.
“Why would you want someone working for you who is a rapist?” he
asked. He was told there were privacy issues involved.
“Get a subpoena,” the executive suggested.
So Brennan got a fax number for Ovations and called Detective Foote at
Miami-Dade; before long a subpoena spat from the machine. It turned
out that Ovations had an employee named Michael Lee Jones who fit the
description. He was working in Frederick, Maryland.
The Interrogation
Michael Lee Jones was standing behind a barbecue counter at Harry
Grove Stadium, home of the minor-league Frederick Keys, when Detective
Foote and one of his partners showed up. It was an early-spring
evening in the Appalachian foothills, and Foote the Floridian was so
cold his teeth were chattering beneath his mustache.
When Brennan had called him with the information about Jones, Foote
was impressed by the private detective’s tenacity, but still
skeptical. This whole effort more or less defined the term “long
shot,” but the name and location of a potential suspect was without
question the first real lead since the case had landed on his desk. It
had to be checked out. The department had a requirement that
detectives traveling out of town to confront suspected criminals go as
a team, so Foote waited until another detective had to make such a
trip to the suburbs of Washington. He got the detective to agree to
take him along as partner. Together they made the hour-and-a-half
drive to Frederick to visit Jones in person.
Foote had called Jones earlier that day to see if he would be
available. The detective kept it vague. He just said he was
investigating an incident in Miami that had happened during the boat
show, and confirmed that Jones had been working there. On the phone,
Jones was polite and forthcoming. He said he’d been in Miami at that
time and that he would be available to meet with Foote, and gave him
directions to the ballpark.
Jones was a massive man. Tall, wide, and powerful, with long arms and
big hands and a great round belly. His size was intimidating, but his
manner was exceedingly soft-spoken and gentle, even passive. He wore
clear-rimmed glasses and spoke in a friendly way. Jones was in charge
of the operation at the food counter and appeared to be respected and
well liked by his busy employees. He was wearing an apron. He steered
Foote and the other detective away from the booth to a picnic area
just outside the stadium.
As Foote recalled it later, he asked Jones about meeting women in
Miami, and Jones said he had “hooked up” once. The detective asked him
to describe her. “I only have sex with white women,” Jones said.
Foote asked if he had had sex with anyone at the Airport Regency, and
Jones said no. He said that the woman he had had sex with in Miami had
been working at the boat show, and that they had hooked up elsewhere.
“Any blonde women?,” Foote asked.
“No.”
“Foreign accent?”
Jones said the woman he had sex with in Miami had been German.
Foote was not making Jones as a suspect. The big man acted
convincingly, like someone with nothing to hide. The detective was
freezing in the evening air. Foote preferred coming right to the
point; he was not given to artful interrogation. Besides, he felt more
and more as if the trip had been a waste of time. So he just asked
what he wanted to know.
“Look, I’ve got a girl who was raped that week. Did you have anything
to do with it?”
“No, of course not!” said Jones, appropriately shocked by the
question. “No way.”
“You didn’t beat the shit out of this girl and leave her for dead in a
field down there?”
“Oh, no. No.”
“Are you willing to give me a DNA specimen?,” Foote asked.
Jones promptly said he would, further convincing the detective that
this was not the guy. Do the guilty volunteer conclusive evidence?
Foote produced the DNA kit, had Jones sign the consent form, and ran a
cotton swab inside Jones’s mouth.
He called Brennan when he got back.
“I’m telling you, Ken, this ain’t the guy,” he said.
“No, man, he’s definitely the fucking guy,” said Brennan, who flew up
to Frederick himself, traveling with his son, and spent time over a
three-day period talking to Jones, who continued to deny everything.
Months after he returned, the DNA results came back. Brennan got a
call from Foote.
“You ain’t gonna believe this,” said Foote.
“What?”
“You were right.”
Jones’s DNA was a match.
Brennan flew up to Frederick in October to meet Foote, who arrested
the big man. It had been 11 months since he took the case. Foote
formally charged Jones with a variety of felonies that encompassed the
acts of raping, kidnapping, and beating a young woman severely. The
accused sat forlornly in a chair that looked tiny under his bulk, in
an austere Frederick Police Department interrogation room, great rolls
of fat falling on his lap under an enormous Baltimore Ravens T-shirt.
He repeatedly denied everything in a surprisingly soft voice peculiar
for such a big man, gesturing broadly with both hands, protesting but
never growing angry, and insisting that he would never, ever, under
any circumstances do such a thing to a woman. He said that he “never
had any problems” paying women for sex, and that he “did not get a
kick” out of hurting women. He did admit, once the DNA test
irrevocably linked him to the victim, that he had had sex with her,
but insisted that she was a “hooker,” that he had paid her a hundred
dollars, and that when he left her she was in fine shape, although
very drunk. They showed him pictures of her battered face, taken the
day she was found.
“I did not hurt that girl,” Jones said, pushing the photos away, his
voice rising to a whine. “I’m not violent.… I never hit a fucking
woman in my whole fucking life! I’m not going to hurt her.”
Brennan asked him why a man would roll his suitcase out to the parking
lot and stash it in his car at five in the morning, two days before he
checked out of the hotel.
“I couldn’t remember if we were leaving that day or the next day. I
wasn’t sure.… For some reason, I thought, Fuck it, it’s time to go.”
Brennan was able to trip Jones up with only one small thing. Jones
said that his suitcase had only his clothes, shoes, and a video game
in it, but when the detective noted the extra tug Jones had needed to
get it off the elevator, Jones suddenly remembered that he had had a
number of large books in it as well. He said he was an avid reader.
When Brennan asked him to name some of the books he had read, Jones
could not. He could not name a single title.
But Jones was unfailingly compliant, and his manner worked for him.
Even with the DNA, the case against him was weak. He had ample reason
for not having volunteered initially that he had paid a woman for
sex—he had a prior arrest for
soliciting a prostitute—so that
wouldn’t count against him, and if he had had sex with the victim, as
he said, it would account for the DNA. The fact that Jones had
willingly provided the sample spoke in his favor. In court, it would
come down to his word against the young woman’s, and she was a
terrible witness. She had picked Jones out of a photo lineup, but
given how foggy her memory of the night was, and the fact that she had
seen Jones before, unlike the other faces she was shown, it was hardly
convincing evidence of his guilt. Her initial accounts of the crime
were so much at odds with Brennan’s findings that even Foote found
himself wondering who was telling the truth.
Miami prosecutors ended up settling with Jones, who, after being
returned to Miami, pleaded guilty to sexual assault in return for
having all of the more severe charges against him dropped. He was
sentenced to two years in prison, an outcome that Brennan would have
found very disappointing if that had been the end of the story. It was
not.
Three More Hits
Brennan never doubted that Jones was a rapist, and given what he had
observed, first on the surveillance video and then after meeting him
in person, he was convinced that sexual assault was Jones’s pastime.
“This ain’t a one-fucking-time deal,” Brennan told Foote. “I’m telling
you, this is this guy’s thing. He’s got a job that sends him all over
the country. Watch him on that video. He’s slick. Nonchalant. He’s too
cool, too calm. You’ll see it when you put his DNA into the system.”
The “system” is the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). The
F.B.I.-administered database now has well over eight million DNA
offender profiles. Local, state, and federal law-enforcement officials
routinely enter DNA samples recovered from convicts and from the
scenes and victims of unsolved crimes, and over the years the system
has electronically matched more than 100,000 of them, often reaching
across surprising distances in place and time. It means that when a
DNA sample exists a case can never be classified as entirely “cold.”
Michael Lee Jones had left a trail. The Miami-Dade police entered
Jones’s DNA into CODIS in late 2006, and several months later, which
is how long it takes the F.B.I. to double-check matches the system
finds electronically, three new hits came up.
Detective Terry Thrumston, of the Colorado Springs Police Department
sex-crimes unit, had a rape-and-assault case that had been bugging her
for more than a year. The victim was a blond-haired, blue-eyed woman
who had been picked up early in the morning on December 1, 2005, by a
stranger—a very large black man
with glasses, who had offered her a ride and then talked his way into
her apartment and raped her, holding his hand tightly over her mouth.
Thrumston had no leads, and the case had sat for two years until DNA
collected from the victim matched that of Michael Lee Jones.
There were two victims in New Orleans. One of them, also a blonde, had
been partying in the French Quarter a little too hard, by her own
admission, and very early on the morning of May 5, 2003, she had gone
looking for a cab back to her hotel when a very large black man with
glasses pulled his car over to the curb and offered her a ride. As she
later testified, he drove her to a weedy lot and raped her. He pressed
his large hand powerfully over her face as he attacked her, and she
testified that she bit his palm so hard that she had bits of his skin
in her teeth afterward. When he was finished, he drove off, leaving
her on the lot. She reported the rape to the New Orleans police, who
filed her account and took DNA samples from the rapist’s semen. The
case had sat until CODIS matched the specimen with Michael Lee Jones.
The other New Orleans victim told a similar tale, but failed to pick
Jones’s face out of a photo lineup.
Jones, it turns out, had been in both Colorado Springs and New Orleans
on the dates in question. So in 2008, as his Florida sentence drew to
a close, he was flown to Colorado Springs to stand trial. It was a
novel prosecution, because the Colorado woman had died in the interim,
of causes unrelated to the crime. As a result, Deputy District
Attorney Brien Cecil had no victim to put on the stand. Instead he
fashioned a case out of two of the other rapes, calling as witnesses
the Miami victim and one of the New Orleans victims, both of whom
supplemented the DNA evidence by pointing out Jones as their attacker
in the courtroom. Cecil argued that their cases showed a “common plan,
scheme, or design” that was as much Jones’s signature as his trail of
semen.
The New Orleans victim proved to be a very effective witness. Her
memory was clear and her statements emphatic, the outrage still
evident six years later, along with her chagrin at the poor judgment
she had displayed that night. The Miami victim, on the other hand, was
every bit as bad on the stand as the Miami prosecutors had feared. One
of Jones’s lawyers made much of the different stories she had told
police. Her struggles with English further confused matters.
Jones pleaded not guilty to all charges in the Colorado case. He
argued through his lawyers (he did not testify) that the sex had been
consensual, and that the woman claiming rape had been a prostitute.
But where jurors in Colorado might have been able to accept two
prostitutes in different states at different times unaccountably
filing rape charges after turning a trick, and in both cases
immediately describing their attacker as a huge black man with
glasses, they clearly choked on a third. There was no evidence that
any of the victims were prostitutes. And then, of course, there was
the DNA.
Michael Lee Jones is serving what amounts to a life sentence at the
Fremont Correctional Facility, in Colorado. He received a term of 24
years to life for one count of sexual assault with force, and 12 years
to life for the second count, of felonious sexual contact. He is 38
years old and will not be eligible for his first parole hearing until
2032. The state estimates his term will last until he dies.
His Miami victim won a $300,000 settlement from the hotel and the
hotel’s security company.
Ken Brennan is back doing his private-detective work in Miami. He is
enormously proud of the efforts that have locked Jones away. “The
cases they got him on, they’re just the tip of the iceberg,” he
predicted. “Once other jurisdictions start checking their DNA files on
cases when this guy was at large, I guarantee you they will find
more.”
✾ newyorker.com✾
Thursday 10 January 2019✾
Kristen Roupenian✾ 12 minute read✾
In the fall of 2017, I was finishing up lunch at a Noodles &
Company in Ann Arbor, Michigan, when I saw that I’d missed a call from
a 212 area code. I thought, I bet my story just got into
The New Yorker. This was an unusual assumption for me to
make, given that, at that point, I’d had a single story accepted in a
print literary magazine; the rest of my published work was available
only in online genre venues, like Body Parts Magazine and Weird
Fiction Review. The story I’d submitted to The New Yorker had
already been rejected, politely, by every other publication I’d sent
it to, but, a few weeks earlier, my agent had received an e-mail from
Deborah Treisman,The New Yorker’s fiction editor, which read, in its entirety:
Hi Jenni,
I just want to apologize for holding onto this one for so long. It’s
an intriguing piece and I have it circulating here now, so should be
able to get back to you in the next week or two.
Sorry to keep you waiting,
Deborah
If you are not in the habit of submitting short stories to literary
magazines, this might not seem like such a big deal to you, but, when
I learned that the fiction editor of The New Yorker knew my
name, I was so thrilled that I forwarded the e-mail to my mother.
Against all odds, my prediction was correct. On my voice mail was a
message from my agent—at that
point, we’d had so few reasons to talk to each other that I hadn’t yet
entered her number into my phone. All I remember from the rest of that
afternoon was sitting under an oak tree in a University of Michigan
quad, trying to wrap my brain around what had happened and what it
would mean and thinking, This is it. This is the happiest I will ever
be.
On Monday, December 4th, my story “Cat Person” came out in the magazine and online. I posted the link on my
Facebook page, at which point nearly everyone I’d ever met either
liked it or sent me a message saying “CONGRATULATIONS,” and I
responded “THANK YOU!!!” Then a bunch of my friends took me
out for drinks at a local cocktail bar and, after that, it was pretty
much over.
Except that it wasn’t. Three days later, I was sitting in a coffee
shop with my girlfriend, Callie, trying to write, when she looked up
from her computer and said, “There’s something going on with your
story.” Callie is also a writer, and she used to work in publishing,
so she was much more connected to the literary Internet than I was.
She seemed slightly unnerved. “It’s just Twitter,” I said, with the
smug dismissiveness of a thirtysomething late millennial who had
tweeted a grand total of twelve times in her life. Callie tried to
explain what was happening; I failed to understand. Then I went home,
fired up Twitter, and saw that I had a bunch of notifications from
strangers. I was reading through them when my mom called about
something unrelated. I tried to explain to her what was happening, and
then she went online herself and, at some point, she said, “Oh, my
God, Kristen, someone Barack Obama follows just retweeted
your story.” Then she burst into tears.
In brief, “Cat Person” is a story about two characters—Margot, a twenty-year-old college student, and Robert, a man in his
mid-thirties—who go on a single
bad date. The story is told in the close third person, and much of it
is spent describing Margot’s thought process as she realizes that she
does not want to have sex with Robert but then decides, for a variety
of reasons, to go through with it anyway. When the story appeared
online, young women began sharing it among themselves; they said it
captured something that they had also experienced: the sense that
there is a point at which it is “too late” to say no to a sexual
encounter. They also talked, more broadly, about the phenomenon of
unwanted sex that came about not through the use of physical force but
because of a poisoned cocktail of emotions and cultural
expectations—embarrassment,
pride, self-consciousness, and fear. What had started as a
conversation among women was then taken up and folded into a
much larger debate that played out, for the most part,
between men and women, its flames fanned by the Internet
controversy machine. Was what happened between Robert and Margot an
issue of consent, or no? Was Robert a villain for not picking up on
Margot’s discomfort, or was Margot at fault for not telling Robert
what she was feeling? The lines hardened, think pieces proliferated,
and disagreements were amplified to the point of absurdity, until the
story threatened to become the
blue-dress/white-dress moment
of the
#MeToo
era. Men read “Cat Person” this way! Women read “Cat Person”
that way! Why can’t we all just get along?
I may have oversimplified this version of events. There are a lot of
essays and articles out there that summarize the response to the story
much more objectively than I ever could. When I started writing this,
my goal was to do something different, to tell the story from the
epicenter, to answer a question that I still get asked fairly often:
“What was it like to have your story go viral?” But that is turning
out to be surprisingly hard.
The truth is that my memory of that period is largely fragmentary,
displaced in time and space. I remember that that weekend was very,
very cold; my dog had a U.T.I., so I had to keep going outdoors even
as the rain froze into snow. I remember logging out of Twitter and
then sneaking back onto it from my phone. I remember my friends, on a
group chat, sending me a screenshot of someone on Twitter saying, “I
cannot IMAGINE her group texts rn”—the social-media snake eating its own tail. I remember Callie hugging
me as I cried. I remember the e-mails coming and coming—first, fan letters from people who’d discovered my story and liked
it, then anti-fan letters, from people who’d discovered my story and
didn’t. I received many in-depth descriptions, from men, of sexual
encounters they’d had, because they thought I’d “just like to know.” I
got e-mails from people I hadn’t talked to in years who wondered if
I’d noticed that my story had gone viral. And, as the days went on, I
got e-mails requesting interviews from outlets all over the globe: the
U.S., Canada, England, Australia. Everyone wanted me to come on the
air and talk about my story. Emphasis on my.
Because that was another thing about the story’s second life as an
Internet Sensation: its status as fiction had largely got lost. In a
way, I still feel that this is something to be proud of: the story’s
realism, and Margot’s perspective in particular, were things I had
worked very hard to perfect. I’d wanted people to be able to see
themselves in the story, to identify with it in such a way that its
narrative scaffolding would disappear. But, perhaps inevitably, as the
story was shared again and again, moving it further and further from
its original context, people began conflating me, the author, with the
main character. Sometimes this was blunt (“What,
The New Yorker is just publishing diary entries now?”) and
other times it was subtler: the assumption was that I’d be happy to go
on the radio and explain why young women in 2018 were still struggling
to achieve satisfying sex lives—in other words, the assumption was that my own position and history
would be identical to Margot’s. I was thirty-six years old and a few
months into my first serious relationship with a woman, and now
everyone wanted me to explain why twenty-year-old girls were having
bad sex with men. I felt intensely protective of Margot, and of the
readers who identified with her, and, at the same time, I felt like an
impostor. I felt as though if I were truthful about who I was, I would
let everyone down.
So what was it like to have a story go viral? For a few
hours, before I came to my senses and shut down my computer, I got to
live the dream and the nightmare of knowing exactly what people
thought when they read what I’d written, as well as what they thought
about me. A torrent of unvarnished, unpolished opinion was delivered
directly to my eyes and my brain. That thousands—and, eventually, millions—of
readers had liked the story, identified with it, been affected by it,
exhorted others to read it, didn’t make this any easier to take. The
story was not autobiographical, but it was, nonetheless, personal—everything I write is personal—and here were all these strangers dissecting it, dismissing
it, judging it, fighting about it, joking about it, and moving on.
I want people to read my stories—of course I do. That’s why I write them. But knowing, in that
immediate and unmediated way, what people thought about my writing
felt . . . the word I keep reaching for, even though it seems
melodramatic, is annihilating. To be faced with all those
people thinking and talking about me was like standing alone, at the
center of a stadium, while thousands of people screamed at me at the
top of their lungs. Not for me, at me. I guess some
people might find this exhilarating. I did not.
For people with low-level social anxiety, a common piece of
conventional wisdom is that you should stop worrying so much about
what other people think, because no one is actually thinking about
you. In fact, this isn’t true, even if you haven’t had a story go
viral. Almost everyone we encounter thinks about us. Bad hair, they
think, as they pass us on the street. Annoying voice. Nice legs. Gummy
smile. Stained shirt. She looks like my third-grade teacher. Why is
she taking so long to order her coffee? I hate her stupid face. The
problem is not that other people think about us but that their
thoughts are so flattening, so reductive in comparison to our own
complicated view of ourselves. Here I am, having this irreducible and
mysterious set of human experiences, and all you think when you
encounter me is, Her hair is weird. Many horror stories revolve around
this theme: if we could eavesdrop on all the quick, dismissive
thoughts that other people were having about us, we would go insane.
We are simply not meant to see ourselves as others see us.
Here’s the catch: when you read a story I’ve written, you’re not
thinking about me—you’re
thinking as me. I’ve wormed my way inside your head (hi!) and
briefly taken over your mind. You’re forced to reckon with my full
complexity—or, at least, whatever
fraction of that complexity I’ve managed to get down on the page. When
the story is over—or if you put
it down midway—you’re free to
think whatever you want. You can think, Dumb, or Boring, or Great, or,
She looks like a bitch in her author photo, or, What the fuck did I
just read? But I don’t need to be there to absorb your reaction. In
fact, I shouldn’t be. My role in the process is over. The
interpretation, the criticism, the analysis telling you that you’re
right or that you’re wrong or that you’re an asshole—that’s someone else’s job. I can’t, and won’t, take part.
After “Cat Person” went viral, I sold
my first book, a story collection. It’s
coming out this month. I’m hoping that the number of monsters and
murderers in its pages will put at least some of the autobiographical
questions to rest. But, more than that, I want people to read it. I
hope they like it. And, at the same time, I don’t want to know what
they think about it. I’m sure that sometime, late at night, I’ll go on
Twitter and search for my name and try to figure out what people are
saying—or not saying—about me and my book. I’ll do this because I’m human, and I’m
curious, and I’m anxious, and because it’s possible to want things
that are bad for us—but I’ll also
do my best to resist. Another piece of conventional wisdom is that
what other people think about us is none of our business. And, as it
turns out, with that I agree.
For years,
Facebook
gave some of the world’s largest technology companies more intrusive
access to
users’ personal data
than it has disclosed, effectively exempting those business partners
from its usual privacy rules, according to internal records and
interviews.
The special arrangements are detailed in hundreds of pages of
Facebook
documents obtained by The New York Times. The records, generated in
2017 by the company’s internal system for tracking partnerships,
provide the most complete picture yet of the social network’s
data-sharing practices. They also underscore how personal data has
become the most prized commodity of the digital age, traded on a
vast scale by some of the most powerful companies in Silicon Valley
and beyond.
The exchange was intended to benefit everyone. Pushing for explosive
growth, Facebook got more users, lifting its advertising revenue.
Partner companies acquired features to make their products more
attractive. Facebook users connected with friends across different
devices and websites. But Facebook also assumed extraordinary power
over the personal information of its 2.2 billion users—control it has wielded with little transparency or outside
oversight.
Facebook allowed Microsoft’s Bing search engine to see the names of
virtually all Facebook users’ friends without consent, the records
show, and gave Netflix and Spotify the ability to read Facebook
users’ private messages.
The social network permitted Amazon to obtain users’ names and
contact information through their friends, and it let Yahoo view
streams of friends’ posts as recently as this summer, despite public
statements that it had stopped that type of sharing years earlier.
Facebook has been reeling from a series of privacy scandals, set off
by revelations in March that a political consulting firm, Cambridge
Analytica,
improperly used Facebook data
to build tools that aided President Trump’s 2016 campaign.
Acknowledging that it had breached users’ trust, Facebook insisted
that it had instituted stricter privacy protections long ago. Mark
Zuckerberg, the chief executive,
assured lawmakers
in April that people “have complete control” over everything they
share on Facebook.
But the documents, as well as interviews with about 50 former
employees of Facebook and its corporate partners, reveal that
Facebook allowed certain companies access to data despite those
protections. They also raise questions about whether Facebook ran
afoul of a 2011 consent agreement with the Federal Trade Commission
that barred the social network from sharing user data without
explicit permission.
In all, the deals described in the documents benefited more than 150
companies—most of them tech
businesses, including online retailers and entertainment sites, but
also automakers and media organizations. Their applications sought
the data of hundreds of millions of people a month, the records
show. The deals, the oldest of which date to 2010, were all active
in 2017. Some were still in effect this year.
[Here are five takeaways from The Times’s investigation.]
In an interview, Steve Satterfield, Facebook’s director of privacy
and public policy, said none of the partnerships violated users’
privacy or the F.T.C. agreement. Contracts required the companies to
abide by Facebook policies, he added.
Still, Facebook executives have acknowledged missteps over the past
year. “We know we’ve got work to do to regain people’s trust,” Mr.
Satterfield said. “Protecting people’s information requires stronger
teams, better technology and clearer policies, and that’s where
we’ve been focused for most of 2018.” He said that the partnerships
were “one area of focus” and that Facebook was in the process of
winding many of them down.
Facebook has found no evidence of abuse by its partners, a
spokeswoman said. Some of the largest partners, including Amazon,
Microsoft and Yahoo, said they had used the data appropriately, but
declined to discuss the sharing deals in detail. Facebook did say
that it had mismanaged some of its partnerships, allowing certain
companies’ access to continue long after they had shut down the
features that required the data.
With most of the partnerships, Mr. Satterfield said, the F.T.C.
agreement did not require the social network to secure users’
consent before sharing data because Facebook
considered the partners extensions of itself—service providers that
allowed users to interact with their Facebook friends. The partners
were prohibited from using the personal information for other
purposes, he said. “Facebook’s partners don’t get to ignore people’s
privacy settings.”
Data privacy experts disputed Facebook’s assertion that most
partnerships were exempted from the regulatory requirements,
expressing skepticism that businesses as varied as device makers,
retailers and search companies would be viewed alike by the agency.
“The only common theme is that they are partnerships that would
benefit the company in terms of development or growth into an area
that they otherwise could not get access to,” said Ashkan Soltani,
former chief technologist at the F.T.C.
Mr. Soltani and three former employees of the F.T.C.’s consumer
protection division, which brought the case that led to the consent
decree, said in interviews that its data-sharing deals had probably
violated the agreement.
“This is just giving third parties permission to harvest data
without you being informed of it or giving consent to it,” said
David Vladeck, who formerly ran the F.T.C.’s consumer protection
bureau. “I don’t understand how this unconsented-to data harvesting
can at all be justified under the consent decree.”
Details of the agreements are emerging at a pivotal moment for the
world’s largest social network. Facebook has been hammered with
questions about its data sharing from lawmakers and regulators in
the United States and Europe. The F.T.C. this spring opened a new
inquiry into Facebook’s compliance with the consent order, while the
Justice Department and Securities and Exchange Commission are also
investigating
the company.
Facebook’s stock price has fallen, and a group of shareholders has
called for Mr. Zuckerberg to step aside as chairman. Shareholders
also have filed a lawsuit alleging that executives failed to impose
effective privacy safeguards. Angry users started a #DeleteFacebook
movement.
This month, a British parliamentary committee investigating internet
disinformation
released internal Facebook emails, seized from the plaintiff
in another lawsuit against Facebook. The messages disclosed some
partnerships and depicted a company preoccupied with growth, whose
leaders sought to undermine competitors and briefly considered
selling access to user data.
As Facebook has
battledone crisis after another, the company’s critics,
including some former advisers and employees, have singled out the
data-sharing as cause for concern.
“I don’t believe it is legitimate to enter into data-sharing
partnerships where there is not prior informed consent from the
user,” said Roger McNamee, an early investor in Facebook. “No one
should trust Facebook until they change their business model.”
An Engine for Growth
Personal data is the oil of the
21st century, a
resource worth billions to those who can most effectively extract
and refine it. American companies alone are expected to spend close
to $20 billion by the end of 2018 to acquire and process consumer
data, according to the Interactive Advertising Bureau.
Few companies have better data than Facebook and its rival, Google,
whose popular products give them an intimate view into the daily
lives of billions of people—and
allow them to dominate the digital advertising market.
Facebook has never sold its user data, fearful of user backlash and
wary of handing would-be competitors a way to duplicate its most
prized asset. Instead, internal documents show, it did the next best
thing: granting other companies access to parts of the social
network in ways that advanced its own interests.
Facebook began forming data partnerships when it was still a
relatively young company. Mr. Zuckerberg was determined to weave
Facebook’s services into other sites and platforms, believing it
would stave off obsolescence and insulate Facebook from competition.
Every corporate partner that integrated Facebook data into its
online products helped drive the platform’s expansion, bringing in
new users, spurring them to spend more time on Facebook and driving
up advertising revenue. At the same time, Facebook got critical data
back from its partners.
The partnerships were so important that decisions about forming them
were vetted at high levels, sometimes by Mr. Zuckerberg and Sheryl
Sandberg, the chief operating officer, Facebook officials said.
While many of the partnerships were announced publicly, the details
of the sharing arrangements typically were confidential.
By 2013, Facebook had entered into more such partnerships than its
midlevel employees could easily track, according to interviews with
two former employees. (Like the more than 30 other former employees
interviewed for this article, they spoke on the condition of
anonymity because they had signed nondisclosure agreements or still
maintained relationships with top Facebook officials.)
So they built a tool that did the technical work of turning special
access on and off and also kept records on what are known internally
as “capabilities”—the special
privileges enabling companies to obtain data, in some cases without
asking permission.
The Times reviewed more than 270 pages of reports generated by the
system—records that reflect
just a portion of Facebook’s wide-ranging deals. Among the
revelations was that Facebook obtained data from multiple partners
for a controversial friend-suggestion tool called “People You May
Know.”
The feature, introduced in 2008, continues even though some Facebook
users have objected to it, unsettled by its knowledge of their
real-world relationships. Gizmodo and other news outlets
have reported cases
of the tool’s recommending friend connections between patients of
the same psychiatrist, estranged family members, and a harasser and
his victim.
Facebook, in turn, used contact lists from the partners, including
Amazon, Yahoo and the Chinese company Huawei—which has been flagged as a security threat by American
intelligence officials—to gain
deeper insight into people’s relationships and suggest more
connections, the records show.
Some of the access deals described in the documents were limited to
sharing non-identifying information with research firms or enabling
game makers to accommodate huge numbers of players. These raised no
privacy concerns. But agreements with about a dozen companies did.
Some enabled partners to see users’ contact information through
their friends—even after the
social network, responding to complaints, said in 2014 that it was
stripping all applications of that power.
As of 2017, Sony, Microsoft, Amazon and others could obtain users’
email addresses through their friends.
Facebook also allowed Spotify, Netflix and the Royal Bank of Canada
to read, write and delete users’ private messages, and to see all
participants on a thread—privileges that appeared to go beyond what the companies needed to
integrate Facebook into their systems, the records show. Facebook
acknowledged that it did not consider any of those three companies
to be service providers. Spokespeople for Spotify and Netflix said
those companies were unaware of the broad powers Facebook had
granted them. A spokesman for Netflix said Wednesday that it had
used the access only to enable customers to recommend TV shows and
movies to their friends.
“Beyond these recommendations, we never accessed anyone’s personal
messages and would never do that,” he said.
A Royal Bank of Canada spokesman disputed that the bank had had any
such access. (Aspects of some sharing partnerships, including those
with the Royal Bank of Canada and Bing, were first reported
by The Wall Street Journal.)
Spotify, which could view messages of more than 70 million users a
month, still offers the option to share music through Facebook
Messenger. But Netflix and the Canadian bank no longer needed access
to messages because they had deactivated features that incorporated
it.
These were not the only companies that had special access longer
than they needed it. Yahoo, The Times and others could still get
Facebook users’ personal information in 2017.
Yahoo could view real-time feeds of friends’ posts for a feature
that the company had ended in 2012. A Yahoo spokesman declined to
discuss the partnership in detail but said the company did not use
the information for advertising. The Times—one of nine media companies named in the documents—had access to users’ friend lists for an article-sharing
application it had discontinued in 2011. A spokeswoman for the news
organization said it was not obtaining any data.
Facebook’s internal records also revealed more about the extent of
sharing deals with over 60 makers of smartphones, tablets and other
devices, agreements first
reported by The Times
in June.
Facebook empowered Apple to hide from Facebook users all indicators
that its devices were asking for data. Apple devices also had access
to the contact numbers and calendar entries of people who had
changed their account settings to disable all sharing, the records
show.
Apple officials said they were not aware that Facebook had granted
its devices any special access. They added that any shared data
remained on the devices and was not available to anyone other than
the users.
Facebook officials said the company had disclosed its sharing deals
in its privacy policy since 2010. But the language in the policy
about its service providers does not specify what data Facebook
shares, and with which companies. Mr. Satterfield, Facebook’s
privacy director, also said its partners were subject to “rigorous
controls.”
Yet Facebook has an imperfect track record of policing what outside
companies do with its user data. In the Cambridge Analytica case, a
Cambridge University psychology professor created an application in
2014 to
harvest the personal data
of tens of millions of Facebook users for the consulting firm.
Pam Dixon, executive director of the World Privacy Forum, a
nonprofit privacy research group, said that Facebook would have
little power over what happens to users’ information after sharing
it broadly. “It travels,” Ms. Dixon said. “It could be customized.
It could be fed into an algorithm and decisions could be made about
you based on that data.”
400 Million Exposed
Unlike Europe, where social media companies have had to adapt to
stricter regulation, the United States has no
general consumer privacy law, leaving tech companies free to
monetize most kinds of personal information as long as they don’t
mislead their users. The F.T.C., which regulates trade, can bring
enforcement actions against companies that deceive their customers.
Besides Facebook, the F.T.C. has consent agreements with Google and
Twitter stemming from alleged privacy violations.
Facebook’s agreement with regulators is a result of the company’s
early experiments with data sharing. In late 2009, it changed the
privacy settings of the 400 million people then using the service,
making some of their information accessible to all of the internet.
Then it shared that information, including users’ locations and
religious and political leanings, with Microsoft and other partners.
Facebook called this “instant personalization” and promoted it as a
step toward a better internet, where other companies would use the
information to customize what people saw on sites like Bing. But the
feature drew complaints from privacy advocates and many Facebook
users that the social network had shared the information without
permission.
The F.T.C. investigated and in 2011 cited the privacy changes as a
deceptive practice. Caught off guard, Facebook officials stopped
mentioning instant personalization in public and entered into the
consent agreement.
Under the decree, the social network introduced a “comprehensive
privacy program” charged with reviewing new products and features.
It was initially overseen by two chief privacy officers, their lofty
title an apparent sign of Facebook’s commitment. The company also
hired PricewaterhouseCoopers to assess its privacy practices every
two years.
But the privacy program faced some internal resistance from the
start, according to four former Facebook employees with direct
knowledge of the company’s efforts. Some engineers and executives,
they said, considered the privacy reviews an impediment to quick
innovation and growth. And the core team responsible for
coordinating the reviews—numbering about a dozen people by 2016—was moved around within Facebook’s sprawling organization, sending
mixed signals about how seriously the company took it, the
ex-employees said.
Critically, many of Facebook’s special sharing partnerships were not
subject to extensive privacy program reviews, two of the former
employees said. Executives believed that because the partnerships
were governed by business contracts requiring them to follow
Facebook data policies, they did not require the same level of
scrutiny. The privacy team had limited ability to review or suggest
changes to some of those data-sharing agreements, which had been
negotiated by more senior officials at the company.
Facebook officials said that members of the privacy team had been
consulted on the sharing agreements, but that the level of review
“depended on the specific partnership and the time it was created.”
In 2014, Facebook ended instant personalization and walled off
access to friends’ information. But in a previously unreported
agreement, the social network’s engineers continued allowing Bing;
Pandora, the music streaming service; and Rotten Tomatoes, the movie
and television review site, access to much of the data they had
gotten for the discontinued feature. Bing had access to the
information through last year, the records show, and the two other
companies did as of late summer, according to tests by The Times.
Facebook officials said the data sharing did not violate users’
privacy because it allowed access only to public data—though that included data that the social network had made public
in 2009. They added that the social network made a mistake in
allowing the access to continue for the three companies, but
declined to elaborate. Spokeswomen for Pandora and Rotten Tomatoes
said the businesses were not aware of any special access.
Facebook also declined to discuss the other capabilities Bing was
given, including the ability to see all users’ friends.
Microsoft officials said that Bing was using the data to build
profiles of Facebook users on Microsoft servers. They declined to
provide details, other than to say the information was used in
“feature development” and not for advertising. Microsoft has since
deleted the data, the officials said.
Compliance Questions
For some advocates, the torrent of user data flowing out of Facebook
has called into question not only Facebook’s compliance with the
F.T.C. agreement, but also the agency’s approach to privacy
regulation.
“There has been an endless barrage of how Facebook has ignored
users’ privacy settings, and we truly believed that in 2011 we had
solved this problem,” said Marc Rotenberg, head of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, an online privacy group that filed one
of the first complaints about Facebook with federal regulators. “We
brought Facebook under the regulatory authority of the F.T.C. after
a tremendous amount of work. The F.T.C. has failed to act.”
According to Facebook, most of its data partnerships fall under an
exemption to the F.T.C. agreement. The company argues that the
partner companies are service providers—companies that use the data only “for and at the direction of”
Facebook and function as an extension of the social network.
But Mr. Vladeck and other former F.T.C. officials said that Facebook
was interpreting the exemption too broadly. They said the provision
was intended to allow Facebook to perform the same everyday
functions as other companies, such as sending and receiving
information over the internet or processing credit card
transactions, without violating the consent decree.
When The Times reported last summer on the partnerships with device
makers, Facebook used the term “integration partners” to describe
BlackBerry, Huawei and other manufacturers that pulled Facebook data
to provide social-media-style features on smartphones. All such
integration partners, Facebook asserted, were covered by the service
provider exemption.
Since then, as the social network has disclosed its data sharing
deals with other kinds of businesses—including internet companies such as Yahoo—Facebook has labeled them integration partners, too.
Facebook even recategorized one company, the Russian search giant
Yandex, as an integration partner.
Facebook records show Yandex had access in 2017 to Facebook’s unique
user IDs even after the social network stopped sharing them with
other applications, citing privacy risks. A spokeswoman for Yandex,
which was accused last year by Ukraine’s security service of
funneling its user data to the Kremlin, said the company was unaware
of the access and did not know why Facebook had allowed it to
continue. She added that the Ukrainian allegations “have no merit.”
In October, Facebook said Yandex was not an integration partner. But
in early December, as The Times was preparing to publish this
article, Facebook told congressional lawmakers that it was.
An F.T.C. spokeswoman declined to comment on whether the commission
agreed with Facebook’s interpretation of the service provider
exception, which is likely to figure in the F.T.C.’s ongoing
Facebook investigation. She also declined to say whether the
commission had ever received a complete list of partners that
Facebook considered service providers.
But federal regulators had reason to know about the
partnerships—and to question
whether Facebook was adequately safeguarding users’ privacy.
According to a letter that Facebook sent this fall to Senator Ron
Wyden, the Oregon Democrat, PricewaterhouseCoopers
reviewed at least some of Facebook’s data partnerships.
The first assessment, sent to the F.T.C. in 2013, found only
“limited” evidence that Facebook had monitored those partners’ use
of data. The finding was redacted from a public copy of the
assessment, which gave Facebook’s privacy program a passing grade
over all.
Mr. Wyden and other critics have questioned whether the
assessments—in which the F.T.C.
essentially outsources much of its day-to-day oversight to companies
like PricewaterhouseCoopers—are
effective. As with other businesses under consent agreements with
the F.T.C., Facebook pays for and largely dictated the scope of its
assessments, which are limited mostly to documenting that Facebook
has conducted the internal privacy reviews it claims it had.
How closely Facebook monitored its data partners is uncertain. Most
of Facebook’s partners declined to discuss what kind of reviews or
audits Facebook subjected them to. Two former Facebook partners,
whose deals with the social network dated to 2010, said they could
find no evidence that Facebook had ever audited them. One was
BlackBerry. The other was Yandex.
Facebook officials said that while the social network audited
partners only rarely, it managed them closely.
“These were high-touch relationships,” Mr. Satterfield said.
The content you have chosen to save (which may include videos,
articles, images and other copyrighted materials) is intended for your
personal, noncommercial use. Such content is owned or controlled by
The New York Times Company or the party credited as the content
provider. Please refer to nytimes.com and the Terms of Service
available on its website for information and restrictions related to
the content.
Last fall, True Manufacturing completed a project long in the making.
The company, which specializes in commercial refrigeration systems,
had decided to abandon the neutral cubicles that had encased
customer-service workers at its Missouri headquarters, opting instead
for a redesign that featured the clustered, partitionless seating now
ubiquitous in modern offices. A few months later, as the coronavirus
forced Americans to learn the details of social distancing and
respiratory droplets, the company got to work on another initiative,
this one executed with considerably more haste: redividing its workers
into cubicles with clear plexiglass partitions.
“Oh my gosh, talk about taking 10 steps back,” Steven Proctor, True
Manufacturing’s director of sales and marketing, told me. “We just did
the big open-office concept; we put everybody in desk shares that were
right on top of each other.” The company’s office and the problems it
suddenly presented might have been brand new, but the concerns of
Proctor and his co-workers were far from unique. This spring, millions
of Americans trying to limit their interactions with colleagues or
working from home alongside roommates or family members were forced to
look around and wonder where all the walls had gone. On a hunch, True
didn’t stop at just its own partitions—the company ordered more plexiglass, settled on some standard sizes,
and contacted the local chamber of commerce to offer itself up for
custom jobs, sure that lots of other businesses would find themselves
in the same bind. Orders began coming in almost immediately.
Over the past few decades, the formerly subdivided interior spaces of
work and home got a lot more open. Private offices gave way to
cost-effective cubicles, and once California tech companies became the
influential employers of a new generation, their open plans were the
beginning of the end of private workspaces—even the humble cubicle. At home, a cavalcade of HGTV house flippers
and luxury renovators instructed viewers to
tear down those walls
in pursuit of an open-concept living space. Open plans were
so tantalizing to some people that they spawned their own celebrities:
Chip and Joanna Gaines, a pair of evangelical Texas parents,
became huge stars, complete with their own
product lines, shops, and restaurants, by demolishing seemingly
every interior wall in Waco.
But this spring, walls both partial and permanent got the advocate
they needed: the pandemic.
In the past few months, the lives that unfolded in the airy,
impersonal spaces of the Before Times have changed. Collaboration and
togetherness have become disease vectors, to say nothing of open floor
plans’ less deadly problems, such as the impossibility of two Zoom
calls happening without a wall between them. Once sold as chic and
modern, the wholesale abandonment of defined spaces feels at times
even more ill-considered than it did when the biggest issue was
listening to your co-workers yak on the phone. As early as March,
designers, manufacturers, and architects started building plans and
products for what they guessed might be a precipitous change in daily
life. They were right. Personal space is finally back in style, but
re-creating it after two decades of its destruction is hardly a
straightforward task. We have to decide what we want from walls in the
first place. The threat of illness and extended home quarantine took
floor plans out of the realm of philosophy and reminded all involved
of the necessary functional reason humans have been building walls for
millennia: to keep other people away from them.
The march toward open-plan everything came in fits and starts. In the
early 1900s, Frank Lloyd Wright’s
“Prairie” style
helped give open plans a visual vernacular, and as the century
progressed, walls began to fall away as domestic help became less
affordable. If middle-class mothers couldn’t sequester the cook in the
kitchen while they tended to the kids, then the hidden kitchen would
no longer do. “Then, as now, [open plans] promised to tear down
obstruction and facilitate connection,” my colleague Ian Bogost wrote
in a
2018 history of the style. “The mother, relegated to
the kitchen, needed to have a view of where the children were playing
in the yard. This key principle would evolve to justify open plans
more generally, but with a mother’s view of the safe confines of the
indoors more in mind.” HGTV, which features lots of wall removal
because
demolition makes for great TV, isn’t selling just a theory
of design—it’s selling the
persistent myth that if women buy the right things, they really
can have it all.
The office’s embrace of fully open plans was faster. Many offices were
first partially opened for mid-century secretarial pools, but the
design’s wide adoption for office workers of all kinds began in the
early 2000s, with the ascendance of Silicon Valley tech companies such
as Google and Apple and their futuristic, super-casual workplaces.
They influence the American workplace today in much the same way that
companies such as General Motors and General Electric did in the
previous century.
Randy Howder, a co-managing director of the San Francisco office for
the design and architecture firm Gensler, thinks that open plans can
be very effective when they’re well designed by architects who
understand a particular workplace’s culture and needs, though he
admits that’s not the only reason they’ve proliferated. “The angel on
my left shoulder says they’re popular because there was a lot of
belief in the fact that an open office engendered greater
collaboration and more lateral awareness of what other colleagues are
doing,” he said. “The devil on my right shoulder says it was sometimes
cheaper and more cost-effective and faster to build” an open-plan
office, which resulted in squished-together desks and no privacy in
workplaces where people need quiet and focus. And that belief that
open offices would foster teamwork?
The opposite
now appears to be true.
So America found itself with few barriers to prevent “connection”—or to catch sneezes—at the
beginning of 2020. By then, the limitations of open plans had already
become clear both at work and at home: The noisiness of
high-ceilinged, hardwood-floored, densely populated offices had helped
spur the
rapid adoption of Apple AirPods. Dishwashers now come with
decibel ratings to ensure that the occupants of America’s “great
rooms” can hear The Masked Singer over dinner cleanup. In its
2019 workplace survey, Gensler found that 65
percent of respondents wanted at least semiprivate workspaces; another
quarter wanted on-demand access to private spaces. At home, the
American Institute of Architects’ annual survey of residential
architects found double-digit declines in interest in open layouts
compared with the previous year in both
2019
and
2020.
Despite this changing tide of opinion, the return of walls had not
been widely predicted. Walls, or even new office partitions or desk
dividers, are expensive and bulky. Workspaces that had been built to
function without them can’t be easily expanded to accommodate them,
and people who had spent thousands of dollars and months of their life
knocking down too many parts of their house in the past decade might
be loath to spend even more time and money to have individual rooms
once again.
Still, in one way or another, walls have started to creep back into
the places whence they had been banished. You might have already seen
some of True Manufacturing’s work without realizing it—the company has filled orders for plexiglass dividers for the
food-service and hospitality clients it serves through its
refrigeration business, but also for banks, school systems, police
departments, care homes, and the NBC Sports broadcast of a recent
Mecum automotive auction, for which True customized the clear
partitions with the network’s logo. Partitions and dividers have been
in such demand nationwide that supplies of the materials most often
used to make them, like plexiglass, have
begun to run low.
For companies that make products for spaces that have suddenly fallen
into disuse—restaurants, hotels,
offices—pivoting to partitions
has also helped them continue to cut paychecks to engineers,
designers, manufacturers, and salespeople. Stylex, an office-furniture
company based in New Jersey, began planning for the return of walls on
a hunch in late March. “I started to think, somewhat out of
desperation, what could we do that people are actually going to need
toward the end of this year and into next year?” Bruce Golden,
Stylex’s co-CEO, told me. “They probably have enough chairs. They
probably have enough desks.”
To answer that question, his company came up with a product called
Quick Screens—tall, simple,
fabric-covered partitions on casters. When the line launches next
month, orders will ship in 10 days as opposed to Stylex’s typical six
to eight weeks, the fastest the company has ever turned around a
product. Golden said that although the new partitions have generated
some interest, the coronavirus has disrupted more than just office
setups. The commercial-furniture industry is still trying to adjust
its sales techniques to the new normal. “Usually, the salespeople go
out and they make calls—present
the products, talk about the products person to person,” Golden told
me. “The designers and the dealers do go onto our website, but making
them aware of the products is not that easy. But the word will get out
there.”
At Gensler, Howder is already planning for his clients’ return to
work. “We see some interesting movement toward things that are neither
an office nor an open environment,” he told me, emphasizing that the
cube farm of the ’90s is not coming back. Instead, Howder is
predicting the rise of what his firm calls the “officle.” It’s not
exactly a private office, not exactly an open work area, not exactly a
small conference room—but maybe
it’s all those things. The image can be hard to conjure; it’s a small,
partially open space where, at least theoretically, you don’t have to
listen to your desk neighbors talk about their spouse for a couple of
hours while you try to hit a deadline. These spaces would also help
separate workers if they
return to the office
while the threat of coronavirus infection remains. Before more
permanent changes can be made, Howder said, that means reorganizing
open-plan common areas, sometimes with partitions such as those made
by Stylex, which is one of Gensler’s suppliers. In the long term, that
means—yes—walls.
In homes, things work more slowly. The budgets are personal instead of
corporate. Offices can be altered with ease while employees clack away
on laptops at their kitchen tables, but no one wants to live in a
construction site and a pandemic simultaneously. Still, some
residential architects have started to see signs of life. Jane
Frederick, the president of the American Institute of Architects, says
that although business is slower than normal at her Beaufort, South
Carolina, residential-design firm, the phone has started to ring
again. “We’re getting quite a few calls because I think people are
pent up in their houses, and they’re going crazy,” Frederick told me.
“But they’re very nervous to pull the trigger.” She wasn’t shocked to
hear that people wanted to renovate after staring at their own walls
for months on end. “If you moved into an existing space, you just made
your life work around whatever rooms were there,” Frederick said. “You
might have been using the dining room as an office, but it doesn’t
really work now, because if someone is in the kitchen grinding coffee,
you can hear it on your Zoom call.” Even amid a worsening pandemic in
the state, the small firm has booked a handful of new projects.
Frederick told me that, at least in her practice, interest in open
plans was never quite as extreme as the transformations frequently
depicted on HGTV, a channel she said she doesn’t watch, because of the
unrealistic expectations it engenders in novice renovators. But the
past few years have seen a definite uptick in desire for more defined
rooms—just not at the front of
the house. “You used to have one room that was sort of your mudroom,
laundry room, and pantry, and now those typically are three different
rooms” in the home’s rear, Frederick told me. In new homes and
high-end renovations, unsightly chores have gotten their own dedicated
spaces, away from the presentation area of the open kitchen. Frederick
expects demand for these kinds of spaces to continue to rise during
and immediately after the pandemic, as people prize a separation
between the “dirty” and “clean” areas of a home. The same search for
separation (but without the cleanliness concern) has happened with the
living room—more of Frederick’s
clients have started to request spaces for yoga, reading, or
meditation elsewhere in their home, seeking seclusion for activities
that might have previously been done in the now-open area.
Although these choices are the province of the wealthy, the
preferences of people with lots of choices often end up reflected in
the homes of Americans with more modest means down the line. “Open
kitchens” and their immense, marble-topped islands get shrunk down to
budget sizes and remade in cheap materials, tucked into the corners of
rental apartments and finished with a subway-tile backsplash. People
without a dedicated mudroom buy shoe racks and wall hooks to dress up
the area near their door as a “room” unto itself. It isn’t a wall, but
during a pandemic, walls have started to seem pretty luxurious. To
have walls, you need space.
Where space isn’t available, or when time is of the essence, both
manufacturers that I spoke with expect the partition business to
attract new customers and competitors for at least the next six months
to a year, if not longer. And as the country has already learned this
year with
faulty masks
and
fake hand sanitizer, pandemic panic-buying can
attract some unsavory operators and pose unforeseen risks to a
desperate public—even cutting
into a sheet of plexiglass and bolting it to a desk or counter isn’t
as straightforward as it might seem. “That acrylic gets in your skin
and cuts you, and I think you’d rather get cut with glass,” said Steve
Alexander, True Manufacturing’s parts-marketing manager. Walls, in all
their variations, aren’t created equally: Hastily purchased panels
that haven’t been properly finished at the edges, that aren’t thick
enough to stand rigidly, or whose bases are too narrow for their
height could cause more problems than they solve, especially in
sensitive environments such as hospitals or classrooms. “You can’t
have these things fall on third or fourth graders if they go back to
school,” Alexander noted. “That would be a big problem.”
✾ putanumonit.com✾
Wednesday 16 October 2019✾
24 minute read✾
“The Rationalist community isn’t just a sex cult,” quoth
Diana Fleischman
in
a new book about Rationalists, “they do other great things
too!” When I read that I asked my friends if there are any cultish sex
parties I’m not being invited to; they all assured me that they’re not
having secret sect sex in my absence (except for Diana, who kept mum).
So, I assume that this trope mostly comes down to the high percentage
of Rationalists who are polyamorous. I found out about this
correlation soon after discovering Rationality (having already been in
an open relationship), but I never paused to question it. When a
journalist recently called to interview me about polyamory and
rationality, it got me thinking: what actually explains the
correspondence?
It is estimated that about
5% of Americans
are CNM (consensually non-monogamous) although that number varies
widely based on the survey sample and the exact definition of
non-monogamy used. In contrast, 17% of Americans in the
2014 LessWrong survey
said that they prefer polyamory. Perhaps more than 5% of
non-Rationalist Americans would prefer open relationships if
they could get them, but it’s unlikely that 17% do. Moreover, the
survey indicates that polyamory increases with Rationality engagement
both online and off: 19% of those who have posted on LessWrong prefer
polyamory vs. 12% of those who haven’t, same for those who have and
haven’t read at least half of
The Sequences, and 26% of those who’ve
attended a Rationalist meetup prefer polyamory vs. 11% of meetup
virgins.
It’s not obvious there should be a correlation between a relationship
style that originated in the hippie counterculture and a
meta-philosophy that originated in questions of decision theory,
cognitive biases, and artificial intelligence. There could be a
founder effect: LessWrong creator Eliezer is open about being open.
But he’s not that open: the word “polyamory” isn’t mentioned
even once in The Sequences, while “polysyllabismic” occurs twice. If
this entire community is a plot by Eliezer to get laid, he’s really
throwing people off the scent with all the AI work.
The scolds tell us that
“Polyamory is for rich, pretty people”
but while Rationalists are good looking, they’re not richer
than the average American. A bunch of nerds in a Berkeley group house
are not the upper-class decadent playboys the author imagines.
I brainstormed six plausible theories to explain the connection
between polyamory and Rationality, as alternatives to the hypothesis
that Rationalists are simply indoctrinating their friends into
non-monogamy. In a rare burst of scientific endeavor,
I posted a survey
to interrogate all seven hypotheses, and a couple of other variables
as well. The survey has gathered 633 responses as of this writing
thanks to my diligent readers and my friends who retweeted it. You can
view the survey to see the original phrasing of the questions and
contribute your data. You can also
download the raw data
yourself, come up with your own stories, and critique mine.
I’m not particularly attached to any of these theories, this is purely
driven by curiosity, not advocacy. Most of these are beliefs and
attitudes that should correlate separately with both Rationality and
polyamory, at least in my personal experience. It is very hard to
tease out causality from these relationships: each attitude can be a
result of engaging with Rationality and polyamory, a
preexisting cause that leads people to them, or a result of
one and a cause of the other. Establishing a causal direction is
beyond the power of a point-in-time survey, so whenever I mention
causality below keep in mind that I’m just speculating.
Survey Analysis
The survey consists of multiple-choice questions, the majority of
which encode a linear scale (even if the scale was not explicit). For
example, the answers to the two questions regarding engagement with
online Rationality and the Rationality community are treated as 4
point scales, and the two scores are added to create a 7-point scale
for “combined engagement”.
Linear scales are easy to work with and most of my analysis is in the
form of linear regressions and correlations. While this introduces
some inaccuracies (e.g., the implicit assumption that the distance
between 1–2 on the scale is the same as
2–3 and 3–4) some errors are unavoidable no matter how these things are
measured and encoded. I erred on the side of making the answer options
explicit so respondents wouldn’t have to guess what “3 out of 7 on the
polyamory scale” means. I also erred on the side of making the survey
short and accessible—this is all
exploratory. I also preregistered the core of my analysis plan with 3
scientists and the aforementioned journalist, to help keep it free
from bias.
The main variables I measured, which will be explained in detail
below, are:
Engagement with Rationality, via two 4-point scales.
Preference for polyamory, with a single 4-point scale.
Questioning and overcoming intuition, two 4-point scales.
Agreement with evolutionary psychology, a 5-point scale.
Acceptance of weirdness, a 4-point scale.
Ethics, a question with 6 discrete categories 3 of which are used to
encode a “Rationalist Ethics” scale.
Religiosity, a 4-point scale.
Utopianism, a poorly written question collapsed to a 3-point scale.
Attitude towards progressive politics, a 5-point scale.
Below is the correlation matrix of all the main variables, with the
color representing the strength and direction of the correlation. We
will dive into each in turn.
Respondents
Of the 633 respondents, 78% are straight men. I don’t break out any of
the main analyses by gender and orientation, so keep in mind that if
these confounders have a strong impact on the measured variables this
impact may not be accounted for.
I posted the poll on Putanumonit, LessWrong, my own Twitter, and my
Facebook. It was also retweeted and shared, most noticeably by former
Putanumonit interviewees
Aella
and
Geoffrey Miller—these all fall under
“elsewhere”.
Respondents who came to the survey from different sources differ quite
a bit in their engagement with Rationality and polyamory, although not
so much on the other variables. The two charts below also show the
relative number of respondents from each source.
And now, to the stories.
Story 1 – Overcoming Intuitions
A core tenet of Rationality is that what feels true is not
necessarily what is true. What feels true may simply be what
is pleasant, politically expedient, or what fits your biases and
preconceptions. The willingness to entertain the idea that your
intuitions about truth may be wrong is a prerequisite for learning
Rationality, and Rationality further cultivates that skill.
A key to polyamory is realizing that what feels bad is not
necessarily a sign that something is bad. Seeing your partner
kiss another lover can trigger feelings of jealousy and insecurity.
But in the context of polyamory, it’s actually a positive sign: that
they trust you and feel comfortable around you, and that they
encourage you to express your love for other people too.
Failure to overcome your intuitions can happen in two places: failing
to question them in the first place, and failing to believe that you
can overcome your immediate reaction and in time dissolve the
intuition itself. Many Rationality skeptics (including Daniel
Kahnemann himself!) see biased thinking as inevitable and impossible
to improve. Many polyamory skeptics don’t believe that jealousy and
possessiveness can be overcome. To progress in Rationality or
polyamorous relationships, you need the opposite attitude.
After fiddling with
ggplot2
for several hours, the chart above is the most comprehensive way I
came up with to illustrate the relationship between questioning
intuition and both Rationality and polyamory. It may not be clear at
first glance what’s going on, so let me explain what these charts
represent.
There are 7 different levels of engagement with Rationality forming
the X-axis, from left (unfamiliar) to right (engaged Rationalist). I
used labels instead of the numbers 2–8
to clarify the meaning.
There are 4 relationship type preferences forming the Y-axis, from
fully monogamous at the bottom to polyamorous on top.
The two axes form 7×4 = 28 combinations. The area of each square
represents the number of respondents in that combination. For
example, there were 44 people who scored
6⁄8 on
Rationality engagement (Rat-adjacent) and are monogamous,
represented by the
5th square from the
left (since that scale goes 2–8) on
the bottom row.
The color of each square represents mistrusting and overcoming one’s
intuition, from bright red (trusting) to dark blue (overcoming).
Overall, there wasn’t much variance on the “overcoming intuition”
scale, with most individuals (and all 28 group averages) falling in
the 5–7 range of the 2–8 scale. Whatever variance there is strongly correlated with
polyamory (p < 10-4) and not correlated
at all with Rationality. On the chart, you see the squares
getting darker as we move up but not as we move left or right.
The latter result is very surprising to me. The ability to notice,
dissect, and when necessary overcome my intuitions and gut
reactions is an invaluable skill for me, and I credit a lot of that to
my engagement with Rationality. Skeptics of Rationalist
self-improvement like Scott Alexander say that to the extent that is
ability is real, it is innate and not enhanced by engaging with
Rationality. The two survey questions get at attitude more
than skill, but it’s still evidence in favor of the skeptics.
Story 2 – Believing in Evolutionary Psychology
This is related to the first story, but I could imagine it has a
standalone effect. Dissecting our emotions and intuitions requires
understanding where they come from, and that understanding starts with
our evolution. On the Rationality side, evolutionary psychology
explains many of our cognitive biases, especially around social
behavior and
signaling.
Evolutionary psychology also offers insight into the emotion at the
heart of relationship choices: jealousy. Men tend to be sexually
jealous and control their partner’s sexual access, as a result of the
immense cost in reproductive fitness borne by raising another man’s
child by your mate. Women experience more jealousy around emotional
investment and solicit signs of commitment from their partners, having
been dependent on a man to provide them and their children with the
resources necessary for survival.
Grasping the full implications of this did a lot to dispel jealousy’s
hold on me. The first thing I noticed is that our ancestor’s
reproductive fitness concerns are not very relevant in the
21st century.
Contraception and genetic testing make raising another man’s children
a very remote possibility, and a pregnant or nursing woman is unlikely
to starve these days just because a man is not there to provide for
her. More importantly, there’s no particular reason for me to follow
my evolved drives; if I adopted a child I would love and raise them
even though it does little to propagate my genes.
Well, it appears that I’m alone on this one. Accepting evolutionary
psychology does not correlate with Rationality and correlates
negatively with polyamory.
The correlation is not very strong because there wasn’t a lot of
variance in people’s attitudes about evolutionary psychology. 91% of
the sample were at least Neutral on a 5-point scale of
accepting that it does a good job explaining human behavior and
emotions. Among monogamous people 69% agreed or strongly agreed, vs.
56% of poly folk.
I considered that evolutionary psychology is not popular in
politically progressive circles because it rejects the blank slate
doctrine, and progressive politics are correlated with polyamory.
While both these things are confirmed in my data, progressive politics
don’t fully explain away the negative relationship between
evolutionary psychology and monogamy.
What does explain it? Since I predicted the opposite, I do not want to
speculate.
As for Rationality, it correlates with neither evolutionary
psychology, nor progressive politics, nor the two together (they could
have offsetting correlations with Rationality, but seem to simply have
none). This further frustrates my hypothesis, but it at least dispels
the notion that Rationalists are a reactionary sex cult, a
canard that is promoted on one particular subreddit.
Story 3 – Social Reality and Weirdness
In a story that
I shared on Twitter, I told my coworker that
when I’m in a rush and need a measured dose of caffeine I just chew on
a handful of roasted espresso beans. The taste is not actually
bad—if you like chocolate covered
beans, you may not totally need the chocolate. I suggested to my
coworker that she try it at least once, just to know what it tastes
and feels like.
She adamantly refused, citing
“that’s not how it’s consumed” and
“it’s weird, people don’t do that” as her main objections. I
countered that these are facts about people, rather than
facts about coffee beans. While you can infer some things
about beans from observing people, the beans are right there in the
office kitchen to be experienced directly. My coworker seemed unable
to grasp the distinction, treating the
social unacceptability of eating coffee beans as akin to
physical impossibility.
I call this phenomenon social reality. Those who feel its
pull strongly allow for small quirks but mostly follow the socially
acceptable course—monogamy. Those
who ignore social reality stand the risk of becoming Soylent-drinking,
AI-safety-donating, cryonic-enlisted Rationalists.
At least, that was my hypothesis. Instead of asking directly “how
weird are you?” I opted for a question giving strange eating habits
(coffee beans, cold steak, raw oil) as a concrete example to gauge
people’s reactions.
As with the intuition question, weirdness correlates strongly with
polyamory (p ≈ 10-1) and not at all with
Rationality engagement. Again, this is shocking to me. It could well
be that the question wasn’t getting at the willingness to be a
weirdo-among-weirdos that I associate with Rationalists, but if it
measured nothing at all it wouldn’t correlate with polyamory either.
Joke’s on us—Rationalists were
the normies all along.
This wasn’t in my original analysis, but I checked the connection
between weirdness and overcoming intuition. The two are significantly
correlated but are not measuring the same thing. For example, when
regressing polyamory on rationality engagement, weirdness, and
overcoming intuition together, all three show up with positive and
significant coefficients.
Story 4 – Religion
While the Old Testament had mostly positive things to say about
kiloamorous King Solomon, modern religions tend to criticize adultery
for both sexes. As for Rationality, I personally think that LessWrong
has become too hostile to religious folk and I’m
a Bayesian atheist. The absence of religious
people in both polyamory and Rationality will cause them to correlate.
Only 10% of my respondents were religious, but that was enough to
demonstrate a negative relationship to both polyamory and Rationality.
The survey also included a single polyamorous, Rationalist,
virtue-ethicist, religious woman. If that’s you,
please get in touch! I would love to hear some more about your lifestyle and worldview.
Story 5 – Ethics
Most people don’t need an explicit system to make moral choices, they
follow their intuitions and the norms of their social circle. This
applies to relationship choices as well—asking your partner not to kiss other people is usually not the
output of a moral deliberation but just the popular norm.
Polyamory doesn’t fit well within the normal moral-intuitionist
framework. As
Geoffrey Miller noted, the natural justification
for polyamory is from consequentialist ethics: the pleasure Geoffrey’s
partner and her lover gain from spending time together outweighs the
discomfort it brings him. Consequentialism doesn’t have a lot of room
for claims of special moral rank due to “being her
real boyfriend”, the well-being of all people is treated the
same regardless of their relationship status.
The polyamory guide
More Than Two
also argues that expanding one’s moral circle and adhering to a
stricter moral system is required for flourishing polyamorous
relationships. Polyamory requires treating as moral equals not only
currently existing lovers but also potential ones: an existing couple
shouldn’t make rules (for example, veto power) that will unreasonably
constrain or harm new people who may one day enter into a relationship
with one of them. The book’s mantra
“the people in a relationship are more important than the
relationship”
likewise carries a strong flavor of consequentialism.
Rationalists are also very likely to follow a
consequentialist ethical system, and not just those who
overlap with Effective Altruism. There are myriad reasons for this and
exploring all of them would take a project at least the scope of this
one. For now, I’ll simply claim that
it is known. If the data contradicts me on this one I should really
give up on saying anything at all about Rationalists.
Whew. Consequentialism has a remarkably strong correlation with
Rationality. On the non-Rationalist end of the scale,
consequentialists are a small minority while 50% follow their
intuitions rather than an explicit system. On the Rationalist end,
consequentialists are a large majority.
When regressed on multiple variables, consequentialism also shows a
significant positive relationship with overcoming intuition (since it
requires overriding one’s moral intuitions) and a significant negative
relationship with religiosity (since religious people are likely to
follow a religious system of ethics instead). When these variables are
included consequentialism no longer has a significant relationship
with polyamory (although it still does with Rationality).
Story 6 – Utopianism
Have you ever experienced a moment of bliss? On the rapids of
inspiration maybe, your mind tracing the shapes of truth and beauty?
Or in the pulsing ecstasy of love? Or in a glorious triumph achieved
with true friends? Or in a conversation on a vine-overhung terrace one
star-appointed night? Or perhaps a melody smuggled itself into your
heart, charming it and setting it alight with kaleidoscopic emotions?
Or when you prayed, and felt heard? […]
Yet a little later, scarcely an hour gone by, and the ever-falling
soot of ordinary life is already covering the whole thing. The silver
and gold of exuberance lose their shine, and the marble becomes dirty.
[…]
I summoning the memory of your best moment—why? In the hope of kindling in you a desire to share my happiness.
And yet, what you had in your best moment is but a beckoning scintilla
at most. Not close to what I have. No closer than the word “sun”
written in yellow ink is to the actual sun. For I’m beyond words and
imagination. […]
The challenge before you: to become fully what you now are only in
hope and potential.
This excerpt is from Nick Bostrom’s poetic
Letter From Utopia, an imagined missive to today’s humans from our possible future
selves who are wiser, happier, better in every way that we want to be
better.
I am not much given to religious sentiment, but
Letter From Utopia comes closest to kindling that sentiment
in me.
I use Utopia as a benchmark for orienting myself towards the person I
want to be. With a clear enough picture of Utopia in my head, I can
interrogate it along many dimensions. Are the people of Utopia
nationalist or universalist? Secular or religious? Do they feel joy or
anger when their lovers find new lovers? Some of these are hard to
answer, but I can’t imagine that in the glorious future people
regulate who their lovers may and may not spend time with. It just
doesn’t fit.
Polyamory is new, it’s weird, and it’s certainly forward-looking.
Insomuch as people have the instinct to explore and experiment with
new ways of being, to take risks in the hope of reaching new plateaus
of happiness, that instinct will push them towards polyamory.
As for Rationality, it was conceived on transhumanist messaging boards
and still retains that sentiment. Our home is not a static point but a
vector—Less Wrong every day. The project of Rationality is born of
the belief that humans can become wiser, polyamory is the belief that
we can become happier and more loving.
The question I came up with to assess positive and negative attitudes
about humanity’s future potential garnered a lot of complaints, all of
them justified. It was confusing, poorly worded, and unintuitive. And
yet, even with the measurement noise that resulted from the badly
written question, “utopianism” correlates significantly with both
Rationality engagement and polyamory. In the glorious future, everyone
is a polyamorous nerd (and almost certainly bisexual).
Bisexual?
While not the main aim of the survey, I was curious to confirm my
anecdotal impression that bisexuality correlates with polyamory. It
surely does. Bisexuals were exactly twice as likely in my sample to be
polyamorous as heterosexuals: 56% vs. 28% for women and 39% vs. 20%
for men. Somewhat surprisingly, only 2 of the 15 homosexual men in the
survey were polyamorous, although I don’t know if we can draw
conclusions for this small sample by itself.
Summary
How did my hypotheses do when faced with 633 actual human beings? Some
were confirmed, some are still in question, and some went up in
flames.
The six stories were based purely on my own experience: I’m a
consequentialist non-religious transhumanist weirdo. Learning about
evolutionary psychology blew my mind, and so did realizing that my
emotions are subject to introspection and modification. I’m still not
bisexual, but, you know, growth mindset. I arrived at
polyamory and Rationality independently; what the survey shows is that
there any many different paths to the same destination.
Polyamory did show significant correlations with all six variables
thrown into a single regression, except that evolutionary psychology
had the opposite effect from what I predicted. When
Rationality engagement is added to the regression it screens out some
of the effect of religiosity on polyamory and most of the effect of
consequentialism.
My hypotheses did a worse job explaining Rationality than they did
polyamory. Only religiosity, consequentialism (massively so), and
utopianism had a positive relationship with Rationality. When
polyamory is included in the regression, overcoming intuition becomes
significantly correlated in the opposite direction from what I
predicted.
Bottom line: only religiosity and utopianism (despite the poorly
written question) significantly correlate with both Rationality and
polyamory when everything is thrown in the regression.
Consequentialism is purely a proxy for Rationality, and accepting
evolutionary psychology is a proxy for monogamy. Not
accepting your intuitions and yes accepting weirdness are not
correlated positively with Rationality engagement, which goes against
my intuitions and is extremely weird to me.
More importantly, even when all the above variables are included
Rationality and polyamory show a very strong correlation. Rationality
engagement alone accounts for 9% of the variance in polyamory, and the
six additional variables only contribute another 5% of variance
explained between them. Whatever makes Rationalists poly or vice
versa, we have not explained it yet.
San Francisco Bay
Since I published the survey, I happened to talk to two women who said
that everyone they know in the San Francisco Bay Area is polyamorous.
One of them moved to New York in part because she couldn’t find a
monogamous boyfriend in SF, the other is polyamorous and still lives
there.
Rationalists also happen to concentrate in Berkeley and the rest of
the Bay Area, albeit for initial reasons that had nothing to do with
polyamory. My survey didn’t ask whether people live in the Bay or not,
and neither did any of the LessWrong surveys to my knowledge. I
quickly ran an even-less-scientific
Twitter poll
with the following results:
I can’t match this poll to the original survey’s respondents, but the
overall percentage of polyamorous respondents matches almost
perfectly: 22% vs. 24% in the original survey. Living in the Bay is
correlated with polyamory but not overwhelmingly so: 31% of Bay Area
respondents are poly vs. 20% of respondents who live elsewhere. While
this is quite a strong effect, geography also doesn’t suffice to fully
explain the poly-Rat relationship.
Well, is Rationality a polyamorous cult then?
I included one question in the survey to measure the direct impact of
Rationality engagement on polyamory, asking nonmonogamous people who
or what opened them up to open relationships. I “independently
invented” polyamory, and so did my wife and most of my poly friends. I
know very few people who were convinced to try polyamory by their
acquaintances, even fewer who were converted by something they read.
Still, I decided to ask how people became polyamorous: whether they
came up with it themselves or if they picked it up from friends
(Rationalist or otherwise) or something they read (Rationalist or
otherwise).
Holy poly. This chart blew my mind when it first rendered. I rechecked
the data three times to make sure they’re correct. They are.
The percent of people who self-invent polyamory is roughly constant
for all levels of Rationality engagement, and the percent of those who
pick it up from non-Rationalist sources goes up only slightly. But
three out of four highly-engaged Rationalist in my
survey are polyamorous, and fully half of those had
absorbed polyamory from other Rationalists—those are the expanding green bars/
My survey certainly oversampled polyamorous people, but I still have
to conclude that
engaging with Rationalists and Rationalist writing will at least
double your chance of becoming polyamorous.
There’s no point fighting it anymore, and no reason to. Rationality is
great and it will make your life better. Polyamory is great and it
will make your life better. That may not be true for everyone, but I
suspect that it’s true for a lot of you who are 4,000 words deep into
a research post on a polyamorous Rationalist’s blog.
Calafia Café in Palo Alto is one of the smartest eateries in the
world. With Google’s former executive chef Charlie Ayers at the helm,
the food here isn’t just for sustenance. This is California—eating is also a path to self-improvement. Each dish is carefully
crafted with ingredients that not only keep you slim, but make you
smarter and more energized too. A half-dozen venture capitalists pick
at their dandelion salads. A sleepy suburb at night, by day Palo Alto
becomes the beating heart of Silicon Valley, the monied epicenter of
the greatest gathering of scientific and engineering talent in the
history of human civilization. To the west, across the street, lies
Stanford University. The Googleplex sprawls a few miles to the east.
In the surrounding region, some half-million engineers live and work.
A tech tycoon or two wouldn’t be out of place here.
Steve Jobs
was a regular.
Excusing myself to the men’s room, however, I discover that Calafia
Café has a major technology problem. Despite the pedigree of its
clientele, the smart toilet doesn’t work. As I stare hopefully at the
stainless steel throne, a red light peering out from the small black
plastic box that contains the bowl’s “brains” blinks at me
fruitlessly. Just above, a sign directs an escape path. “If sensor
does not work,” it reads, “use manual flush button.” And so I bail
out, sidestepping
fifty years of progress in computer science and industrial
engineering
in the blink of an eye.
Back at my table, I try to reverse-engineer the model of human-waste
production encoded in the toilet’s CPU. I imagine a lab somewhere in
Japan. Technicians in white lab coats wield stopwatches as they
methodically clock an army of immodest volunteers seated upon row
after row of smart johns. The complexity of the problem becomes clear.
Is it supposed to flush as soon as you stand up? Or when you turn
around? Or pause for a fixed amount of time? But how long? Can it tell
if you need another flush? It’s not quite as challenging an
engineering task as putting a man on the moon, or calculating driving
directions to the airport. Somehow, though, that stuff works every
time.
My bewilderment quickly yields to a growing sense of dread. How is it
that even in the heart of Silicon Valley it’s completely acceptable
for smart technology to be buggy, erratic, or totally dysfunctional?
Someone probably just cured cancer in the biotechnology lab across the
street and is here celebrating over lunch. Yet that same genius will
press the manual flush button just as I did, and never think twice
about how consistently this new world of smart technology is letting
us down. We are
weaving these technologies into our homes, our communities, even our very bodies—but even experts have become disturbingly complacent about their
shortcomings. The rest of us rarely question them at all.
I know I should stop worrying, and learn to love the smart john. But
what if it’s a harbinger of bigger problems? What if the seeds of
smart cities’ own destruction are already built into their DNA?
I’ve argued
that smart cities are a solution to the challenges of
21st-century urbanization, that despite potential pitfalls, the benefits
outweigh the risks, especially if we are aggressive about confronting
the unintended consequences of our choices. But in reality we’ve only
scratched the surface.
What if the smart cities of the future are buggy and brittle? What are
we getting ourselves into?
Buggy
A few weeks later, I found myself wandering around the MIT campus in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, with nary a thought about uncooperative
toilets in mind. Strolling west from Kenmore Square, a few minutes
later I came across the new home of the
Broad Institute, a monolith of glass and
steel that houses a billion-dollar center for research in genomic
medicine. The street wall was tricked out with an enormous array of
displays showing in real time the endless sequences of DNA base pairs
being mapped by the machinery upstairs.
And then, out of the corner of my eye, I saw it. The
Blue Screen of Death, as the alert displayed by
Microsoft Windows following an operating-system crash is colloquially
known. Forlorn, I looked through the glass at the lone panel. Instead
of the stream of genetic discoveries, a meaningless string of
hexadecimals stared back, indicating precisely where, deep in the core
of some CPU, a lone miscomputation had occurred. Just where I had
hoped to find historic fusion of human and machine intelligence, I’d
found yet another bug.
The term “bug,” derived from the old Welsh
bwg (pronounced “boog”), has long been used as slang for
insects. But appropriation of the term to describe technical failings
dates to the dawn of the telecommunications age. The first telegraphs
invented in the 1840s used two wires, one to send and one to receive.
In the 1870s, duplex telegraphs were developed, permitting messages to
be sent simultaneously in both directions over a single wire. But
sometimes stray signals would come down the line, which were said to
be “bugs” or “buggy.” 1 Thomas Edison himself used the
expression in an 1878 letter to Puskás Tivadar, the Hungarian inventor
who came up with the idea of a telephone exchange that allowed
individual lines to be connected into a network for the first time.
2 According to an early history of Edison’s own quadruplex,
an improved telegraph that could send two signals in each direction,
by 1890 the word had become common industry parlance. 3
The first documented computer bug, however, was an actual insect. In
September 1947, Navy researchers working with professors at Harvard
University were running the Mark II Aiken Relay Calculator through its
paces when it suddenly began to miscalculate. Tearing open the
primitive electromechanical computer, they found a moth trapped
between one of its relays. On a website maintained by Navy historians,
you can still see a
photograph
of the page from the lab notebook where someone carefully taped the
moth down, methodically adding an annotation: “First actual case of
bug being found.” 4 As legend has it, that person was Grace
Hopper, a programmer who would go on to become an important leader in
computer science. (Hopper’s biographer, however, disputes this was the
first time “bug” was used to describe a malfunction in the early
development of computers, arguing “it was clear the term was already
in use.”) 5
Since that day, bugs have become endemic in our digital world, the
result of the enormous complexity and ruthless pace of modern
engineering. But how will we experience bugs in the smart city? They
could be as isolated as that faulty toilet or a crashed public screen.
In 2007 a Washington Metro rail car caught fire after a power surge
went unnoticed by buggy software designed to detect it.
6 Temporarily downgrading back to the older, more reliable
code took just 20 minutes per car while engineers methodically began
testing and debugging.
The troubles of automation in transit systems are a precursor to the
kinds of problems we’re likely to see as we buy into smart cities. As
disconcerting as today’s failures are, however, they are actually a
benchmark for reliability. Current smart systems are painstakingly
designed and extensively tested. They have multiple layers of
fail-safes. With the urgency of urban problems increasing and the
resources and will to deal with them in doubt, in the future many
smart technologies will be thrown together under tight schedules and
even tighter budgets. They will struggle to match this gold standard
of reliability, with only a few short-lived, sporadic glitches each
year.
The sheer size of city-scale smart systems comes with its own set of
problems. Cities and their infrastructure are already the most complex
structures humankind has ever created. Interweaving them with equally
complex information processing can only multiply the opportunities for
bugs and unanticipated interactions. As Kenneth Duda, a
high-performance networking expert told the New York Times,
“the great enemy is complexity, measured in lines of code, or
interactions.” 9 Ellen Ullman, a writer and former software
developer, argues, “it is impossible to fully test any computer
system. To think otherwise is to misunderstand what constitutes such a
system. It is not a single body of code created entirely by one
company. Rather, it is a collection of ‘modules’ plugged into one
another. … The resulting system is a tangle of black boxes wired
together that communicate through dimly explained ‘interfaces.’ A
programmer on one side of an interface can only hope that the
programmer on the other side has gotten it right.” 10
In his landmark 1984 study of technological disasters,
Normal Accidents, sociologist Charles Perrow argued that in
highly complex systems with many tightly linked elements, accidents
are inevitable. What’s worse is that traditional approaches to
reducing risk, such as warnings and alerts (or the installation of the
backup recovery system in the BART incident), may actually introduce
more complexity into systems and thereby increase risks. The Chernobyl
nuclear disaster, for instance, was caused by an irreversible chain of
events triggered during tests of a new reactor safety system. Perrow’s
conclusion: “Most high-risk systems have some special characteristics,
beyond their toxic or explosive or genetic dangers, that make
accidents in them inevitable, even ‘normal.’” 11
Normal accidents will be ever-present in smart cities. Just as the
rapid pace of urbanization has revealed shoddy construction practices,
most notably in China’s notorious “tofu buildings,” hastily put together smart
cities will have technological flaws created by designers’ and
builders’ shortcuts. These hasty hacks threaten to make earlier design
shortcuts like the Y2K bug seem small in comparison. Stemming from a
trick commonly used to save memory in the early days of computing, by
recording dates using only the last two digits of the year, Y2K was
the biggest bug in history, prompting a worldwide effort to rewrite
millions of lines of code in the late 1990s. Over the decades, there
were plenty of opportunities to undo Y2K, but thousands of
organizations chose to postpone the fix, which ended up costing over
$300 billion worldwide when they finally got around to it.
12 Bugs in the smart city will be more insidious, living
inside lots of critical, interconnected systems. Sometimes there may
be no way to anticipate the interdependencies. Who could have foreseen
the massive traffic jam caused on U.S. Interstate 80 when a bug in the
system used to manage juror pools by Placer County, California,
erroneously summoned twelve hundred people to report for duty on the
same day in 2012? 13
The pervasiveness of bugs in smart cities is disconcerting. We don’t
yet have a clear grasp of where the biggest risks lie, when and how
they will cause systems to fail, or what the chain-reaction
consequences will be. Who is responsible when a smart city crashes?
And how will citizens help debug the city? Today, we routinely send
anonymous bug reports to software companies when our desktop crashes.
Is this a model that’s portable to the world of embedded and
ubiquitous computing?
Counterintuitively, buggy smart cities might strengthen and increase
pressure for democracy. Wade Roush, who studied the way citizens
respond to large-scale technological disasters like blackouts and
nuclear accidents, concluded that “control breakdowns in large
technological systems have educated and radicalized many lay citizens,
enabling them to challenge both existing technological plans and the
expertise and authority of the people who carry them out.” This public
reaction to disasters of our own making, he argues, has spurred the
development of “a new cultural undercurrent of ‘technological
citizenship’ characterized by greater knowledge of, and skepticism
toward, the complex systems that permeate modern societies.”
14 If the first generation of smart cities does truly prove
fatally flawed, from their ashes may grow the seeds of more resilient,
democratic designs.
In a smart city filled with bugs, will our new heroes be the
adventurous few who can dive into the ductwork and flush them out?
Leaving the Broad Institute’s Blue Screen of Death behind, I headed
back in the rain to my hotel, reminded of Brazil, the 1985
film by Monty Python troupe member Terry Gilliam, which foretold an
autocratic smart city gone haywire. Arriving at my room, I opened my
laptop and started up a Netflix stream of the film.
As the scene opens, the protagonist, Sam Lowry,
played by Jonathan Pryce, squats sweating by an open refrigerator.
Suddenly the phone rings, and Harry Tuttle, played by Robert De Niro,
enters. “Are you from Central Services?” asks Lowry, referring to the
uncaring bureaucracy that runs the city’s infrastructure. “They’re a
little overworked these days,” Tuttle replies. “Luckily I intercepted
your call.” Tuttle is a guerrilla repairman, a smart-city hacker
valiantly trying to keep residents’ basic utilities up and running.
“This whole system of yours could be on fire, and I couldn’t even turn
on a kitchen tap without filling out a twenty-seven-B-stroke-six.”
Let’s hope that’s just a story. Some days, it doesn’t feel so
far-fetched.
Brittle
Creation myths rely on faith as much as fact. The Internet’s is no
different. Today, netizens everywhere believe that the Internet began
as a military effort to design a communications network that could
survive a nuclear attack.
The fable begins in the early 1960s with the publication of “On
Distributed Communications” by Paul Baran, a researcher at the RAND
think tank. At the time, Baran had been tasked with developing a
scheme for an indestructible telecommunications network for the U.S.
Air Force. Cold War planners feared that the hub-and-spoke structure
of the telephone system was vulnerable to a preemptive Soviet first
strike. Without a working communications network, the United States
would not be able to coordinate a counterattack, and the strategic
balance of “mutually assured destruction” between the superpowers
would be upset. What Baran proposed, according to Harvard University
science historian Peter Galison, “was a plan to remove, completely,
critical nodes from the telephone system.” 15 In “On
Distributed Communications” and a series of pamphlets that followed,
he demonstrated mathematically how a less centralized latticework of
network hubs, interconnected by redundant links, could sustain heavy
damage without becoming split into isolated sections.
16 The idea was picked up by the Pentagon’s Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA), a group set up to fast-track R&D
after the embarrassment of the Soviet space program’s Sputnik launch
in 1957.
ARPANET, the Internet’s predecessor,
was rolled out in the early 1970s.
So legend has it.
The real story is more prosaic. There were indeed real concerns about
the survivability of military communications networks. But RAND was
just one of several research groups that were broadly rethinking
communications networks at the time—parallel efforts on distributed communications were being led by
Lawrence Roberts at MIT and Donald Davies and Roger Scantlebury at the
United Kingdom’s National Physical Laboratory. Each of the three
efforts remained unaware of each other until a 1967 conference
organized by the Association for Computing Machinery in Gatlinburg,
Tennessee, where Roberts met Scantlebury, who by then had learned of
Baran’s earlier work. 17 And ARPANET wasn’t a military
command network for America’s nuclear arsenal, or any arsenal for that
matter. It wasn’t even classified. It was a research network. As
Robert Taylor, who oversaw the ARPANET project for the Pentagon,
explained in 2004 in a widely forwarded e-mail, “The creation of the
ARPA net was not motivated by considerations of war. The ARPA net was
created to enable folks with common interests to connect to one
another through interactive computing even when widely separated by
geography.” 18
We also like to think that the Internet is still widely distributed as
Baran envisioned, when in fact it’s perhaps the most centralized
communications network ever built. In the beginning, ARPANET did
indeed hew closely to that distributed ideal. A 1977 map of the
growing network shows at least four redundant transcontinental routes,
run over phone lines leased from AT&T, linking up the major
computing clusters in Boston, Washington, Silicon Valley, and Los
Angeles. Metropolitan loops created redundancy within those regions as
well. 19 If the link to your neighbor went down, you could
still reach them by sending packets around in the other direction.
This approach is still commonly used today.
By 1987, the Pentagon was ready to pull the plug on what it had always
considered an experiment. But the research community was hooked, so
plans were made to hand over control to the National Science
Foundation, which merged the civilian portion of the ARPANET with its
own research network,
NSFNET, launched a year earlier. In
July 1988, NSFNET turned on a new national backbone network that
dropped the redundant and distributed grid of ARPANET in favor of a
more efficient and economical hub-and-spoke arrangement.
20 Much like the air-transportation network today,
consortia of universities pooled their resources to deploy their own
regional feeder networks (often with significant NSF funding), which
linked up into the backbone at several hubs scattered strategically
around the country.
Just seven years later, in April 1995, the National Science Foundation
handed over management of the backbone to the private sector. The move
would lead to even greater centralization, by designating just four
major interconnection points through which bits would flow across the
country. Located outside San Francisco, Washington, Philadelphia, and
Chicago, these hubs were the center not just of America’s Internet,
but the world’s. At the time, an e-mail from Europe to Asia would
almost certainly transit through Virginia and California. Since then,
things have centralized even more. One of those hubs, in Ashburn,
Virginia, is home to what is arguably the world’s largest
concentration of data centers, some forty buildings
boasting the collective footprint of 22 Walmart Supercenters.
21 Elsewhere, Internet infrastructure has coalesced around
preexisting hubs of commerce. Today, you could knock out
a handful of buildings in Manhattan
where the world’s big network providers connect to each other—60 Hudson Street, 111 Eighth Avenue, 25 Broadway—and cut off a good chunk of transatlantic Internet capacity. (Fiber
isn’t the first technology to link 25 Broadway to Europe. The
elegant 1921 edifice
served as headquarters and main ticket office for the great
ocean-crossing steamships of the Cunard Line until the 1960s.)
Despite the existence of many chokepoints, the Internet’s nuke-proof
design creation myth has only been strengthened by the fact that the
few times it has actually been bombed, it has proven surprisingly
resilient. During the spring 1999 aerial bombardment of Serbia by
NATO, which explicitly targeted telecommunications facilities along
with the power grid, many of the country’s Internet Protocol networks
were able to stay connected to the outside world. 22 And
the Internet survived 9/11 largely
unscathed. Some 3 million telephone lines were knocked out in lower
Manhattan alone—a grid the size
of Switzerland’s—from damage to a
single phone-company building near the World Trade Center. Broadcast
radio and TV stations were crippled by the destruction of the north
tower, whose rooftop bristled with antennas of every size, shape, and
purpose. Panic-dialing across the nation brought the phone system to a
standstill. 23 But the Internet hardly blinked.
But while the Internet manages to maintain its messy integrity, the
infrastructure of smart cities is far more brittle. As we layer ever
more fragile networks and single points of failure on top of the
Internet’s still-resilient core, major disruptions in service are
likely to be common. And with an increasing array of critical
economic, social, and government services running over these channels,
the risks are compounded.
The greatest cause for concern is our growing dependence on untethered
networks, which puts us at the mercy of a fragile last wireless hop
between our devices and the tower. Cellular networks have none of the
resilience of the Internet. They are the fainting ladies of the
network world—when the heat is
on, they’re the first to go down and make the biggest fuss as they do
so.
Cellular networks fail in all kinds of ugly ways during crises; damage
to towers (15 were destroyed around the World Trade Center on
9/11 alone), destruction of the
“backhaul” fiber-optic line that links the tower into the grid (many
more), and power loss (most towers have just four hours of battery
backup). In 2012, flooding caused by Hurricane Sandy cut backhaul to
over 2000 cell sites in eight counties in and around New York City and
its upstate suburbs (not including New Jersey and Connecticut), and
power to nearly 1500 others. 24Hurricane Katrina
downed over a thousand cell towers in Louisiana and Mississippi in
August 2005, severely hindering relief efforts because the public
phone network was the only common radio system among many responding
government agencies. In the areas of Japan north of Tokyo annihilated
by the 2011 tsunami, the widespread destruction of mobile-phone towers
literally rolled the clock back on history, forcing people to resort
to radios, newspapers, and even human messengers to communicate. “When
cellphones went down, there was paralysis and panic,” the head of
emergency communications in the city of Miyako told the
New York Times. 25
The biggest threat to cellular networks in cities, however, is
population density. Because wireless carriers try to maximize the
profit-making potential of their expensive spectrum licenses, they
typically only build out enough infrastructure to connect a fraction
of their customers in a given place at the same time.
“Oversubscribing,” as this carefully calibrated scheme is known in the
business, works fine under normal conditions, when even the heaviest
users rarely chat for more than a few hours a day. But during a
disaster, when everyone starts to panic, call volumes surge and the
capacity is quickly exhausted. On the morning of September 11, for
instance, fewer than 1 in 20 mobile calls were connected in New York
City. 26 A decade later, little has changed. During a scary
but not very destructive earthquake on the U.S. East Coast in the
summer of 2011, cell networks were again overwhelmed. Yet media
reports barely noted it. Cellular outages during crises have become so
commonplace in modern urban life that we no longer question why they
happen or how the problem can be fixed.
Disruptions in public cloud-computing infrastructure highlight the
vulnerabilities of dependence on network apps.
Amazon Web Services, the 800-pound gorilla of
public clouds that powers thousands of popular websites, experienced a
major disruption in April 2011, lasting three days. According to a
detailed report on the incident posted to the company’s website, the
outage appears to have been a normal accident, to use Perrow’s term. A
botched configuration change in the data center’s internal network,
which had been intended to upgrade its capacity, shunted the entire
facility’s traffic onto a lower-capacity backup network. Under the
severe stress, “a previously unencountered bug” reared its head,
preventing operators from restoring the system without risk of data
loss. 27 Later, in July 2012, a massive electrical storm
cut power to the company’s Ashburn data center, shutting down two of
the most popular Internet services—Netflix and Instagram. 28 “Amazon Cloud Hit By Real
Cloud,” quipped a PC World headline. 29
The cloud is far less reliable than most of us realize, and its
fallibility may be starting to take a real economic toll. Google,
which prides itself on high-quality data-center engineering, suffered
a half-dozen outages in 2008 lasting up to 30 hours.
30 Amazon promises its cloud customers 99.5 percent annual
uptime, while Google pledges 99.9 percent for its premium apps
service. That sounds impressive until you realize that even after
years of increasing outages, even in the most blackout-prone region
(the Northeast), the much-maligned American electric power industry
averages 99.96 percent uptime. 31 Yet even that tiny gap
between reality and perfection carries a huge cost. According to
Massoud Amin of the University of Minnesota, power outages and power
quality disturbances cost the U.S. economy between $80 billion and
$188 billion a year. 32 A back-of-the-envelope calculation
published by International Working Group on Cloud Computing Resiliency
tagged the economic cost of cloud outages between 2007 and mid-2012 at
just $70 million (not including the July 2012 Amazon outage).
33 But as more and more of the vital functions of smart
cities migrate to a handful of big, vulnerable data centers, this
number is sure to swell in coming years.
Cloud-computing outages could turn smart cities into zombies.
Biometric authentication, for instance, which senses our unique
physical characteristics to identify individuals, will increasingly
determine our rights and privileges as we move through the city—granting physical access to buildings and rooms, personalizing
environments, and enabling digital services and content. But biometric
authentication is a complex task that will demand access to remote
data and computation. The keyless entry system at your office might
send a scan of your retina to a remote data center to match against
your personnel record before admitting you. Continuous authentication,
a technique that uses always-on biometrics—your appearance, gestures, or typing style—will constantly verify your identity, potentially eliminating the
need for passwords. 34 Such systems will rely heavily on
cloud computing, and will break down when it does. It’s one thing for
your e-mail to go down for a few hours, but it’s another thing when
everyone in your neighborhood gets locked out of their homes.
Another “cloud” literally floating in the sky above us, the
Global Positioning System
satellite network, is perhaps the greatest single point of failure for
smart cities. Without it, many of the things on the Internet will
struggle to ascertain where they are. America’s rivals have long
worried about their dependence on the network of 24 satellites owned
by the U.S. Defense Department. But now even America’s closest allies
worry that GPS might be cut off not by military fiat but by neglect.
With a much-needed modernization program for the decades-old system
way behind schedule, in 2009 the Government Accountability Office
lambasted the Air Force for delays and cost overruns that threatened
to interrupt service. 35 And the stakes of a GPS outage are
rising fast, as navigational intelligence permeates the industrial and
consumer economy. In 2011 the United Kingdom’s Royal Academy of
Engineering concluded that “a surprising number of different systems
already have GPS as a shared dependency, so a failure of the GPS
signal could cause the simultaneous failure of many services that are
probably expected to be independent of each other.” 36 For
instance, GPS is extensively used for tracking suspected criminals and
land surveying. Disruptions in GPS service would require rapidly
reintroducing older methods and technologies for these tasks. While
alternatives such as Russia’s
GLONASS
already exist, and the
European Union’s Galileo
and
China’s Compass
systems will provide more alternatives in the future, the GPS seems
likely to spawn its own nasty collection of normal accidents. “No one
has a complete picture,” concluded Martyn Thomas, the lead
investigator on the UK study, “of the many ways in which we have
become dependent on weak signals 12,000 miles above us.” 37
Centralization of smart-city infrastructure is risky, but
decentralization doesn’t always increase resilience. Uncoordinated
management can create its own brittle structures, such as the
Internet’s “bufferbloat” problem. Buffering, which serves as a kind of transmission gearbox
to sync fast-flowing and congested parts of the Internet, is a key
tool to smoothing out surges of data and reducing errors. But in 2010
Jim Gettys, a veteran Internet engineer, noticed that manufacturers of
network devices had taken advantage of rapidly falling memory prices
to beef up buffers far beyond what the Internet’s original
congestion-management scheme was designed for. “Manufacturers have
reflexively acted to prevent any and all packet loss and, by doing so,
have inadvertently defeated a critical TCP congestion-detection
mechanism,” concluded the editors of ACM Queue, a leading
computer networking journal, referring to the Internet’s traffic cop,
the Transmission Control Protocol. The result of bufferbloat was
increasing congestion and sporadic slowdowns. 38 What’s
most frightening about bufferbloat is that it was hiding in plain
view. Gettys concluded: “the issues that create delay are not new, but
their collective impact has not been widely understood … buffering
problems have been accumulating for more than a decade.” 39
What a laundry list of accidental ways smart cities might be brittle
by design or oversight! But what if someone deliberately tried to
bring one to its knees? The threat of cyber-sabotage on civil
infrastructure is only just beginning to capture policymakers’
attention.
Stuxnet, the virus that attacked
Iran’s nuclear weapons plant at Natanz in 2010, was just the
beginning. Widely believed to the product of a joint Israeli-American
operation, Stuxnet was a clever piece of malicious software, or
malware, that infected computers involved with monitoring and
controlling industrial machinery and infrastructure, known by the
acronym SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition). At Natanz
some 6000 centrifuges were being used to enrich uranium to bomb-grade
purity. Security experts believe Stuxnet, carried in on a USB thumb
drive, infected and took over the SCADA systems controlling the
plant’s equipment. Working stealthily to knock the centrifuges off
balance even as it reported to operators that all was normal, Stuxnet
is believed to have put over a thousand machines out of commission,
significantly slowing the refinement process, and the Iranian weapons
program. 40
The wide spread of Stuxnet was shocking. Unlike the laser-guided,
bunker-busting smart bombs that would have been used in a conventional
strike on the Natanz plant, Stuxnet attacked with all the precision of
carpet bombing. By the time Ralph Langner, a German computer-security
expert who specialized in SCADA systems, finally deduced the purpose
of the unknown virus, it had been found on similar machinery not only
in Iran but as far away as Pakistan, India, Indonesia, and even the
United States. By August 2010, over 90,000 Stuxnet infections were
reported in 115 countries. 41
Stuxnet was the first documented attack on SCADA systems, but it is
not likely to be the last. A year later, in an interview with CNET,
Langer bristled at the media’s focus on attributing the attack to a
specific nation. “Could this also be a threat against other
installations, U.S. critical infrastructure?” he asked.
“Unfortunately, the answer is yes because it can be copied easily.
That’s more important than the question of who did it.” He warned of
Stuxnet copycat attacks, and criticized governments and companies for
their widespread complacence. “Most people think this was to attack a
uranium enrichment plant and if I don’t operate that I’m not at risk,”
he said. “This is completely wrong. The attack is executed on Siemens
controllers and they are general-purpose products. So you will find
the same products in a power plant, even in elevators.” 42
Skeptics argue that the threat of Stuxnet is overblown. Stuxnet’s
payload was highly targeted. It was programmed to only attack the
Natanz centrifuges, and do so in a very specific way. Most
importantly, it expended a highly valuable arsenal of “zero-day”
attacks, undocumented vulnerabilities that can only be exploited once,
after which a simple update will be issued by the software’s supplier.
In its report on the virus, security software firm Symantec wrote,
“Incredibly, Stuxnet exploits four zero-day vulnerabilities, which is
unprecedented.” 43
Stuxnet’s unique attributes aside, most embedded systems aren’t
located in bunkers, and they are increasingly vulnerable to much
simpler attacks on their human operators. Little more than a year
after Stuxnet was uncovered, a lone hacker known only as “pr0f”
attacked the water utility of South Houston, a small town of 17,000
people just outside Texas’s most populous city. Enraged by the U.S.
government’s downplaying of a similar incident reported in
Springfield, Illinois, pr0f homed in on the utility’s Siemens SIMATIC
software, a web-based dashboard for remote access to the waterworks’
SCADA systems. While the Springfield attack turned out to be a false
alarm—federal officials
eventually reported finding “no evidence of a cyber intrusion”—pr0f was already on the move, and the hacker didn’t even need to
write any code. 44 It turned out that the plant’s operators
had chosen a shockingly weak three-letter password. While pr0f’s
attack on South Houston could have easily been prevented, SIMATIC is
widely used and full of more fundamental vulnerabilities that hackers
can exploit. That summer Dillon Beresford, a security researcher at
(oddly coincidentally) Houston-based network security outfit NSS Labs,
had demonstrated several flaws in SIMATIC and ways to exploit them.
Siemens managed to dodge the collateral damage of Stuxnet, but the
holes in SIMATIC are indicative of far more serious risks it must
address.
Another troubling development is the growing number of “forever day”
vulnerabilities being discovered in older control systems. Unlike
zero-day exploits, for which vendors and security firms can quickly
deploy countermeasures and patches, forever-day exploits target holes
in legacy embedded systems that manufacturers no longer support—and therefore will never be patched. The problem affects
industrial-control equipment sold in the past by both Siemens and GE,
as well as a host of smaller firms. 45 It has drawn
increased interest from the
Cyber Emergency Response Team, the government agency that
coordinates American cyber-security efforts.
One obvious solution for securing smart-city infrastructure is to stop
connecting it to the Internet. But “air-gapping,” as this technique is
known, is only a stopgap measure at best. Stuxnet, much like
Agent.btz, the virus that infected the Defense Department’s global
computer network in 2008, were likely both walked into secure
facilities on USB sticks. 46 Insecure wireless networks are
everywhere, even emanating from inside our own bodies. Researchers at
the security firm McAfee have successfully hijacked insulin pumps,
ordering the test devices to release a lethal dose of insulin, and a
group of computer scientists at the University of Washington and
University of Massachusetts have disabled heart-defibrillator implants
using wireless signals. 47
These vulnerabilities are calling the entire open design of the
Internet into question. No one in those early days of ARPANET ever
imagined the degree to which we would embed digital networks in the
support systems of our society, the carelessness with which we would
do so, and the threat that malevolent forces would present. Assuring
that the building blocks of smart cities are reliable will require new
standards and probably new regulation. Colin Harrison, IBM’s
smarter-cities master engineer, argues that in the future, “if you
want to connect a computer system to a piece of critical national
infrastructure it’s going to have to be certified in various ways.”
48 We’ll also have take stronger measures to harden smart
cities against direct assault. South Korea has already seen attacks on
its civil infrastructure by North Korean cyber-warriors. One strike is
believed to have shut down air traffic control in the country for over
an hour. 49
Nothing short of a crisis will force us to confront the risk of smart
cities’ brittle infrastructure. The first mayor who has to deal with
the breakdown of a city-scale smart system will be in new territory,
but who will take the blame? The city? The military? Homeland
security? The technology firms that built it? Consider the
accountability challenge Stuxnet poses—we’d likely never have known about it were it not for its own bug.
Carried out of Natanz by some unsuspecting Iranian engineer, the worm
failed to detect that it had escaped into the open, and instead of
deactivating its own reproductive mechanisms, like a real virus it
proliferated across the globe. 50
A New Civics
If the history of city building in the last century tells us anything,
it is that the unintended consequences of new technologies often dwarf
their intended design.
Motorization promised to save city dwellers
from the piles of horse manure that clogged
19th-century streets and deliver us from a shroud of factory smoke back
to nature. Instead, it scarred the countryside with sprawl and
rendered us sedentary and obese. If we don’t think critically now
about the technology we put in place for the next century of cities,
we can only look forward to all the unpleasant surprises they hold in
store for us.
Smart cities are almost guaranteed to be chock full of bugs, from
smart toilets and faucets that won’t operate to public screens
sporting Microsoft’s ominous Blue Screen of Death. But even when their
code is clean, the innards of smart cities will be so complex that
so-called normal accidents will be inevitable. The only questions will
be when smart cities fail, and how much damage they cause when they
crash. Layered atop the fragile power grid, already prone to overload
during crises and open to sabotage, the communications networks that
patch the smart city together are as brittle an infrastructure as
we’ve ever had.
But that’s only if we continue doing business as usual. We can stack
the deck and improve the odds, but we need to completely rethink our
approach to the opportunities and challenges of building smart cities.
We need to question the confidence of tech-industry giants, and
organize the local innovation that’s blossoming at the grassroots into
a truly global movement. We need to push our civic leaders to think
more about long-term survival and less about short-term gain, more
about cooperation than competition. Most importantly, we need to take
the wheel back from the engineers, and let people and communities
decide where we should steer.
People often ask me, “What is a smart city?” It’s a hard question to
answer. “Smart” is a problematic word that has come to mean a million
things. Soon, it may take its place alongside the handful of
international cognates—vaguely
evocative terms like “sustainability” and “globalization”—that no one bothers to translate because there’s no consensus about
what they actually mean. When people talk about smart cities, they
often cast a wide net that pulls in every new public-service
innovation from bike sharing to pop-up parks. The broad view is
important, since cities must be viewed holistically. Simply installing
some new technology, no matter how elegant or powerful, cannot solve a
city’s problems in isolation. But there really is something going on
here—information technology is
clearly going to be a big part of the solution. It deserves treatment
on its own. I take a more focused view and define smart cities as
places where information technology is combined with infrastructure,
architecture, everyday objects, and even our bodies to address social,
economic, and environmental problems.
I think the more important and interesting question is, “what do you
want a smart city to be?” We need to focus on how we shape the
technology we employ in future cities. There are many different
visions of what the opportunity is. Ask an IBM engineer and he will
tell you about the potential for efficiency and optimization. Ask an
app developer and she will paint a vision of novel social interactions
and experiences in public places. Ask a mayor and it’s all about
participation and democracy. In truth, smart cities should strive for
all of these things.
There are trade-offs between these competing goals for smart cities.
The urgent challenge is weaving together solutions that integrate
these aims and mitigate conflicts. Smart cities need to be efficient
but also preserve opportunities for spontaneity, serendipity, and
sociability. If we program all of the randomness out, we’ll have
turned them from rich, living organisms into dull mechanical
automatons. They need to be secure, but not at the risk of becoming
surveillance chambers. They need to be open and participatory, but
provide enough support structure for those who lack the resources to
self-organize. More than anything else, they need to be inclusive. In
her most influential book,
The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the acclaimed
urbanist Jane Jacobs argued that “cities have the capability of
providing something for everybody, only because, and only when, they
are created by everybody.” 51 Yet over fifty years later,
as we set out to create the smart cities of the
21st century, we seem
to have again forgotten this hard-learned truth.
But there is hope that a new civic order will arise in smart cities,
and pull every last one of us into the effort to make them better
places. Cities used to be full of strangers and chance encounters.
Today we can mine the social graph in an instant by simply taking a
photo. Algorithms churn in the cloud, telling the little things in our
pocket where we should eat and whom we should date. It’s a jarring
transformation. But even as old norms fade into the past, we’re
learning new ways to thrive on mass connectedness. A sharing economy
has mushroomed overnight, as people swap everything from spare
bedrooms to cars, in a synergistic exploitation of new technology and
more earth-friendly consumption. Online social networks are leaking
back into the thriving urban habitats where they were born in
countless promising ways.
For the last 15 years, I’ve watched the struggle over how to build
smart cities evolve from the trenches. I’ve studied and critiqued
these efforts, designed parts of them myself, and cheered others
along. I’ve written forecasts for big companies as they sized up the
market, worked with start-ups and civic hackers toiling away at the
grass roots, and advised politicians and policy wonks trying to push
reluctant governments into a new era. I understand and share much of
their agendas.
But I’ve also seen my share of gaps, shortfalls, and misguided
assumptions in the visions and initiatives that have been carried
forth under the banner of smart cities. And so I’m going to play the
roles of myth buster, whistle-blower, and skeptic in one. The
technology industry is asking us to rebuild the world around its
vision of efficient, safe, convenient living. It is spending hundreds
of millions of dollars to convince us to pay for it. But we’ve seen
this movie before. As essayist Walter Lippmann wrote of the 1939
World’s Fair, “General Motors has spent a small fortune to convince
the American public that if it wishes to enjoy the full benefit of
private enterprise in motor manufacturing, it will have to rebuild its
cities and its highways by public enterprise.” 51 Today the
computer guys are singing the same song.
I believe there is a better way to build smart cities than to simply
call in the engineers. We need to lift up the civic leaders who would
show us a different way. We need to empower ourselves to build future
cities organically, from the bottom up, and do it in time to save
ourselves from climate change. If that seems an insurmountable goal,
don’t forget that at the end of the day the smartest city in the world
is the one you live in. If that’s not worth fighting for, I don’t know
what is.
Dr. Elon & Mr. Musk: Life Inside Tesla’s Production Hell
✾ wired.com✾
Thursday 13 December 2018✾
Charles Duhigg✾ 52 minute read✾
The young Tesla engineer was excited. Ecstatic, in fact. It was a
Saturday in October 2017, and he was working at the Gigafactory,
Tesla’s enormous battery manufacturing plant in Nevada. Over the
previous year, he had been living out of a suitcase, putting in
13-hour days, seven days a week. This was his first real job. And now
a colleague had tracked him down to say that Elon Musk—Elon Musk!—needed his personal help.
The previous year, Musk had made an audacious announcement: His
company, which was known—fetishized, actually—for its
luxurious electric vehicles, would soon begin manufacturing a new
sedan that it planned to sell for just $35,000, putting it within
reach of the middle class. The
Model 3, Tesla hoped, would
transform the auto industry by proving that a mass-produced,
emissions-free vehicle was not only feasible but profitable. If
successful, the vehicle would help end humanity’s addiction to fossil
fuels, slow climate change, and show that ingenuity and ambition could
accomplish nearly anything. Within a year of that announcement,
however, work on the car was behind schedule. There were problems in
battery manufacturing, parts construction, and development of assembly
lines. Tesla’s goal was to build 5,000 vehicles a week; recently the
company had been producing roughly three cars a day. Many inside the
Gigafactory—not to mention at the Tesla
headquarters in Palo Alto and the assembly factory in Fremont,
California—had been working hard
for months, trying to get things on track.
Musk was spending the weekend in the Gigafactory, attempting to
discover why machines weren’t functioning, why parts kept misaligning,
why the software was crashing. Musk had demanded that his factories be
automated as much as possible. But among the consequences of this
extreme robotization were delays and malfunctions.
Tesla
had spent more than $1 billion building the Gigafactory, and almost
nothing was going as planned.
At about 10 o’clock on Saturday evening, an angry Musk was examining
one of the production line’s mechanized modules, trying to figure out
what was wrong, when the young, excited engineer was brought over to
assist him.
“Hey, buddy, this doesn’t work!” Musk shouted at the engineer,
according to someone who heard the conversation. “Did you do this?”
The engineer was taken aback. He had never met Musk before. Musk
didn’t even know the engineer’s name. The young man wasn’t certain
what, exactly, Musk was asking him, or why he sounded so angry.
“You mean, program the robot?” the engineer said. “Or design that
tool?”
“Did you fucking do this?” Musk asked him.
“I’m not sure what you’re referring to?” the engineer replied
apologetically.
“You’re a fucking idiot!” Musk shouted back. “Get the fuck out and
don’t come back!”
The young engineer climbed over a low safety barrier and walked away.
He was bewildered by what had just happened. The entire conversation
had lasted less than a minute. A few moments later, his manager came
over to say that he had been fired on Musk’s orders, according to two
people with knowledge of the situation. The engineer was shocked. He’d
been working so hard. He was set to get a review from his manager the
next week, and had been hearing only positive things. Instead, two
days later, he signed his separation papers.
On a Wednesday morning a few weeks later, Musk returned to the
Gigafactory on his private plane. Tesla had started firing hundreds of
other employees for performance reasons—more than 700 would eventually be let go. Musk was scheduled to talk
to the plant’s workers, to inspire them to push through what Musk had
forecast would be a “manufacturing hell.” The Gigafactory needed
widespread fixes; there was no way the plant would produce 5,000
batteries a week anytime soon.
When he arrived, Musk began marching through the factory. He walked
along the assembly line, red-faced and urgent, interrogating workers
he encountered, telling them that at Tesla excellence was a passing
grade, and they were failing; that they weren’t smart enough to be
working on these problems; that they were endangering the company,
according to someone who observed him.
Employees knew about such rampages. Sometimes Musk would terminate
people; other times he would simply intimidate them. One manager had a
name for these outbursts—Elon’s
rage firings—and had forbidden
subordinates from walking too close to Musk’s desk at the Gigafactory
out of concern that a chance encounter, an unexpected question
answered incorrectly, might endanger a career.
After Musk had patrolled the factory floor for a while, executives
pulled him into a conference room. “I think we can fix this,” one of
his top lieutenants, Jon McNeill, told him, according to someone who
heard the conversation. McNeill tried to calm Musk down, and repeated
a proverb he had once heard:
No man comes up with a good idea when being chased by a tiger. At that moment, Musk was the tiger. (A spokesperson for McNeill
said he did not want to participate in this story.)
Musk, though, had other concerns. “What’s that smell?” he asked.
Everyone went silent. They knew Musk was so sensitive to odors that
job candidates were told not to wear cologne or perfume when they met
him. They had seen him become upset over small issues like this, had
observed him attack executives for their incompetence and inabilities.
One person explained that there were vats of liquid silicon nearby.
When heated, it sometimes smelled like burning plastic.
These vapors were going to kill people, Musk said. They were going to
kill him.
The group got back to solving the Gigafactory’s problems. Eventually
it was time for Musk to give his speech. He left the room and walked
onto a makeshift stage. The Model 3 was always going to be difficult,
he told workers. But it was turning out to be even harder than anyone
anticipated. He thanked employees for their work—and then warned them that more was coming. Tesla had to have high
standards to succeed. It was not a 9 to 5 company. People were already
working hard; now Musk was implying they needed to do more. He was at
turns complimentary, awkward, and intense. The Model 3 was a
bet-the-company decision, he said. Everybody needed to work hard and
smarter.
Then Musk walked off the stage. The remaining executives decamped to a
conference room to continue working through a list of the
Gigafactory’s problems. Musk, according to one participant, was
gone—on to the next task.
Eight months later, Tesla would announce that it had managed to hit
its target and
produce 5,000 Model 3s
in one week. Three months after that, it would report profits of $312
million, well beyond Wall Street’s expectations. Musk seemed, once
again, to have snatched victory from the maw of catastrophe, proving
his critics wrong through ambition and sheer force of will. But the
path to that triumph would be more turbulent than almost anyone
anticipated. Over the past year, Musk has fascinated, delighted, and
horrified his fans and detractors alike by attacking strangers
on Twitter,berating analysts
on earnings calls, calling a man he had never met a pedophile, and,
most consequentially, tweeting that he was considering taking Tesla
private at $420 a share with “funding secured,” when in fact there was no
such funding secured. That tweet would cause the Securities and
Exchange Commission to sue Musk
for securities fraud
and, in a settlement, to compel him to pay $20 million and abandon his
company’s chairmanship. None of that, however, has chastened Musk, who
tweeted in October that the tweet that cost him $20 million was “worth
it.” The tiger was on the loose.
If it has been strange to watch Musk’s wild ride via news reports and
social media, it’s been even weirder inside the company. Over the past
six months I’ve communicated with dozens of current and former Tesla
employees, from nearly every division. They describe a thrilling and
tumultuous workplace, where talented engineers and designers have done
some of their proudest work but where, as one former executive put it,
“everyone in Tesla is in an abusive relationship with Elon.” Almost
all these employees spoke on the condition of anonymity because of
nondisclosure agreements or fears of being sued or fired by Musk.
(Even those with positive things to say asked for anonymity.) Most
wanted the best for Tesla and said the recent profit report made them
hopeful that the company is finally climbing onto firmer ground.
But experience gives them pause. A large number of high-ranking
executives have left in the past two years, and Tesla has stumbled
over basic tasks like delivering its cars. Working at the firm has
been an agony and ecstasy, some say—sometimes toggling between both extremes in a single day.
Tesla, which was given extensive summaries of the reporting in this
article, including what took place during Musk’s Gigafactory visits
and the engineer’s dismissal, said through a spokesperson that some
aspects were “overly dramatized,” “abbreviated,” and “ultimately
misleading anecdotes that completely lack essential context.” The
company added that “Elon cares very deeply about the people who work
at his companies. That is why, although it is painful, he sometimes
takes the difficult step of firing people who are underperforming and
putting the success of the entire company” at risk. Tesla also noted
that Musk was worried about the comfort and safety of workers when he
complained about the vapors in the Gigafactory.
Tesla declined to make Musk, any board members, or any executives
except the company’s general counsel available for on-the-record
interviews. WIRED did hear from an outside law firm representing Tesla
and Musk, which objected to the reporting and how questions were being
asked, and suggested that WIRED might be sued.
On the day in 2017 that Musk gave his speech at the Gigafactory, he
was both despot and savior. There were grand pronouncements, searing
interrogations, and a laserlike focus on doing what no one had
accomplished before. His speech deflated some and inspired others.
“That was a pretty typical Wednesday, actually,” one senior executive
told me. “That’s what it was like until I quit.”
Elon Musk didn’t start Tesla. But he did, in the most important ways,
create it. When Musk invested $6.3 million in Tesla in 2004 and became
the firm’s chairman, he found a pulpit worthy of his ambitions. Soon
he would become chief executive and turn Tesla as much into a cause as
a company. “The overarching purpose of Tesla Motors (and the reason I
am funding the company) is to help expedite the move from a
mine-and-burn hydrocarbon economy toward a solar electric economy,”
Musk wrote in a 2006 document he called “The Secret Tesla Motors
Master Plan.” “We will not stop until every car on the road is
electric,” he said at one point. It was a lesson in his approach to
life. “Optimism, pessimism, fuck that,” he once told WIRED about
his other company, SpaceX. “We’re going to make it
happen. As God is my bloody witness, I’m hell-bent on making it work.”
Silicon Valley was built on such audaciousness. Musk’s story, in
particular, has been embraced as proof that believing in the
impossible can sometimes make it real. He was born in South Africa in
1971 and moved to Canada as soon as he completed high school. He
didn’t have much of a plan—he had
only $2,000 when he arrived—but
after working odd jobs and enrolling in a local college he eventually
made it to the University of Pennsylvania, where he studied economics
and physics. After graduating, he founded a company with his brother
and a friend and worked constantly, sometimes sleeping under his desk
and showering at a local YMCA. They eventually sold their company,
earning Musk $22 million. That funded his next startup, which became
PayPal, a venture eBay bought for
$1.5 billion in 2002. Musk was fantastically rich at the age of 31.
Such good fortune wasn’t all that unusual in Silicon Valley in the
late 1990s. “I could go and buy one of the islands in the Bahamas and,
uh, turn it into my personal fiefdom,” he told reporters in 1999 as
they observed him taking delivery of a $1 million McLaren F1 sports
car. “But I’m much more interested in trying to build and create a new
company.” (Musk later crashed the car.)
These new companies of Musk’s imagination would not make ephemeral,
digital chaff but, rather, reshape the physical world through struts,
thrusters, rocket engines, and steel. Musk started SpaceX; bought
Solar City, an alternative energy company; and created the Boring
Company to dig a network of
high-speed transportation tunnels. But it was Tesla that first
demonstrated his world-changing ambitions.
As a leader, Musk managed by example—by working hard, demanding perfection, thinking in unconventional
ways, and insisting the inconceivable could be accomplished if it was
simply reduced to logical steps. “He’s someone who empowers you to be
better than you think you can be,” said Todd Maron, who was Tesla’s
general counsel for five years until the company said earlier this
month that he would be leaving. “He has extraordinarily high
standards, and so he pushes you to be your absolute best.” Similar
sentiments were expressed by other executives and managers. “He is the
smartest person I have ever met,” said a former executive at Solar
City. “I can’t tell you how many times I prepared a report for him and
he asked a question that made us realize we were looking at the
problem completely wrong.”
Many Tesla executives have stories about how Musk reset their concept
of the possible, but the classic tale is about retractable door
handles. In the mid-2000s, the company was designing the
luxury Model S
when Musk insisted the car needed handles that would lie flush against
its body. They would glide out, as if by magic, just as the owner
reached the vehicle, by responding to a signal from an electronic key.
“It was unanimous among the executive staff that the complex door
handle idea was crazy,” said a former executive. It required
incredibly complicated engineering, and it solved a problem that no
one else thought was actually a problem. But no matter how forcefully
executives objected, Musk wouldn’t yield. Even once the car was
released, the handles sometimes proved troublesome. When
Consumer Reports wanted to review a Model S in 2015, it had
to postpone the analysis because “the fancy retractable door handles
refused to let us in.”
But Musk was right. Those door handles quickly became a signature
feature. A flush handle is now standard on every new Tesla. “It
creates this almost emotional connection with the car, this sense that
you’re part of the future,” the former executive said. “And that’s
Elon’s genius. He knows what people want before they know.”
This is the familiar pattern: Musk demands something impossible.
Colleagues push back. Musk insists. And then innovation occurs at a
speed hardly anyone thought possible. When
Consumer Reports reviewed the Model S, it said the sedan
“performed better in our tests than any other car ever has.” More
important, Tesla helped prod the rest of the auto industry to begin
developing electric cars of their own. Today, General Motors, Ford,
BMW, Volkswagen, and Nissan are among the many automakers offering
electric vehicles.
As CEO, Musk was often an emotional leader, colleagues say, sometimes
tearing up in front of employees when overcome by frustrations or the
importance of the firm’s mission. He could also be socially awkward,
prickly when others failed to show deference, defensive when
corrected. To some he seemed to have a robotic lack of empathy and odd
interpersonal mannerisms. “People used to tell me to hunch down lower
in my seat during meetings,” one former high-ranking executive told
me. “Elon reacted better to people when he was sitting higher than
them.”
In Silicon Valley, people are allowed to be strange. In fact, they are
often celebrated for it. At Tesla, Musk’s oddness was accepted. He
was, after all, the leader, the biggest stockholder, the visionary.
But sometimes his impatience would turn into tirades. “We called it
‘the idiot bit,’ ” a senior engineering executive told me. “If you
said something wrong or made one mistake or rubbed him the wrong way,
he would decide you’re an idiot and there was nothing that could
change his mind.” Musk would openly deride employees in meetings,
according to numerous sources, insulting their competence, bullying
those who had failed to perform, demoting people on the spot. Musk
could afford to fire, because a long list of qualified people wanted
to work at Tesla. “It’s one of the few companies that is genuinely
changing the world,” a former executive said. “And everyone was so
smart.”
If Tesla executives weren’t exactly giddy, they were at least proud.
Tesla sold 50,000 Model S cars in 2015, even as the price started at
$76,000. That same year, Tesla introduced
the Model X, an SUV with upward-folding
falcon-wing doors. The company’s revenues soared to $7 billion the
next year, and its workforce expanded to nearly 18,000. As Tesla’s
cars grew in popularity, so did Musk’s fame. He played himself in
episodes of The Simpsons and The Big Bang Theory and
began appearing on red carpets. Millions of people started following
him on Twitter, where he would post photos of spacecraft built by his
rocket company, spark dialogs with strangers, and produce the
occasional technologist’s koan. “The rumor that I’m building a
spaceship to get back to my home planet Mars is totally untrue,” he
tweeted in 2015.
“He went from nerd famous to Hollywood famous,” said a former longtime
executive. “It changes you when you suddenly become a celebrity.” Musk
bought five different mansions in one Bel Air neighborhood, at a total
cost of $72 million. One was a ranch-style house with 16,251 square
feet and a screening room for videogames. As Musk’s public profile
grew, his life became more complicated. After he was divorced from his
first wife, with whom he has five children, in 2008, he started dating
celebrities (including actress Talulah Riley, whom he married and
divorced twice). Some company executives say they began reading
celebrity tabloids. If the magazines reported turmoil in Musk’s love
life, they knew to wait to deliver bad news. And executives followed
his tweets and retweets closely. “We called it management by Twitter,”
a former Solar City employee said. “Some customer would tweet some
random complaint, and then we would be ordered to drop everything and
spend a week on some problem affecting one loudmouth in Pasadena,
rather than all the work we’re supposed to do to support the thousands
of customers who didn’t tweet that day.”
Still, Musk’s storms were relatively easy to navigate. “He was
surrounded by people he knew and trusted, who had been there for a
while, who knew how to push back on him,” said a former executive who
spoke to Musk regularly over much of the past decade. “He listened to
us when we said he needed to dial it down. But then the Model 3
happened and everyone started leaving, and then everything started
falling apart.”
On the morning of March 31, 2016, Musk left one of his Los Angeles
homes and drove to a Tesla store in nearby Century City. It was the
first day that customers could make reservations for the Model 3. If
Musk’s plans worked, the midpriced vehicle would sell by the millions
and revolutionize transportation. Manufacturing wasn’t scheduled to
start for at least another year, but buyers who were willing to put
down $1,000 could reserve a car.
For weeks, some Tesla executives had wagered among themselves how many
people would preorder a Model 3. Some optimists guessed more than
50,000, which would be close to an industry record. When Musk arrived
in Century City, though, he saw something amazing. Nearly 2,000 people
were standing in a line that wrapped around the building and into the
parking lot. Musk began walking in the crowd, slapping hands while his
bodyguard occasionally yelled “no selfies, just high-fives.” Musk
phoned other executives. Tesla stores elsewhere were similarly mobbed.
By the end of the day, Tesla had accepted 180,000 reservations. By the
end of the week, 325,000 people had ordered a Model 3. Tesla’s stock
price began to soar. The company had sold fewer than 150,000 cars in
its entire history, but within a little over a year it was worth more
than General Motors, a company that sold more than 150,000 cars, on
average, every week.
Soon after reservations opened, Doug Field, Tesla’s senior vice
president of engineering, called a meeting of his staff. “You are now
working at a different company,” he told them. Tesla had to go from a
small manufacturer to a mass producer. “Everything has changed,” Field
said. Field was a critical cog in making sure that change occurred
smoothly. Musk had increasingly come to rely on Field and Jon McNeill,
Tesla’s president of sales, marketing, delivery, and service, to
oversee the company’s rapidly growing workforce. Both Field and
McNeill were seasoned managers, respected in Silicon Valley and by
Tesla’s staff. They and others had been recruited for their expertise
and because running a company with tens of thousands of employees—from hourly workers to PhD scientists—required more than just genius and willpower.
Field was known to be methodical and disciplined. He had received
degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and had helped
build automobiles at Ford Motor Company. He came to Tesla in 2013
after working at Apple. Leaving Apple “was the hardest career decision
I’ve made,” Field said in a 2015 interview. “But it came down to the
mission. It felt like a convergence of everything I had done in my
career.” (A spokesperson for Field declined to discuss his time at
Tesla.)
McNeill, a former Bain consultant who had started four companies,
joined Tesla in 2015. He was known as a generous mentor who had built
a reputation for creating happy workplaces. “The awards that bring me
the most satisfaction are the Best Places to Work awards,” he told an
interviewer in 2012. “Do these awards help us get business? I do not
know.” But they attracted talent.
Tesla didn’t have a chief operating officer, so over time Field and
McNeill became de facto daily managers, recruiting or overseeing
dozens of vice presidents and other executives. By the time Tesla
started taking reservations for the Model 3, that staff had already
spent many months planning how it would build the car. The strategy
was to start vehicle assembly at the Fremont plant in October 2017,
according to a former engineering executive. Initially the factory
would start small, giving employees time to smooth out assembly-line
kinks and refine work processes. Then Tesla would start ramping up to
5,000 cars a week, the benchmark Musk had said the company needed to
achieve.
In the summer of 2016, however—soon after customers began reserving Model 3s—Musk called a meeting that changed everything, according to multiple
people who attended or were briefed on the gathering. The company had
to move faster, Musk told his senior executives. He wanted to start
production in July 2017, almost four months ahead of plan. Musk was
excited by a particular notion: He had recently had a dream, people in
the room recall him saying, in which he had seen the factory of the
future, a fully automated manufacturing plant where robots built
everything at high speed and parts moved along conveyor belts that
delivered each piece, just in time, to exactly the right place. He
said he had been working on such ideas for a while. “This thing will
be an unstoppable alien dreadnought,” he told his colleagues, causing
some of them to pull out their phones and Google the phrase. (It
returned disturbing images of sci-fi armored spaceships that looked
like copulating squids.)
To make the dreadnought a reality, Musk said, departments would need
to redesign their manufacturing plans. The familiar pattern kicked in:
Executives told Musk what he was proposing was unrealistic. Tesla was
already building the most advanced factory in auto manufacturing, and
there would be plenty of time to make incremental improvements and add
automation once everything was running smoothly. Overhauling all the
lines would cost so much time and money that it might be impossible to
meet his expectations.
Musk has said that nearly anything is possible unless it violates the
laws of physics.
We’re going to build the machine that builds the machine, he
told the room. But they had to move fast. A fully automated factory,
he said, was an investment in Tesla’s future that would help the
company compete in the coming decades. Over the next few weeks,
executives kept arguing with Musk. A steady stream of engineers began
giving notice. And a troubling trend emerged, according to former
executives: If someone raised concerns or objections, Musk would
sometimes pull the person’s manager aside and order that the offender
be reassigned, or potentially terminated, or no longer invited to
meetings. Some executives began excluding skeptics out of
self-preservation. “If you were the kind of person who was likely to
push back, you got disinvited, because VPs didn’t want anyone pissing
off Elon,” one former executive who reported to Musk told me. “People
were scared that someone would question something.”
Musk himself would later estimate that Tesla was burning through up to
$100 million a week as thousands of employees tried to build Musk’s
dreadnought. The threat of firing became a drumbeat. One former
employee recalled hearing about a colleague who was eating breakfast
at his desk when he was called away. His banana went brown and the
milk in the cereal bowl formed a film before his officemates realized
he’d been fired and cleaned up the mess. Musk “would say ‘I’ve got to
fire someone today,’ and I’d say, ‘No you don’t,’ and he’d say, ‘No,
no, I just do. I’ve got to fire somebody,’ ” one former high-ranking
executive told me. (A Tesla spokesperson disputed this but added that
Musk makes “difficult but necessary decisions.”) At one meeting Musk,
agitated, broke a phone. During another, he noticed that an executive
was missing and called him. The man’s wife had recently given birth,
and he explained that he was taking time off as she recuperated. Musk
was angry. At a minimum, you should be on phone calls, Musk told the
man. Having a kid doesn’t prevent you from being on the phone. (A
Tesla spokesperson said that while Musk “was once upset that a
particular executive did not dial into an important conference call
several days after his child was born,” the company would not penalize
an employee for taking paternity leave.)
“Everyone came to work each day wondering if that was going to be
their last day,” another former executive told me. A previous employee
remembered Musk saying that Tesla’s goal was to save the world. “He
would get really emotional,” this person told me—and that’s why he sometimes seemed callous, “because what’s one
person’s feelings compared to the fate of billions? Elon cares a lot
about humanity, but he doesn’t really care about individual people all
that much.” (A Tesla spokesperson said Musk “very much cares about
individual people.”)
By the summer of 2017, more than a year had passed since Tesla had
started taking reservations for the Model 3, but the company was still
nowhere near ready to make the car in volume. Engineers were still
trying to figure out how to get robots to recognize and reliably grasp
different colored wires, how to get parts where they were needed via a
maze of conveyor belts. The company was far behind schedule, and some
customers were
starting to ask
for their deposits back. On July 28, the firm hosted a huge press
conference and celebration called the Model 3 Handover Party at the
Fremont factory. Events like this were important, because Tesla does
not spend money on advertising. Instead, it relies on glowing press
coverage and ecstatic reviews to help sell cars.
At the party, Musk was scheduled to give the first 30 Model 3
customers—most of them
employees—their automobiles.
Because the assembly line was not fully functioning, those vehicles
had been painstakingly built. Nevertheless, Musk, with a showman’s
zeal, had tweeted earlier that month that Tesla would be making 20,000
cars a month by year’s end.
Once the event started, though, executives became worried. Musk,
sitting in a room with his colleagues waiting for the press conference
to start, seemed unresponsive, almost dead to the world. He had been
dating the actress Amber Heard, but recently they had broken up. Now
there was a vacant look on Musk’s face.
Executives squatted next to their boss and delivered pep talks. They
told Musk he ought to enjoy this moment, when his dream of changing
the world was finally becoming real. Musk stared ahead, silent.
Eventually he walked into the room where journalists were waiting. His
comments started off oddly dark. “We’re going to go through
six months of manufacturing hell,” he said. “It’s going to be
pretty great, but it’s going to be quite a challenge to build this
car.” He began listing all the things that might go wrong. “Floods,
fires, tornadoes, ships sink, if anything interrupts one of our supply
chains, that will interrupt the production ramp.” Musk answered a few
questions. “Sorry for being a little dry,” he said. “Got a lot on my
mind right now.” To some, he appeared irritated to be there.
By that evening, Musk seemed more at ease when he unveiled 30 cars
before an audience of hundreds. But the relief was short-lived,
according to colleagues. The event marked the start of “a downward
spiral,” said a former high-ranking executive who was with Musk that
day. “He was always a mad genius, but he was about 95 percent genius
and 5 percent mad.” That summer, possibly due to the breakup with
Heard and the stress from the Model 3, the “ratio started to shift,
and by the fall it was totally inverted.”
Over the next few months, what had once been a tense situation inside
Tesla became, as Musk had prophesied, hellish. He did little to mask
his angst. One Sunday morning a few days after the Model 3 event, as
Musk was scrolling through Twitter on his iPhone, he saw a question
posed by a game developer: “Following @elonmusk on Instagram shows an
amazing life. I wonder if the ups and down he had make for a more
enjoyable life?”
Musk began typing. “The reality is great highs, terrible lows and
unrelenting stress. Don’t think people want to hear about the last
two,” he replied. As others chimed in, one asked if Musk thought he
suffered from bipolar depression. “Yeah,” Musk tweeted back. “Maybe
not medically tho. Dunno. Bad feelings correlate to bad events, so
maybe real problem is getting carried away in what I sign up for.”
At work, Musk sometimes seemed almost giddy, occasionally interrupting
meetings to insist that his colleagues watch clips of
Monty Python episodes on his computer, according to several
people. A particular favorite was a skit of aristocrats debating the
virtues of words like antelope versus sausage. He
would play it more than once, laughing uproariously each time, as his
colleagues waited to return to the issues at hand.
More concerning to executives were Musk’s low periods, particularly in
the wake of his split from Amber Heard. In the weeks after the first
Model 3 handovers, Musk occasionally didn’t show up for meetings, or
they would be canceled at the last minute, former employees say.
Colleagues say they would call him on his cell phone in the morning,
to make sure he had started the day. Musk gave bizarre interviews: He
described being in “severe emotional pain” to a writer from Rolling Stone and then asked for dating
advice. “I will never be happy without having someone,” he said.
“Going to sleep alone kills me.”
In the months after the handover party, Musk seemed angrier than
before, according to multiple people. “It started to feel like every
day you expected to be fired,” said one executive who says he had
three supervisors in three days. “There was this constant feeling of
dread.”
Some managers feared that by taking on more prominent roles they
increased their risk of termination or public humiliation. One former
executive described Musk shaming her in front of colleagues. “He was
shouting that I didn’t know what I was doing, that I was an idiot,
that he’s never worked with someone so incompetent,” she told me. In a
company with so many male employees, “as a woman it was particularly
humiliating,” she said.
Todd Maron, Tesla’s general counsel, said in defense of Musk that
“there’s a lot of people outside Tesla who will sort of sugarcoat what
they actually think of your performance, or of an issue, because they
don’t really want to have the hard conversation.” Musk, however, “is
someone who, I think, puts a lot of effort into forcing himself to be
fully honest, and when he genuinely thinks someone has failed at
something, he will let you know that he thinks you have failed at that
and that the company requires that you do better so that we can
achieve our mission and succeed.” (A month after I spoke to Maron,
Tesla made the announcement that he would be leaving in January, one
in a string of recent executive departures, which includes the
company’s chief information officer, chief people officer, chief
accounting officer, and vice presidents of manufacturing, worldwide
finance, and engineering.)
Whether it was because of Musk’s management style or in spite of it,
progress continued. “And that was the weird part,” a high-ranking
engineering executive said, “because we were doing amazing work. I
don’t want it to seem like the whole experience was negative, because
when people were shielded from Elon, Tesla was amazing. We did
incredible things.”
By the fall of 2017, parts of the Model 3 assembly line were starting
to function smoothly. Production was beginning to pick up. Advances
sometimes felt Pyrrhic, though, given Musk’s tendency to announce
ambitious milestones. (Shareholders have sued the company over such
announcements, and the Department of Justice has opened a probe into
whether Tesla misled the public about Model 3 projections and
production. Tesla, in a statement, said it was cooperating with the
Department of Justice and that “Tesla’s philosophy has always been to
set truthful targets.”)
Then, one evening in late October of that year, as things were still
going badly inside the Gigafactory, Musk climbed onto the facility’s
roof and posted a video on Instagram of himself and a few others
roasting marshmallows, drinking whiskey, and singing a Johnny Cash
song. “That did not go over well,” said a former high-ranking
engineering executive. “All these people are working super hard, and
he’s drinking and having a campfire.” Soon afterward, the company
revealed that it had lost $671 million in the previous quarter and had
built only 222 Model 3s; it had lost $1.5 billion in the first nine
months of the year. During a November conference call with Wall Street
analysts, as his colleagues listened apprehensively, Musk declared: “I
have to tell you, I was really depressed about three or four weeks
ago.” But he had become optimistic. “Now I can see sort of a clear
path to sunshine,” he said. He had been working nonstop, sleeping in
the factory, personally diagnosing robot calibration problems. “We are
on it,” he added. “We’ve got it covered.”
Some of Musk’s colleagues cringed at these statements. Among the
biggest obstacles, they believed, was Musk himself. There was disarray
at Tesla because Musk kept insisting on automation, because so many
people were leaving, because subordinates were terrified that
challenging Musk could cost them their jobs.
Some executives felt something more was needed. At least two senior
executives approached some of Tesla’s board members and said they were
worried about Musk, according to people with knowledge of those
conversations. Everyone wanted Musk to succeed but he needed help, one
executive told them. (Board members Antonio Gracias, Ira Ehrenpreis,
and Robyn Denholm, in a statement, said that it “is not true” that
they were asked to speak to Musk about his behavior. The board members
declined to be interviewed and declined to answer questions about
whether they had or sought out conversations about Musk’s behavior.)
One person who tried to share concerns with Musk himself was his
personal assistant. She approached him one day in private, according
to people who later heard about the conversation. Executives are
struggling, she told Musk. (In an email, she objected to any
suggestion of tension with Musk and declined interview requests.)
Colleagues say the assistant was a gentle, calming presence in Musk’s
life. It was her job to give him feedback, even if it was sometimes
hard to hear. She was beloved by other executives, who often asked her
to help them gauge Musk’s moods.
A few months later, she left the company.
By early February 2018, top executives were leaving. McNeill told Musk
he was quitting, and would go on to become the chief operating officer
at Lyft. This was a huge loss—with the possibility of inflaming anxieties among employees and
stockholders—and so there were
discussions about how to handle disclosing the departure. But after
the news leaked, Musk announced the exit as almost an afterthought
during a conference call with Wall Street analysts. “Actually, one
thing we forgot to mention is Jon McNeill, who is heading up our sales
and service group, is departing the company.” Musk said. “Going
forward, I will be having the sales and service report directly to
me.”
A few months later, Doug Field indicated he wanted to take a leave of
absence, which one person described to
The Wall Street Journal as a “six-week sabbatical.” Field
never returned to Tesla; instead he took a job back at Apple. All
told, more than 36 Tesla vice presidents or higher-ranking staffers
had left the company in the previous two years. Some of them weren’t
replaced. Soon, according to various sources, there were 19 people
directly reporting to Musk and another 11 executives who did not have
superiors. (Tesla disputes those numbers.) Musk had enormous oversight
responsibilities, particularly as he was running other companies at
the same time. “It felt like the adults were leaving the building,”
one senior finance person told me. “There was really no one left who
could push back on Elon anymore.”
By then, even Musk had conceded that the company’s fully automated
factory vision, the “alien dreadnought,” wasn’t working. Workers
ripped out conveyor belts inside the Fremont plant. Employees began
carrying car parts to their workstations by hand or forklift and
stacking boxes in messy piles. In April, Musk halted production for an
entire week to make repairs. On some level, Musk seemed to recognize
that he was undermining Tesla. “Excessive automation at Tesla was a
mistake,” Musk tweeted. “To be precise, my mistake.” He once told a
colleague: “We just have to stop punching ourselves in the head.”
But the punches kept coming. Musk’s Twitter habits accelerated—and sometimes veered out of control. On average, he had tweeted 94
times a month in 2016 and 2017. But after Field and McNeill left, he
seemed to get sucked into a social media vortex. He sent 421 messages
in May 2018, 414 in June, and 310 in July. The content of the messages
was as unrestrained as the frequency. He posted bits of poems, derided
journalists, and taunted short-sellers who were betting that Tesla’s
stock price would fall. “You’re an idiot,” he tweeted in 2017 at a
transit expert who criticized him. “Sorry,” he clarified. “Meant to
say ‘sanctimonious idiot.’ ” He also sent insults via other means.
“You’re a horrible human being,” he emailed a former employee who had
spoken out about Tesla, according to The Washington Post. He
sent a BuzzFeed reporter an email calling him a “fucking asshole.”
In May, Musk announced the company’s latest earnings in a conference
call. He made no effort at civility and no one held him back. When a
Wall Street analyst asked Tesla’s chief financial officer about
capital expenditures, Musk responded: “Boring. Bonehead questions are
not cool. Next?” With the next question, he erupted again. “These
questions are so dry. They’re killing me!” and called upon a YouTube
video blogger with an enormous enthusiasm for Tesla to ask questions
for the next 20 minutes. (The company’s stock price dropped more than
5 percent after the call.)
Come summer, news coverage of Tesla was lurching from disaster to
disaster. “For a long time, Elon would say or do something kind of
wacky, and I would get up in front of my team and explain, this is why
you shouldn’t worry about it,” said one executive who had been with
Tesla for some years. “But eventually it got to where I couldn’t
apologize anymore.”
Rumors of Musk’s behavior made their way to potential hires. One story
that numerous people recounted involved a candidate for a retail
development position. When he came to his interview with Musk, he wore
blue shoes. Musk turned to a colleague and said he didn’t like the
candidate’s shoes. The colleague explained the candidate’s
qualifications. But Musk was unmoved; he rejected the candidate. (In a
statement, a Tesla spokesperson said that Musk rejected the candidate
because his experience wasn’t right for Tesla, and “the fact that Elon
also mentioned in passing that he didn’t like the candidate’s shoes
had nothing at all to do with why he wasn’t hired.”)
The story, however, came to be seen as an example of Musk’s
impulsiveness. “After hearing about that, you stop recommending to
friends they should apply,” a former executive told me. “You don’t
want to put friends through that.”
In June, at Tesla’s annual shareholders meeting, Musk seemed sometimes
near tears. “This is like—I tell
you—the most excruciating,
hellish several months that I have maybe ever had,” he said. It would
eventually come out in Tesla’s financial filings that almost 20
percent of customers who had put down a deposit for the Model 3 had
asked for refunds.
Musk soon announced Tesla had built a
tent in the parking lot
of the Fremont factory, where a new assembly line had been
constructed. Musk spent his
47th birthday inside
the factory, working nonstop. “All night—no friends, nothing,” he later told The New York Times.
“The Model 3 production ramp was excruciatingly difficult for everyone
at Tesla,” a company spokesperson said in a statement to WIRED. “In
order for Tesla to succeed, we must have extremely high standards and
work harder and smarter than everyone else. Sometimes, when we feel
it’s important to the success of our mission, that means people are
let go. Those decisions are never easy and they are not made lightly,
but hard decisions need to be made if we are to succeed. The
alternative is the death of sustainable transportation, which is
something we simply cannot accept.”
On July 1—more than two years
after opening reservations for the Model 3—Musk finally sent the jubilant email many employees had been waiting
for. “I think we just became a real car company,” he wrote. Tesla had
manufactured 5,031 Model 3 vehicles during a seven-day period. They
had hit their goal, six months late, at a cost of hundreds of millions
of dollars and dozens of executive departures. “What an incredible job
by an amazing team,” Musk wrote. “Couldn’t be more proud to work with
you.”
Employees inside the company also thought it was amazing, though some
cite different reasons.
“For me, the fact that we were able to build at scale, amid all that
craziness, that’s the real accomplishment,” one former engineering
executive told me. “Just think about it: We designed a car that is so
simple and elegant you can build it in a tent. You can build it when
your CEO is melting down. You can build it when everyone is quitting
or getting fired. That’s a real accomplishment. That’s amazing.”
It was amazing. But, as everyone knows, after that moment things got,
in some ways, even stranger. When a Thai boys’ soccer team was trapped
in a flooded cave in June, Musk offered to
build a submarine
to rescue them. But after his assistance was partially rebuffed, he
tweeted an accusation that one of the rescuers was a pedophile. (There
is no evidence this claim is true, and the rescuer has filed a
defamation lawsuit, which is still pending.) Then news broke that,
with debts of more than $900 million coming due in March, Tesla had
asked suppliers to give back money the company had already paid them.
In August, Musk sent the now infamous tweet: “Am considering taking
Tesla private at $420. Funding secured.” Tesla’s stock soared. It
quickly became apparent, though, that Musk had neither nailed down the
money to take Tesla private nor had he done the basic groundwork for
such an announcement, such as determining what regulatory approvals
were necessary, according to a complaint against him by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Musk and Tesla eventually settled the SEC
charges for $20 million apiece, and Musk was forced to relinquish his
chairmanship of the board. He remains chief executive. (In November,
Tesla named board member Robyn Denholm as chair.)
There were other dramas as well. As part of its settlement with the
SEC, Tesla is supposed to set up controls and procedures for Musk’s
communications. A week later, he sarcastically tweeted that the agency
had been renamed the “Shortseller Enrichment Commission.” In response
to a question on Twitter about cosplay, he posted pictures of manga
women with captions like “im actually catgirl here’s selfie” and
solicitations to buy bitcoin. Twitter shut down his account, assuming
it had been hacked, until Musk confirmed the posts were his.
Then, in September, on the Joe Rogan Experience podcast,
Musk smoked marijuana. The video of the moment
went viral, and while some people mocked Musk for appearing not to
inhale, others raised more serious questions. The show was recorded in
California, where recreational cannabis use is legal, but Musk is
chief executive of SpaceX—a
government contractor that works on national security projects. Musk
has received security clearance, according to the Department of
Defense, and “individuals with federal security clearances have to
abide by federal laws, period. You are not allowed to smoke marijuana,
regardless of state law,” said Department of Defense spokesperson
Audricia Harris. A few weeks before the Rogan podcast,
The New York Times reported that “some board members are also
aware that Mr. Musk has on occasion used recreational drugs, according
to people familiar with the matter.”
Tesla, in a statement to WIRED, wrote that the “employees and
executives who work with Elon day in and day out, and who know him
best, can and do attest to the fact that they have never observed Elon
to be under the influence of anything that could affect his judgment
at work.” The company continued: “SpaceX conducts random drug testing,
administered by an independent laboratory, on its employees in a
sensitive position—including
Elon. Such testing never has shown even trace quantities of drugs in
Elon’s system.” In November, NASA announced it would be conducting a
“cultural assessment study” of SpaceX and Boeing to ensure the
companies were meeting NASA’s requirements of “adherence to a
drug-free environment.” The Washington Post reported that
officials had indicated “the review was prompted by the recent
behavior of SpaceX’s founder, Elon Musk.”
Throughout the summer and into the fall, Musk’s public behavior
lurched from feisty to angry to almost pitiably distraught. As the
weather grew colder, however, Musk seemed to emerge from his gloom.
Musk gave interviews to Kara Swisher’s Recode Decode podcast,
Axios on HBO, and 60 Minutes. He has talked about a
range of subjects: how he’s been misunderstood and mistreated by
journalists, his hope of merging the human brain with machines so we
can download our consciousness, his enthusiasm for competition in the
electric car business. He also declared to 60 Minutes that he
has “no idea how to smoke pot” and said, “I do not respect the SEC.”
In the Axios interview he said, not for the first time, that
the experience of ramping up the Model 3 was among the most difficult
of his life. “Seven days a week, sleeping at the factory,” he said.
“No one should put this many hours into work.” Musk looked tired and
uncomfortable as he said the company had come within weeks of death,
and described how the experience “hurts my brain and my heart.” He
didn’t mention in that interview what his demands had meant to those
who worked for him—to the people
who had been fired, those who had been screamed at, or those who’d
worked long weekends at the Gigafactory.
Musk’s odd behavior isn’t unique or even extreme in the annals of
inventors. Howard Hughes lived like a hermit in hotels, watching
movies in the nude and refusing to cut his fingernails. Nikola Tesla,
who pioneered alternating current electricity delivery—and who is honored in the name of Musk’s company—died destitute, convinced he had invented a motor that could run on
“cosmic rays” and obsessed with caring for sick pigeons. (He is
reputed to have said of one, “I loved that pigeon as a man loves a
woman, and she loved me.”)
There’s a sense of tragedy in such stories because these men seemed,
at one point, to rise above the masses and suggest that genius is
possible. Silicon Valley in particular reveres these kind of
heroes—and the more willful and
ornery they are, the better. Technologists are often called upon to do
things that seem impossible, and so they celebrate when doubters are
proven wrong—when the dismissal
of an idea becomes evidence of its visionary reach. The idea of the
odd genius is afforded a special status within technology. People
lionize inventors who listen to their intuition and ignore naysayers,
who hold themselves and everyone else to a standard of perfection,
regardless of what it costs those around them. Steve Jobs is gone; now
we have Elon Musk.
Throughout the turmoil, workers at Tesla have continued building Model
3s, getting better and faster each day. They still don’t sell the car
for $35,000—the least expensive
version costs at least $10,000 more—but someday, who knows? The large quarterly profit the company
announced in October provided the firm with a moment of relief. Some
former executives say what concerns them now is whether other car
companies—the big ones with
well-honed manufacturing systems, steady executives, and functioning
bureaucracies—will start making
electric cars that are just as good as Tesla’s, erasing the company’s
head start and cachet.
After Musk abandoned his brash proposal to take Tesla private, some on
Wall Street argued that the company would benefit from a leadership
change. “We are hopeful that … the past 17 days will lead the board
down the path to bringing on a more operational CEO, or at a minimum a
COO,” Cowen and Company analysts wrote after Musk tweeted and then
dropped his suggestion about going private. “Now, more than ever, a
solid number 2—someone with
strong operational background that can help Tesla move from ideas to
execution—is crucial,” RBC
Capital Markets wrote to clients. Some have proposed that Musk might
become Tesla’s chief design officer—a wizard and motivational force.
Others, though, are skeptical. “A strong executive isn’t going to come
in with him hovering over their shoulder,” a former senior executive
told me. It is unlikely Musk will give up power, former colleagues
say. In January 2018, shareholders agreed to compensate Musk as much
as $55 billion over the next 10 years, but only if Musk continues to
lead the company and hits 12 milestones, including a market
capitalization of $650 billion, roughly 10 times what it’s worth
today. (Musk, who is worth more than $20 billion and already owns a
great deal of Tesla stock, won’t be paid anything at all if Tesla
doesn’t grow to the targets.) “He’s got 55 billion reasons to never
let anybody run that company,” one executive said.
A Tesla spokesperson said that Musk has proven himself. “The fact that
under Elon’s leadership we have successfully ramped Model 3 production
and just had our most successful quarter in the company’s history
suggests he was not an obstacle to Tesla’s success.”
Eric Larkin, who helped oversee factory software until he was fired in
April, still feels a strong emotional and financial attachment to
Tesla. He’d worked there for three years and was proud to be part of
something that could reduce carbon in the atmosphere and “accelerate
the world’s transition to sustainable energy,” as the company’s
mission statement puts it. “Tesla is the only company positioned to
make this world a better place, to really improve the world right
now,” Larkin told me. “And Tesla is Elon. How can you be bitter about
humanity’s best hope?”
Many I spoke to agreed that Tesla and Musk, for the time being, are
inseparable. Which is why they are so bewildered by his behavior and
so disappointed that his strengths are accompanied by such curious
faults. A few years ago, two Tesla workers were having drinks at a
hotel bar across from the Fremont factory when Musk walked in. He was
alone except for a bodyguard. They asked Musk if he would like to join
their table. Musk sat, and after a few uncomfortable moments started
talking about the TV shows he liked, cartoons like
South Park and Family Guy. Everyone ordered
expensive Scotch and began recounting their favorite episodes from
The Simpsons. It was fun. They laughed a lot. It didn’t feel
normal, exactly. But it also didn’t feel scary or bad, as it so often
did inside the factory. They could have been anyone, just ordinary
friends catching up. Then, after a few hours, Musk paid the bill and
walked away, back into his chaotic, frenzied, tigerlike life.
Source photos: Art Streiber/August Image (Musk); Steve Wilson/Getty
Images (tiger)Nhat V. Meyer/Bay Area News/Getty Images (Musk); Tom
Brakefield/Getty Images (Tiger)Jason Henry/The New York Times/Redux (Gigafactory)Mark Brake/Getty Images (Musk); Justin Kaneps/The New York
Times/Redux (Car)
Charles Duhigg(@cduhigg)was part of a team that won the 2013 Pulitzer Prize for explanatory
reporting, writing about Apple for
The New York Times. He is the author of best sellers The
Power of Habit and Smarter Faster Better.
Correction appended (12–13-2018, 1:00
pm EST): Elon Musk’s “horrible human being” email was first reported
by
The Washington Post, not Business Insider.
Correction appended (12–14-2018, 2:05
pm EST): Updated to clarify which automakers offer electric
vehicles.
This article appears in the February issue.Subscribe now.
Listen to this story, and other WIRED features, on theAudm app.
Let us know what you think about this article. Submit a letter to
the editor atmail@wired.com.
✾ newyorker.com✾
Monday 23 September 2019✾
D. T. Max✾ 35 minute read✾
When Pier Giulianotti was a medical student, he hated the sight of
blood. In the mid-seventies, he travelled from his native Italy to
Spain, on a fellowship, and watched a lung resection. “I nearly
fainted,” he recalled recently. “I had to sit down in the corner.” The
next day, he attended a plastic-surgery procedure. “Something more
gentle,” he told himself. “This will be for me!” The patient had a
burn scar on her face. First, the surgeons removed the damaged skin.
“You’ve seen the movie ‘Terminator’?” Giulianotti said. “I was
trembling on my legs, but I was trying to resist.” After the surgeons
prepared a graft by slicing healthy skin from the woman’s thigh—“Swoosh swoosh swoosh, like cutting a piece of salami!”—he went woozy. Again he was led to the chair of shame. Giulianotti
considered quitting medicine, but he loved helping patients. He got
over his squeamishness and decided to specialize in surgery, but kept
wondering if the practice could be refined. “I am Tuscan—anatomy is painting,” he said to himself. “Surely there is a more
artistic way to interact with the human body.”
He finished his medical studies and did surgical residencies at the
University of Pisa and the University of Milan, which are among
Italy’s best medical faculties. In the mid-eighties, he became an
expert in laparoscopic surgery, in which a doctor inserts a camera
inside a small incision and then uses the video to guide surgical
tools that have been inserted into the body through other incisions.
Minimally invasive surgery speeds recovery and reduces the length of
hospital stays. But he found that laparoscopic equipment was
disorienting to use—among other
problems, depending on the position of the probe inside the body, the
image that the surgeon sees can be backward.
In 1999, Giulianotti remembers, he attended a conference in Germany,
sponsored by Johnson & Johnson, where the company demonstrated a
prototype of a robotic arm for use in performing surgery. The response
was tepid—the surgeons present
said that they just wanted better laparoscopic tools. Johnson &
Johnson shelved the project, but Giulianotti was galvanized by the
concept. “Ninety per cent of the surgeons said bullshit,” he said.
“But I knew.”
On a recent morning in Chicago, Giulianotti, who looks a little like
Arnold Schwarzenegger with white hair, put on a sterile gown and cap,
covered his craggy face with a surgeon’s mask, and entered an
operating room. Giulianotti is now a professor of surgery at the
University of Illinois College of Medicine, where he runs a program in
robotic-assisted surgery. At the age of sixty-six, he has now
performed roughly three thousand procedures with the aid of a robot,
and has helped train nearly two thousand surgeons in the art. Farid
Gharagozloo, a professor at the University of Central Florida and a
surgeon at the Global Robotics Institute, said of Giulianotti, “He
single-handedly started the area of general surgery in robotics, and I
don’t think that’s an overstatement. No matter what the field, there’s
a certain panache and sort of genetic makeup that makes people the
leaders—makes them do things that
no one else wants—and Pier has
that.” Gharagozloo said that, when he watched videos of Giulianotti’s
surgeries, he was left “in awe.” Giulianotti was the first surgeon to
perform more than a dozen robotic procedures, ranging from kidney
transplants to lung resections. In the operating room, he relies on
one robot: a multi-armed, one-and-a half-million-dollar device named
the da Vinci.
The patient, a woman in her twenties, lay etherized upon a table. She
had a genetic endocrine condition that causes an enlarged thyroid, and
recurring tumors on the pancreas and on the adrenal glands. After
Giulianotti arrived in the operating room, the physician assistant
and the chief resident made four tiny incisions, marked with red dots,
on her stomach, and inserted narrow tubes, called cannulas, into the
holes.
Giulianotti greeted the support team and took me over to a monitor,
to look at a preoperative black-and-white scan of the patient’s
innards. He pointed to a large tumor on the tail of the woman’s
pancreas, a couple of centimetres from her spleen. It would be “very,
very challenging,” he warned, to remove the tumor without damaging the
spleen. The abdomen is as densely packed as an overstuffed suitcase.
The spleen nearly touches the curvature of the stomach and a section
of the colon. To operate successfully within such density, surgeons
must have a pinpoint sense of their tools’ locations. Giulianotti’s
clinical fellow, Michail Papamichail, who was observing the operation,
explained, “If you miss the plane, one mistake leads to another, and
soon you have to convert.” Converting is switching to conventional
surgery. Giulianotti told me that he had once made a conversion after
one of the da Vinci’s arms stopped moving. But he had never missed the
plane.
Robotic surgery has several advantages. First is the ability to cut
and suture in deeper, tighter quarters. Robots have thin rods instead
of bulky hands, and—in contrast
to conventional or laparoscopic surgery—the rods never tremble. The da Vinci has four arms: one holds a
camera and the other three grasp instruments. Surgeons sit at a
console and use joysticks and foot pedals to control which two of the
three rods they are manipulating at any given moment. A user as
skillful as Giulianotti creates the illusion of having three
operative hands; surgeons who regularly use the da Vinci often report
experiencing a heightened sense of control. Robotic instruments are
more flexible than a human wrist and can rotate three hundred and
sixty degrees. Laparoscopic tools, by comparison, have a limited range
of motion and can be awkward to use: when the tip of a laparoscopic
tool is deep inside a patient’s body, it can be hard to exert leverage
precisely, and the tiniest movement of the surgeon’s hand can lead to
a major mistake. Finally, whereas most laparoscopic probes show a
two-dimensional image, the da Vinci’s robotic camera gives a full
three-dimensional picture of the body—the surgeon looks at the footage through a stereoscopic viewer that
is attached to the console.
Papamichail told me that, were I to see the procedure unfold solely by
watching the console screen, it would look like “such an easy
operation to perform.” He added, “But it is not. Otherwise, many
people would do it. Pier makes it look easy because he moves so
smoothly, accurately, and quickly.” Papamichail also said, “What
really impresses me is his perception of the inside anatomy and how
delicately he is moving the robotic instruments. For each operation,
he strictly follows his preoperative plan. For whatever action he does
during an operation, there is always a reason behind it.”
Despite the enthusiasm of such practitioners as Giulianotti, many
members of the American surgical establishment remain skeptical of
robotic surgery—in part because
it is expensive (having a robot perform your kidney transplant can add
several thousand dollars to your hospital bill) and in part because
doctors often prefer to stick with methods they have already
mastered. Some physicians view robotic surgery as a pretty technology
in need of a problem. Marty Makary, a doctor who performs both
laparoscopic and robotic surgery, and is also a health-policy expert
at Johns Hopkins University, told me, “Because the robot has been so
heavily marketed, it has become a ‘one hammer’ approach. I know of
instances where there’s no real benefit, but surgeons insist on using
it, in order to attract patients.” Since robotic surgery first came on
the scene, twenty years ago, more than eighteen thousand studies of
its efficacy have been conducted, and with many procedures, such as a
pancreatectomy, the method is considered superior; with other
procedures, it remains unclear whether a robotic approach produces
meaningfully better outcomes than laparoscopic surgery.
Giulianotti, who performed robotic surgery on a cadaver in 1999, has
never looked back. He recalled to me the first times he used a da
Vinci for operations on living patients. (They were all gallbladder
surgeries, because for an accomplished surgeon the procedure is
difficult to mess up.) He described the experience in sensual terms:
“I felt the small robotic hands of the robot were a prolongation of my
own. If you are used to having flat vision, and you pass into 3-D, you
feel you are immersed inside the human body. It was a
fantastic journey—the interior of
the anatomy, the shadow of little vessels and nerves. I immediately
fell in love.” He told me about a bravura operation that he performed,
in 2008, on an Italian woman who had a huge tumor on her liver. The
patient was a Jehovah’s Witness, and therefore couldn’t be given
blood. Giulianotti recalled telling himself, “Any mistake, and the
patient will die on the operating table.” Because his da
Vinci-assisted incisions were so precise, he said, he was able to
remove the tumor with only three hundred cubic centimetres of blood
loss—about half a pint. “That was
a big turning point for me,” he recalled. “I thought this
technique could be expanded—a
lot.” (He has since operated on dozens of other Jehovah’s Witnesses.)
For the patient currently on the table, he felt that the advantages of
robotic surgery were particularly clear. Given her condition, this was
unlikely to be her last visit to an operating room, and he wanted her
body to emerge as intact as possible. Typically, the operation would
call for removing the patient’s spleen, but she was a young woman, and
it was better to keep it. “The spleen has immunitary functions,”
Giulianotti explained.
At 7:35 A.M., the circulating nurse gave the “time out”—the reading of the patient’s name and age, and the reason for the
surgery. Then she turned on the carbon dioxide and the patient’s
stomach expanded obscenely; the suitcase became a closet.
Giulianotti approached the operating table. Rows of gleaming
scalpels, forceps, and sponges were arrayed on a tray—an arrangement familiar to anyone who watches medical dramas. But,
at the moment when a typical surgeon would extend his hand for a
scalpel, Giulianotti went into a corner, where there was a gray
console that reminded me of a hulking computer from the nineties. He
slid off his hospital shoes—green
Crocs—and placed his stockinged
feet on the pedals and his hands on the joysticks. He sank his face
deep into the stereoscopic viewer. A nurse rolled a cart with four
praying-mantis-like arms toward the patient’s exposed belly and
connected them to the cannulas. The machine whirred as it gently
adjusted its height, calculating a position that would allow its arms
to move optimally inside the woman’s abdomen. Giulianotti asked for
forceps, a hook, and a grasper, and the nurses attached them to the
robot’s appendages. At seven-thirty-seven, the da Vinci inserted the
instruments into the woman’s body, and they instantly appeared on
the monitor. It was time to begin cutting.
In the nineteen-nineties, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, the military organization that first developed the Internet,
attempted to design a robotic-surgery device. The goal was for a
doctor to sit securely behind enemy lines and remotely repair
soldiers’ wounds on the battlefield. The project, which was based at
the Stanford Research Institute International, was abandoned: the
bandwidth available at the time was insufficient to operate a
sensitive instrument halfway across the world without a devastating
time lag. Some innovations pioneered at Stanford did work well,
though, such as a method that offered better visualization of wounds.
In 1995, a California surgeon named Fred Moll licensed the technology,
with two colleagues, for tens of millions of dollars, and launched a
startup, Intuitive Surgical.
Moll knew that laparoscopy, for all its benefits, could exhaust and
frustrate surgeons, who often had to spend several hours manipulating
their tools through tiny holes. But, if scalpels and forceps were
attached to a remote-controlled robot, surgeons could easily go as
deep as they wanted, at any angle. Moll and his colleagues built a
device and called it the da Vinci. (Leonardo, the protean genius, had
made drawings of a humanlike robot.)
Initially, sales were slow. Hospitals were wary of the high costs of
the device, and many surgeons found it alienating. David Cassak, the
editor of the journal MedTech Strategist, explained to me,
“These are guys who like to be up to their elbows in gore.” He added
that, when the da Vinci was new, “many really didn’t want to entertain
the idea there was some machine out there that could replace them.”
Moll began promoting the da Vinci for heart-bypass surgery, a
gruelling operation for which no minimally invasive procedure was
generally available—the patient’s
ribs had to be cracked open. This turned out to be a strategic
mistake. According to the company, one problem the researchers faced
was that a patient undergoing a bypass can’t survive for very long on
a mechanical heart pump: surgeons must race the clock. The procedure
was too stressful for use as an introduction to the da Vinci.
One day in 2000, a German urologist named Jochen Binder decided to use
a da Vinci to remove a prostate gland. He was impressed with the
freedom of movement and the 3-D view offered by the da Vinci, and felt
that robotic appendages, with their accuracy and strength, were
especially well suited to the narrow space where the gland is tucked
away. In laparoscopic prostate surgery, suturing was almost
impossible—it was, as a medical
executive explained to me, “like two chopsticks trying to tie a knot.”
The da Vinci completed the sutures with ease. Quickly, a majority of
urologists adopted the robotic approach. Intuitive Surgical executives
now like to joke, “We aimed for the heart and hit the prostate.”
(Around this time, Moll left the company.)
The company, like any West Coast startup, was consumed with making its
platform ubiquitous: if it could get enough of its machines into
hospitals, it would be hard for anyone to get them out. The sales
force worked to create excitement not just among surgeons but also
among potential patients, tapping into the futuristic appeal of
robots. Da Vinci simulators were set up in malls. In radio ads,
hospitals that owned da Vincis boasted about having the latest
technology, using talking points that Intuitive Surgical had provided
for them.
Many surgeons clearly preferred using the da Vinci for certain
procedures, but were they sending patients home sooner and in better
shape? The Food and Drug Administration hadn’t forced Intuitive
Surgical to offer proof. The agency divides medical-device
applications into various categories. The manufacturer of a product
that employs new technology is required to demonstrate that it works
and is safe. In other cases, companies need only show that their
devices are substantially similar to products already in the
marketplace. The F.D.A. judged the da Vinci to be a variant of
laparoscopic surgery, and cleared it for sale.
Intuitive Surgical, in its early push for profit, developed a
reputation for some sloppy practices. The training that surgeons were
offered on the da Vinci often lasted only a day. In 2013, the F.D.A.
sent the company a warning letter, accusing it of failing to keep the
agency informed about updates to the da Vinci’s operating
instructions, on matters such as the proper cleaning of instruments.
Two years later, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists declared that “the rapid adoption of robotic technology
for gynecologic surgery is not supported by high-quality patient
outcomes, safety, or cost data.” At about the same time, shareholders
began filing lawsuits alleging that, among other things, Intuitive
Surgical had made false statements about the da Vinci’s capabilities.
Two of the cases were eventually settled, for fifty-five million
dollars. Other lawsuits were filed by patients who said they had been
harmed during surgery involving a da Vinci. A urologist, who caused a
tear in the rectal wall of an obese patient while performing robotic
prostate surgery, claimed that the company hadn’t warned him that the
operation was not suited to seriously overweight patients. (Intuitive
denied this, but settled the case.) Documents filed in that lawsuit
revealed that sales representatives at Intuitive Surgical had
pressured doctors to increase the number of procedures they performed
with the da Vinci, so that the company’s numbers would be more
impressive.
In 2014, Intuitive Surgical paid for an ad that featured a photograph
of Giulianotti and other white-coated employees at the University of
Illinois medical center. “We believe in da Vinci Surgery because our
patients benefit,” the copy said. A blogger
criticized the school
for endorsing a commercial product, and noted that one person in the
picture was neither a doctor nor a nurse but an administrator. The
company had not compensated the medical team for the endorsement, but
over the years it has given two hundred thousand dollars to help fund
annual conventions for the Clinical Robotic Surgery Association, of
which Giulianotti is a founding member. Giulianotti pointed out that
the money was not paid to him personally, and he does not regret the
ad, explaining that its purpose was to advertise for patients. “I am
totally independent,” he said.
Makary, of Johns Hopkins, told me that in recent years Intuitive
Surgical has “cleaned up its act,” and, among other reforms, now
provides more extensive training to doctors. But its mistakes have
contributed to the surgical community’s skepticism about robotic
surgery. Phil Phillips, a former deputy director at the F.D.A., who
played a major role in clearing the robot for use, told me, “I think
the da Vinci was probably a lightning rod because its manufacturer
cast it as a revolutionary device.” Giulianotti told me that most
general surgeons still oppose robotic procedures. “Ask any of the
presidents of the American College of Surgeons,” he said. “They’re
basically all against it.” (A spokesman for the group said that it has
no official position on robotic surgery.)
Even though Intuitive Surgical is controversial in the medical
community, it has had the robotics field to itself, and has an
excellent business plan. Currently, there are nearly five thousand da
Vincis around the world. Servicing one of the robots can cost up to
two hundred thousand dollars a year. From the end of the month in
which Intuitive Surgical first went public, in 2000, to the end of
last month, the company’s stock price increased more than eight
thousand per cent—almost
twenty-six per cent, on average, per year. During the same period, the
Nasdaq went up less than five per cent a year. Some analysts call
Intuitive Surgical the “Apple of the med-tech sector.”
Once the da Vinci had inserted its 3-D camera inside the patient with
a tumor on her pancreas, everyone turned their eyes to a flat-panel
screen. Monitors had been installed around the operating room, as in a
sports bar. The da Vinci’s three arms were loaded and ready to go: one
held a grasper, the second held a hook, and the third held forceps.
Giulianotti moved the grasper to lift the stomach wall and hold it
immobile. He then used the forceps to push tissue out of the way as he
hooked a ligament and severed it. If you were watching the
patient—nobody was—you saw the arms of the robot steadily moving in and out through the
tiny incisions in the woman’s body. On the screen, things looked more
frenetic. The robotic arms seemed to prod and grab at the tissue like
a pack of predatory animals, giving the disquieting impression that
they were feasting on a carcass.
Medical residents watched from the perimeter. As a playlist of Bach
partitas played in the background, Giulianotti kept up a running
commentary, which was transmitted via a sound system. He pointed out
anatomical landmarks—the liver,
the transverse colon—and
described how he was using each instrument.
The pleasure that he took in his work was evident. “Through the
navigation with the robot, you will see beautiful images,”
Giulianotti had promised me. “You are moving around like you are
dancing, avoiding major blood vessels and organs.” Now, after making a
deft cut, he told his audience, “Michelangelo said the art is already
inside the marble block.” As Giulianotti made his way toward
the pancreas, he occasionally paused to exult in how little blood had
been lost: “Only fifty or sixty millilitres!” He added, “That’s less
than a glass of wine.”
He asked a nurse to replace the forceps with a tool called a vessel
sealer, a device that emits electromagnetic waves in order to cut off
blood flow, usually within seconds. It also contains a blade, for
cutting blood vessels. Once the sealer had been attached, he went back
to work. He came to the tail of the pancreas, where it joins the
spleen, and cut the colon away from the left kidney. The 3-D camera
revealed that smoke was curling inside the patient’s closed abdomen.
At last, the tumor—yellow-red and
bulging—was at the center of the
console screen. Giulianotti did not like the look of it. It seemed
“hypervascularized,” and he suspected that it was cancerous. To test
this theory, an anesthesiologist injected a green dye that moved
through the patient’s bloodstream. Giulianotti switched the camera
probe to infrared mode and, using the foot pedals, activated a laser
on the da Vinci. The tumor pulsed green. This meant that it was
sucking up blood, which suggested that it might indeed be malignant.
Giulianotti stood up and announced that “this operation has become a
cancer operation.” According to standard surgical protocol, the
woman’s spleen would have to come out, after all, because of the risk
of leaving cancerous lymph nodes behind. “Let’s complete the job,” he
said. He went back to the console, and the robot began methodically
cutting the blood vessels that bonded the stomach to the spleen.
Throughout the operation, the da Vinci displayed morsels of digital
intelligence. Whenever Giulianotti wanted to cut something, the robot
first measured the tissue’s impedance—or resistance to an electrical current—and, thus, the extent to which blood had been stanched. If the da
Vinci judged that it was O.K. to proceed, it gave an encouraging beep.
The robot had a stapler, but it would not use it if the tissue that it
was supposed to tack down was too thick. (It reminded me of a remark
that Moll, Intuitive Surgical’s co-founder, had
made to the Times, in 2008. He said that a key
function of robots in an operating room was to constrain bad surgeons:
“Robots are good at going where they are supposed to, remembering
where they are and stopping when required.”)
At eight-forty-five, the tumor paled, its blood supply having been cut
off. Giulianotti cut loose a section of the pancreas near the tumor
and then separated the spleen, and its suspect lymph nodes, from the
stomach wall. If there had been no evidence of cancer, Giulianotti
could have chopped up the tumor and brought it out through the
existing tiny holes in the patient’s belly. But this was impossible
where there was a risk of malignant cells spreading, so a nurse sent a
specimen bag through the cannula. Giulianotti used his robotic
grasper to put the loose organ and the tumor inside the bag.
The elegance that Giulianotti so prized had evaporated. He got up
from his seat and went over to the operating table. The chief resident
made a three-inch incision in the patient’s abdomen. Giulianotti put
a laparoscopic camera through one of the cannulas and, while watching
the screen, used forceps to push the bag toward the incision. He then
squeezed the contents until they fit through the slit.
At 9:42 A.M., he pulled out the bag with the severed spleen
and the tumor. The specimen emerged through the incision with a plop.
Giulianotti looked up like a boy with mixed feelings about having
caught a fish. “We lost more blood from this stupid maneuver than from
the entire robotic operation,” he groused. But there was compensation.
“We finished before the Bach partitas did,” he noted.
Afterward, Giulianotti and I went to a small room outside the O.R.,
where various physicians were typing into terminals. He said, “Some
people—even my colleagues—when speaking about the robot they are saying, ‘Oh, it’s a better
tool.’ No. It’s not a better tool! It’s a complete”—he searched for the end of the thought—“philosophical concept. We are for the first time in the history of
humanity using a world that doesn’t exist—virtuality—to be able
to change reality.”
Later that day, we went across the street, where the university is
building a new robotic-surgery center. (The most generous private
donor is a satisfied former patient of Giulianotti’s.) The new lab,
which is set to open next year, will be underground, and when
Giulianotti first saw the bunkerlike space he found it too gloomy. So
he lifted the audacious concept behind
I. M. Pei’s addition to the Louvre, and added skylights, in the shape of glass
pyramids, to various courtyards. Giulianotti told me that he had
originally come to Chicago for a one-year sabbatical but had grown to
like the city. “It is one of only three American cities acceptable to
Europeans,” he declared.
To get to the new lab, Giulianotti took me beneath the university’s
neuropsychiatric institute, whizzing past an “Authorized Personnel
Only” sign. He has the mind-set, common to many surgeons, that he can
do pretty much whatever he wants. At one point, when a publicist from
the hospital told him that she was obligated to be at his side
whenever I was present, he refused, informing her that he didn’t live
in the Soviet Union.
Arriving at the new lab space, most of which was still under
construction, Giulianotti showed me where seminar rooms and training
facilities would go. He was particularly eager to try out an operation
on patients who suffered from gastric reflux; if the technique worked
as well as he hoped, the patients might emerge fully cured—and could stop taking medication like Prilosec. He swore me to
secrecy on the new procedure, saying, “If they knew that I’m working
on this project they could kill me, because I’m touching a business of
billions around the world.”
We walked over to another empty space. This was where he planned to
build a remote “cockpit” for surgeries in which the patient was not in
the same room. It was the original DARPA project, reborn. “I
think with 5G coming we can do it,” Giulianotti said. He will have to
work quickly: a Boston-area company called Vicarious Surgical, which
is partly funded by Bill Gates, is also working on a robot that a
surgeon will be able to operate from a remote distance.
Even though competitors like Vicarious Surgical are beginning to
emerge, Intuitive Surgical retains an overwhelming market share, and,
with five billion dollars in cash reserves, it can afford to invest
heavily in R. & D. An important next step for the company will
be upgrading the da Vinci. With its cautionary beeps, the robot is
more than a tool, but it is hardly as autonomous as, say, a
self-driving car. It marshals no personal data about the patient or
the population that has the same conditions; it does not make
assessments by weighing genetic information or by aggregating data
from similar procedures. During an operation, a da Vinci offers a
surgeon only rudimentary guidance. If its software were a chess
program, all it would do is keep you from accidentally sacrificing
your queen on the next move.
Giulianotti told me that a more advanced robot could have assessed
the tumor he saw that morning better in situ than he could: “I’m
pretty sure that the computer would be able to recognize—based on the pattern of blood flow and the tissue itself, and based
on billions of people—what is the
best decision: ‘You can save the spleen,’ or ‘It’s better to remove
the spleen.’ ” Later, I learned that the patient’s tumor was not
actually malignant; she could have kept her spleen.
A company called Digital Surgery is trying to smarten robots by
feeding visual data sets of surgical procedures into
artificial-intelligence algorithms. The company already markets an app
that trains doctors through simulated surgery, and it is essentially
applying the same technique to training robots. The company’s founder,
a surgeon named Jean Nehme, told me, “We’re not anywhere near playing
grand-master chess. But the computers are at the level of a
medical-school student. Our algorithms recognize and understand where
a surgeon is in a procedure.”
Fred Moll, the Intuitive Surgical co-founder, is eager to see robotic
medical devices incorporate artificial intelligence, but he argues
that there are some decisions a computer simply can’t make. He asked
me to imagine a surgeon removing a tumor from a patient’s brain. Too
much cutting could lead to a loss of function, such as aphasia; too
little cutting could leave the patient open to a possibly fatal
outcome. The patient, meanwhile, is awake on the operating table,
providing the surgeon with second-by-second feedback. “You’re trying
to make a judgment about how much should I take, and there’s patient
interaction,” Moll said. “When do you stop? There’s a component that’s
going to be hard to displace onto a robot.”
Intuitive Surgical tends to point to the F.D.A. as the reason that
complex artificial intelligence hasn’t yet made it into the operating
room. Last year, Myriam Curet, the company’s chief medical officer,
spoke to the Robot Report, a Web site, and said, “I
actually think the technology to create an autonomous robot will
actually be easy to solve. . . . The problem will be the regulatory
environment.” Consumer fears will also have to be overcome. Gary
Guthart, the C.E.O. of Intuitive Surgical, reminded me that human
pilots still take off and land commercial planes, even though they
don’t have to do so. He said, “Flight-wise, I think most folks, while
they accept that there’s a fair amount of automation, they
want the pilot in there. They want Sully Sullenberger.”He was
careful not to promise too much autonomy for the da Vinci too
soon.“When the computer makes a recommendation, it better be right,”
he said. For the moment, Intuitive Surgical seems focussed more on
making humans as good as robots than on the reverse. Intuitive’s main
automation goal, Curet explained, is to dampen the variability of a
human surgeon’s performance—“ ‘My
child was throwing up, so therefore I’m tired today, and therefore my
hands are not as steady as they were yesterday.’ ”
Some of Intuitive’s key patents related to the da Vinci have expired
or will do so soon, and later this month the company will get a
glimpse of its first significant competitor: a surgical robot made by
Medtronic, the medical-products behemoth. Its device is tentatively
being called the Einstein. (Giulianotti noted, mockingly, “Da Vinci
was a genius, and they need another genius, so—Einstein!”) According to an industry executive who has seen
photographs of the device, it doesn’t seem very different from the da
Vinci. “There are only so many ways to build a robot,” the executive
told me. The Einstein poses a threat mainly because Medtronic can use
its market power to sell the device along with other products. The
University of Illinois, despite its long-standing relationship with
Intuitive Surgical, recently signed a million-dollar deal to test
Medtronic robots in the new underground lab.
Another threat comes from Johnson & Johnson, which now has a
robotics division headed by none other than Fred Moll. This time, Moll
says, his goal isn’t to produce a huge robot for an operating room;
instead, he plans to manufacture a more portable multipurpose device
that can be deployed throughout a hospital, assisting on everything
from colonoscopies to heart surgeries.
Scott Huennekens, who until recently ran a joint venture between
Google and Johnson & Johnson, spoke to me about how the practice
of surgery might be transformed in the next few decades. Once robotic
devices become commonplace and reliable, surgery will no longer have
to take place at a hospital, which means that far more people will
have access to it—especially
those in remote or impoverished areas. There will be dozens of kinds
of surgical robots, and many will tackle specific jobs, from suturing
in the abdomen to setting a broken leg. The over-all surgical plan
will be generated by a computer, crunching data from the patients’
tests and previous similar surgeries. An A.I. algorithm will recommend
a treatment regimen. Humans will oversee but not perform the actual
operating. The only person who will be nostalgic for today’s clumsy
methods is the kind of surgeon who is driven by the visceral thrill of
immersing his hands in flesh. A data-driven, robotic surgical protocol
will not only be more democratic, Huennekens promised; it will “result
in better outcomes, faster recoveries, and lower costs.”
I got a sense of how far we are from this vision when I watched
Giulianotti remove a woman’s gallbladder, a few hours after he’d
finished the operation on the pancreas. He had lunched,
reluctantly, on some woeful pizza in the medical center’s student
cafeteria. During the meal, he gave me some culinary advice: “Never
eat at a so-called Italian restaurant where there is Caesar salad on
the menu. What is this, Caesar salad?” Then he went up to the
designated operating room, and waited impatiently for his turn at
bat—some urologists were taking
forever to complete a robotic prostatectomy.
By two-forty-five, he was back in scrubs. For this patient, he was
using Intuitive Surgical’s newest model robot, the da Vinci S.P. (The
initials stand for “Single Portal.”) The robot has a solitary
appendage: a metal tube that contains within it four little arms ready
to spring out, like the tools in a Swiss Army knife. The operating
team attaches to the arms all the necessary devices, from hooks to
forceps. The patient ends up with only one visible incision. Earlier
this year, the University of Illinois at Chicago sent out a press
release boasting that it owned the only S.P. in the city.
The university’s internal review board had approved the gallbladder
procedure, even though the F.D.A. has not yet officially cleared it
for the S.P. According to Giulianotti’s estimate, only about fifty
such operations have been performed. When I walked into the operating
room, the patient was inert; incisions had been made around her belly
button, and a flap of skin rested on her stomach like a tube of
toothpaste that had been flipped open.
Giulianotti went over to his corner. The operation was not
demanding—he had done it about
five hundred times with the old, four-portal da Vinci. The probe,
which resembled a metal straw, slid smoothly past the liver; once it
was inside the abdomen, four tiny, jointed arms emerged from the tube.
One held the camera; a second, deploying a grasper, pulled back the
neck of the gallbladder; the remaining two moved to clip and cut an
artery that connects to the organ. Because the da Vinci S.P.’s purpose
is to function in even narrower surgical fields than the standard
model, it has special icons on the console that help the user keep
track of where the three tools and the probe are at all times. If
robotic surgery is dancing, the icons help keep you from stepping on
your partner’s toes.
Giulianotti quickly ran into trouble. In order to create a device
that could fit through one small incision, Intuitive Surgical had
designed more delicate tools. Giulianotti’s grasper lost its grip on
the gallbladder, and the organ flopped back down, blocking the
camera’s view. Giulianotti froze. I could sense his frustration both
in his taut shoulders and on the screen. As I watched the grasper
repeatedly fail to hit its target, I understood how much of an
interloper the surgical tools were in the slippery confines of the
body, and how much harm they could do if the surgeon got even
slightly discombobulated. The patient’s liver hovered, like a piñata,
just millimetres away.
Eventually, Giulianotti retracted all the tools, so that he could see
the larger area more clearly. The grasper successfully latched on to
the gallbladder’s neck, and the rest of the operation went smoothly.
Once the gallbladder was free, Giulianotti used the grasper to bring
it near the surface; the assistant surgeon then used forceps to pull
it out of the patient’s belly button.
“It was difficult,” Giulianotti told me, outside the operating room.
“We are still working on the procedure, what we can do better.” He
assured me, with a touch of wounded pride, that “with the multi-probe
it would have been a piece of cake.” A staffer on the hospital’s
internal review board asked him if there had been “any issues.”
Giulianotti curtly reported that the beginning of the procedure had
been a struggle. But, after he’d walked down the hall and thrown his
used scrubs into a compactor, his enthusiasm resurfaced. Because the
incision had been made in the belly button, he noted, “the patient
will have no visible scar at all!” If a laparoscopic operation had
been done with only one incision, he told me, it would have been much
more risky. “And by the way,” he said, “she’s going home in two
hours.” ♦
How a Vermont social network became a model for online communities
✾ theverge.com✾
Thursday 24 January 2019✾
Andrew Liptak✾ 24 minute read✾
On August 29th, 2011, Tropical Storm Irene passed over Vermont, the first such
storm to hit the state since 1938. Almost every river and stream in
the state flooded. When the water receded, four people were dead and
numerous towns faced a massive cleanup, with nearly $700 million
dollars worth of damage across the state.
One of the affected towns was my hometown, Moretown. Nestled on the
edge of the Green Mountains, it’s the classic definition of small
town: no stoplight, a combined general store and gas station, a tiny
library, and a single elementary school, all serving a population of
just under 2,000. When Irene passed overhead, the floodwaters topped
the banks of the Mad River, and flooded more than
60 private homes and public offices, including the post office,
fire department, elementary school, and town offices. Moretown isn’t a
place with significant emergency-response resources, but the residents
did have their neighbors—and a
new online message board called Front Porch Forum.
In the aftermath of Irene, the residents of Moretown used this online
community to coordinate meals for those left without a home, request
assistance with the cleanup, or offer help with preserving family
pictures. The town government had never set up an official online
presence, so it began using the forum, too, posting official updates
and keeping everyone apprised of developments in the cleanup.
Front Porch Forum had come to Moretown just months before, but the
site had spread throughout much of the state, town by town, since it
was founded in 2000 in Burlington. The site looks like a relic from
another era; its website is clean and minimal, without the pictures,
reaction buttons or comment fields that most social platforms have
implemented today. Users register using their real name and address,
and gain access to the forum for their town or neighborhood. This
network of 185 forums covers each town in Vermont, as well as a
handful in neighboring New York and New Hampshire. While most towns
possess their own forum, the more populated areas of the state, such
as the cities of Burlington and Montpelier, are split up into more
manageable districts. During normal times, people might use it to
alert their neighbors about everything from
runaway Roombas
to notices about garage sales or public meetings. But in a pinch, it
proved essential when it came to coordinating disaster relief.
Meg Allison, the librarian for Moretown’s elementary school, recalls
how quickly the town mobilized in the aftermath of Irene. Over the
course of the summer of 2011, people “were slowly gathering momentum
and using [Front Porch Forum],” she explained, and “suddenly, it
became the go-to place for sharing flood and FEMA information.” The
town board even began to print out the day’s digest of postings,
pinning them to the front door of the town hall. “It became the way
the town communicated,” Allison recalled. Town residents pitched in to
help those who lost their homes: they cooked meals and offered help.
Allison, whose own home was out of danger from the floodwaters,
offered up her own expertise, helping her less fortunate neighbors
preserve water-damaged family pictures.
Allison says that her tiny town was prepared for the disaster in part
because its residents had been using the forum for months, and in that
time, it had helped to build and reinforce their relationships with
their neighbors. As a result, when the storm hit, Moretown had a new
tool at its disposal: those pre-existing relationships that had been
strengthened by the multitude of tiny interactions facilitated through
the forum. Towns that lacked the forum certainly had resources and
their shares of neighborly connections that helped them, but the forum
helped provide a durable piece of infrastructure to encourage these
relationships in the preceding months.
Front Porch Forum is similar to a Listserv: networks that were
commonplace on the internet by 2000 but waned as modern social
networks arose, their roles absorbed by sleeker, multibillion-dollar
platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and others. Yet despite the
competition from those larger sites, Front Porch Forum has not only
persisted, it’s thrived in Vermont. Since its founding in 2000, it
boasts nearly 160,000 members, or just under a quarter of the
population of the state.
Bringing people together, and forming communities—this is, of course, the stuff of Facebook mission statements, and a
mantra that’s been so often repeated in a year of scandals and
outcries over the prevalence of toxic behavior and the glacially slow
pace when it comes to addressing it. The broad social media industry
has been forced to contend with the desire to allow for a great
latitude of freedom for its users and the inventiveness of bad actors
that seek to manipulate social media for their own ends. While sites
like Twitter and Facebook have found that they need to introduce new
features, fact-checkers, and tighten up their rules around bad
behavior, they have a long way to go to regain user trust. It’s in
this environment that Front Porch Forum has been operating, doing all
of the things that its bigger rivals say that they want to do: bring
people together and provide a safe environment online.
Michael Wood-Lewis and his wife Valerie got the idea for Front Porch
Forum in 2000, shortly after they moved to Burlington from Washington,
DC in 1998. Michael had just left a job at a business-to-business
startup and was looking for a new project.
It was a challenging time for the family. Their son, Benjamin,
developed cerebral palsy shortly after he was adopted, and as
newcomers to Burlington, they struggled to meet their neighbors.
“Almost all families go through periods of great need,” Michael told
The Verge, “and historically, neighbors were a key part of
peoples’ support networks. Valerie and I realized that Ben’s severe
cerebral palsy would require more than we could provide on our own.”
While their neighborhood was active and outgoing, the family had
trouble breaking in. “Enter Front Porch Forum,” Michael says.
Michael came up with the framework for a Listserv he called the Five
Sisters Neighborhood Forum, and printed up a stack of fliers, which he
distributed throughout his Burlington neighborhood, inviting his
neighbors to join. Hosted through a third-party provider and armed
with an Excel spreadsheet, he designed it as a space for neighbors to
share information and updates about the area. Online communities were
beginning to change, with Listservs and online forums giving way to
the ancestors of today’s social networks. Sites like Six Degrees,
Classmates.com, or PlanetAll allowed users to create individual
profiles and connect with other people they might know—or didn’t know—online. While
Wood-Lewis’ Burlington forum didn’t allow for individual profiles, it
did tap into a similar desire: contact with one’s community and
neighbors.
Michael explained that the Five Sisters neighborhood was home to “lots
of community organizer types,” and, as a result, his list was
instantly popular, with hundreds of people signing up within a few
months. It was a remarkable response, Michael says, because it came at
a time “when it wasn’t even guaranteed that people even had internet
in their homes.” Over the next six years, he operated it on the side,
and people used the list to do everything from solicit recommendations
for local plumbers or carpenters, let their neighbors know about that
wandering skunk, or opine on local issues.
By 2006, Wood-Lewis left his job as an executive director of an
environmental nonprofit and began to think seriously about how to turn
his side project into a viable business that he could scale beyond the
Burlington area. He and his wife pulled some of their savings together
to hire engineer Rob Maurizi to design and relaunch the site, turning
an e-mail-based list into a platform of its own. This new online
network now covered all of Burlington, Vermont’s largest city. “If
what’s happening in the Five Sisters can happen in the rest of
Burlington or Chittenden County,” Wood-Lewis recalled, “there’s got to
be a business in there somewhere, and a social impact.”
For years, Wood-Lewis manually compiled each day’s submitted posts
into a digest that he would then send out to the list each evening.
When Maurizi left the state, Wood-Lewis had to scrape together money
for an update every couple of months. “We really couldn’t add
features,” he says. “It forced me to innovate along different lines,
instead of developing new features or tweaking color schemes.” To
generate revenue, he began cold-calling local businesses to advertise
on the site. That allowed him to hire a neighbor to help moderate the
site and develop the procedures needed for handling the growing
population.
The relaunched site maintains many of the same functions as the
original Listserv. Users can now post messages directly to the site,
which their neighbors can read by logging onto their forum or
receiving the day’s postings in their inbox in a daily email digest.
Users have the option of replying directly to those messages, either
by displaying their feedback in the next day’s digest or contacting
the poster directly via e-mail. They also have the option to make
their listing viewable in neighboring towns—useful if you’re casting a wide net for recommendations or if you
have a missing pet.
Each forum also displays a list of participating public officials—everyone from mayors to state representatives to librarians to
justices of the peace—and users
can navigate through the archive of postings or a community calendar.
Unlike Facebook or Twitter, the forum doesn’t provide members with
individual profile pages or allow members to select who their friends
are. Just as you can’t choose which neighbors surround you, you’re
surrounded by your neighbors online.
An entire generation of social networks grew since the forum launched:
MySpace, Friendster, Facebook, and Twitter. Built on the ashes of the
first generation of social networks, these platforms offered people
entirely new ways to communicate with one another. Despite those
competing sites, Wood-Lewis’ project was a hit locally. “People were
telling me stories daily about how impactful it was,” Wood-Lewis
recalled.
Following the website launch in 2006, word of the network spread, and
the Wood-Lewises put their own money down to once again expand the
system to cover the entirety of Chittenden County. The demand for the
site didn’t stop there, but Wood-Lewis explains that their personal
finances constrained the site’s growth. Shortly after expanding to
Chittenden County, the town of Starksboro (located to the south in
Addison County) and Grand Isle County (containing the towns of
Alburgh, Grand Isle, Isle La Motte, North Hero, and South Hero)
approached the Wood-Lewises to join, and they came up with a
workaround: the towns would pay to sign up. “Then after that,
communities just approached us.”
He began to throw out a one-time fee as a startup cost for each town,
based on the complexity of the desired forum and the state of their
software. Residents raised the money themselves, went to businesses or
their local chamber of commerce for funds, or applied for grants to
pay the few thousand dollars that the company required.
Critically, the site’s growth was organic, growing as demand allowed.
As the site began to expand across the state, it slowly grew its team
of community moderators, who proactively skim over each post to make
sure it adheres to the site’s code of conduct. While major social
media sites like Facebook and Twitter have teams who review reported
posts, they do so in a reactive manner—users have to flag something that’s out of character. While Front
Porch Forum has developed tools to automate some of the review
processes, it’s kept its human moderators in the loop, working to make
sure that what’s being posted to the site isn’t detrimental to the
community.
Along the way, the company experienced two major boosts. The first
came in 2011 with eVermont, an initiative from the Vermont Council on
Rural Development, which had won a federal grant to expand internet
access to rural parts of the state, and Front Porch Forum was part of
the package offered to towns that applied.
But the biggest boost came in the aftermath of Irene (as well as
another major flooding event earlier that summer around Lake
Champlain), which spurred Front Porch Forum to go statewide. After the
storms, the Vermont Council on Rural Development earned a second major
federal grant to increase the resiliency of at-risk towns. Once again,
Front Porch Forum was part of the package, allowing it to expand to
the rest of the state. As of summer 2018, Wood-Lewis notes, 160,000 of
Vermont’s 260,000 households are part of the network, and of those
households, 50 percent of users post to the forum, while 79 percent
take “offline actions” due to their membership on their local forum.
“Our goal is to make Vermont resilient in the face of other coming
issues,” Wood-Lewis says. Irene was a stark reminder that a changing
climate will have an outsized impact on a tiny, less prosperous state.
While resiliency took the form of better culverts and ditches to
manage water from major storms, Front Porch Forum was pitched as a way
to make those communities more resilient by shoring up the bonds
between neighbors.
Interactions on Front Porch Forum can range from serious, to
utilitarian, to downright goofy. Earlier this year, I found a builder
to construct a set of floor-to-ceiling bookshelves in my house through
the site. One recent Burlington post asked for the whereabouts of a
household Roomba, which had been tasked with cleaning a porch, only to
escape down the street. (It was later recovered). In the lead-up to
this year’s midterm elections, my local forum lit up with neighbors
discussing their local candidates, talking about everything from their
stances on a proposed carbon tax to school spending.
Front Porch Forum isn’t designed as a virtual replacement for one’s
real-world neighborhood—it’s
meant to facilitate those everyday, in-person connections that form
the basis of a community. Wood-Lewis says the site changes people’s
perceptions of where they live, because the connections it facilitates
impart a sense that it’s “a real place of real people,” and these
interactions give its users a sense of ownership of their community.
That’s played out in countless ways over the years. Westford resident
Julia Andrews told The Verge about one notable interaction
that she had on the forum shortly after it arrived in her town in
2006. Around Thanksgiving, she said that a fellow Westford resident
posted about her experiences helping her impoverished brother track
down a turkey for their family meal. “Initially, she had a couple of
responses,” Julia said, noting that the original posting really upset
her, and prompted her to reach out. “What happened was that she and I
met at a coffee shop.”
The two had never met before, but after their meeting, they decided to
set up a food bank. Six months of planning and work later, they opened
up their food shelf in the United Church of Westford, a modest
collection of shelves that still helps the community over a decade
later. Andrews says that they use the forum to put out the call for
donations and to advertise the food bank’s hours and policies. The
forum, Andrews says, is “word of mouth on steroids,” and said that
“people just come out of the woodwork” to help stock the shelf.
Others have found the forum to be an ideal platform for contributing
to the community in other ways. Since retiring as a teacher in Barre,
Vermont in 1998, Nancy Wolfe explained that she saw a distinct lack of
hometown pride in her central Vermont city, a blue-collar town that’s
earned a reputation for crime and drugs in recent years. Several years
ago, she began a home-brewed research project into the city’s storied
history in an attempt to inject some civic pride into her neighbors.
Attempts to hold a series of talks never yielded a good turnout, but
she found that the city’s forum provided an ideal venue for her
efforts. She broke her work into small, manageable chunks, and began
posting it—a paragraph at a time,
a couple of times a week, sharing the town’s history of granite mining
and sculpting.
Politicians and city and town officials find the site useful as well.
Front Porch Forum sells an access package to politicians, allowing
them to observe the towns or counties that they represent. Burlington
Ward 6 City Councilor Karen Paul uses the forum as a way to keep her
constituents apprised of her work in city government. “When I go door
to door during campaign season, there’s no question: a lot of people
will say to me that they read my posts on Front Porch Forum,” she told
The Verge. That sentiment was echoed by Washington County
State Senator Ann Cummings, who said that it was a good way to learn
about issues that “were bubbling up in the community,” and noted that
it was another tool that she could use to stay engaged with her
constituents.
Since Front Porch Forum’s founding, other sites have popped up to
occupy a similar space in the industry, such as Nextdoor. Founded in
2011,
Nextdoor allows individuals to map out a neighborhood
and post recommendations, events, lost and found reports, and other
items of interest. But the tenor is notably different. Loud,
back-and-forth comment threads are frequently featured on platforms
like
Best of Nextdoor, but the interactions on
Front Porch Forum are typically a bit more low-key. While you still
get poorly worded responses or snarky back-and-forth discussions on
the forum that would be worthy of Best of Nextdoor, the discussion
feels less like gossip, and more service-y. This appears to be by
design; where the major social media sites prize the number of
interactions through features like post comments or reactions,
discussions on the forum move at a slower pace.
Front Porch Forum structures its conversations differently than the
likes of Facebook, Twitter, and Nextdoor, slowing the pace down to
prompt users to think a bit more about what they’re saying before
their community. There’s no news feed with rapid-fire updates to check
every couple of minutes. You can fire off an angry reply to a neighbor
over something they wrote—but it
will show up a day later on the site. Wood-Lewis said that they’ve had
more than one user write to the site directly, asking to retract a
comment written in haste. It’s harder to get in a flame war when each
exchange takes 24 hours to respond to, at least on the platform
itself.
This isn’t to say that Front Porch Forum is free from heated
discussions. While it’s easy to find
bad Nextdoor posts, Front Porch Forum has its
share of passive-aggressive and irritating users, arguing for days
over issues relevant only to a small group of people. For example, the
destruction of a home in Winooski earlier this year unleashed a
flood of now-homeless rats
into nearby properties. When someone asked about how to remove the
rats, neighbors engaged in a fierce debate over the ethics of trapping
and killing animals. In another recent posting, someone reported that
their car was smeared with dog poop after
complaining about unleashed dogs. And as this year’s midterm
elections approached, the site saw an influx of political advocacy.
But on the whole, the platform’s approach to discussions helps
maintain a largely civil discourse.
But a bigger reason for the civil tone likely comes down to the fact
that the users are all part of the same real-world community. And
unlike Facebook or Twitter, where someone without a stake in a
conversation or issue can drop in to interrupt and derail discussions,
Front Porch Forum’s requirement that someone list their address helps
to protect against outsiders from sabotaging local conversations or
spreading misinformation.
Furthermore, that team of moderators helps ensure that the site’s
guidelines are being followed. The company employs six such community
moderators across the state. Wood-Lewis explains these employees skim
the postings (he says that they don’t edit them) to make sure that
they adhere to the site’s Terms of Use, which prohibits racist or
illegal conduct or personal attacks against one another. And while the
site has the
usual prohibitions against content that is unlawful, abusive, or
pornographic, it also has some additional
clauses: users can’t use the forum “in a way counter to its
community-building mission.”
“People tend to have thick skins around topics,” Wood-Lewis explained,
“but not around people.” It’s okay to call out a bad idea, but it’s
not okay to call the person an idiot for doing so. Wood-Lewis says
that the community manager team performs a vital role for the site,
and that they go through a “months-long in-house training that covers
all aspects” of the work that they perform, and that when a
problematic post does come up, it’ll be reviewed by multiple OCM
members. When a post is flagged, it’s reviewed, and the author is
contacted. Most authors, Wood-Lewis says, aren’t mad that their post
was stopped: “Often, we are greeted with expressions of relief,” happy
that a post written in the moment was pulled back before it caused
problems. In most extreme examples, the moderators will just close an
individual’s account.
“We generally have a subjective test—no personal attacks,” says Wood-Lewis. “Critiquing the decisions of a
public official, we don’t deem that a personal attack.” He estimates
that 99 percent of all of the site’s posts make it past the
moderators, and that “the vast majority of postings are not
controversial in any way.”
Some users have complained about Front Porch Forum’s approach to
community moderation. In 2013,
one user posted a comment
about not wanting to use poison to deter wildlife in their yard,
unless they’re planning on killing “some useless right-wing radio talk
show host,” which raised several complaints from users, and resulted
in one of them being kicked off the site.
But in other places around the state, the community-oriented structure
of the forum helps set the tone for its real-world counterpart.
Monkton resident John Mejia recounted to The Verge an
instance when they posted to their local forum following the theft of
several Black Lives Matter signs from their front yard. They “got an
overwhelming amount of support directly to me initially,” Mejia says.
“I was a little disappointed that there wasn’t more response to the
forum in general.” What did end up on the forum was “a couple of posts
that were just racist, I would say, in terms of bringing up all these
well, lies, about the Black Lives Matter movement, but in general
about race and racism in the US.”
Mejia’s response was to address those statements head-on, issuing
corrections with facts, which earned another round of responses from
neighbors who “were horrified at what the other person had written.”
Mejia urged them to take their horror public on the forum. “Although I
appreciated the personal support that I was getting, it was important
for the community to see that those anti-black world views that were
expressed are not common in our area.” Mejia noted that moderators
from Front Porch Forum contacted them as this played out, saying that
they were monitoring the exchange, in case the discussion devolved.
Now that the site covers all of Vermont, the company has begun to take
tentative steps beyond the state’s borders. The site included one tiny
New Hampshire community as a result of a federal grant, and the
company has recently expanded to a handful of towns in New York’s
Washington County—Argyle,
Cambridge, White Creek, and Jackson—with the hope that they’ll continue into others as time and word of
mouth progresses. But Wood-Lewis says he doesn’t want to take over the
world: scaling up too quickly would mean outstripping their workforce.
He explains that now that they’ve gotten a handle on the site’s
growth, they’re looking to begin tackling the long list of updates
that they’ve always wanted to hit, and they recently hired their first
in-house software engineer to work on it. “We’re settling up some
deferred maintenance and software debt,” he says.
Wood-Lewis described his company’s revenue as having three components:
ad sales to local businesses—the
largest source of revenue for the site—which purchase unobtrusive blocks in the digests a few times a year;
custom subscriptions for politicians or local governmental officials
to access the forums of their constituents or jurisdictions, either to
notify them of updates or to reach constituents in multi-town
districts; and a yearly NPR-style pledge drive (that raised $150,000
this year), which is only a small percentage of their budget. “All
three of those products, interestingly enough,” he says “came about
because people knocked on our doors.” The site’s users wanted to
advertise, gain access to multiple forums, or simply give the site
money because they found it to be really useful.
While a social focus remains at the forefront of the company and its
direction, it’s still a for-profit enterprise. The company’s slow
growth came due to restraints from available resources and funding,
but that conservative handling has prompted a far more thoughtful
approach to how it serves its members. Where bigger sites have
parceled out shares of the company to multiple individuals, Front
Porch Forum remains solely in the hands of Wood-Lewis and his wife.
That arrangement allows them to exert a level of control over the
look, feel, and direction of the company and its social mission.
For now, Wood-Lewis is more interested in adding features (the company
says that it is working on a mobile app) and focusing on local
communities than in driving growth.
And if a major company like Nextdoor or Facebook came to Vermont with
an acquisition offer? “I would listen,” he says, “and it would be an
interesting conversation, but I don’t think it would happen.”